Davis v. Crow

District Court, W.D. Oklahoma·Decided October 26, 2021·No. 5:21-cv-00965·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

WILLIAM C. DAVIS, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) -vs- ) Case No. CIV-21-965-F ) SCOTT CROW, ) ) Respondent. )

ORDER Petitioner, William C. Davis, a state prisoner appearing pro se, commenced this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court referred the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Gary M. Purcell for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). After examining the § 2254 petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Magistrate Judge Purcell issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Magistrate Judge Purcell specifically concluded petitioner’s petition is an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition which the court lacks jurisdiction to address. Presently before the court is petitioner’s timely objection to the Report and Recommendation. Upon de novo review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), the court concurs with the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Purcell. Petitioner does not dispute that he previously filed a § 2254 petition challenging the same state-court convictions he is challenging in the instant § 2254 petition or that he did not seek authorization from the Tenth Circuit as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) prior to filing the instant § 2254 petition. Instead, he argues that his petition challenging the state trial court’s jurisdiction is not second or successive because (1) his jurisdictional claim was not ripe until the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued its decision in Bosse v. State, 484 P.3d 286 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021),1 recognizing that the Chickasaw Reservation still exists; and (2) a jurisdictional claim can be raised at any time and cannot be waived, barred, or forfeited. Petitioner is correct that a second or successive petition does not require the Tenth Circuit’s authorization if the claim asserted was not ripe at the time petitioner filed his first petition. See, e.g., In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a claim is not second or successive if the basis for the claim did not exist when prior proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were ongoing). However, the narrow exception to the bar on unauthorized second or successive petitions applies “‘where the factual basis for a claim does not yet exist—not where it has simply not yet been discovered—at the time of a defendant’s first motion.’” Dopp v. Martin, 750 Fed. Appx. 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2018)2 (quoting United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1059, 1068 (10th Cir. 2015)). Petitioner does not present any factual basis underlying his jurisdictional claim that did not exist at the time of his first § 2254 petition. His recent discovery of the factual basis of his claim due to the Bosse decision is not sufficient to establish that his claim was previously unripe. Dopp, 750 Fed. Appx. at 757. The fact that petitioner did not identify his jurisdictional claim when he filed his first § 2254 petition does not mean that he could not have done so. Id. The court therefore rejects petitioner’s argument that

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