Davis v. Commonwealth

38 S.E. 191, 99 Va. 838, 1901 Va. LEXIS 108
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedMarch 21, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 38 S.E. 191 (Davis v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E. 191, 99 Va. 838, 1901 Va. LEXIS 108 (Va. 1901).

Opinions

Cardwell, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

TT- A. Davis was indicted in the County Court of Fauquier county for poisoning a well. Upon this indictment he was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of four years. He thereupon applied to the Circuit Court of Fauquier county for a writ of error, which was denied, and tie ease is before us upon a writ of error awarded by this court.

The indictment charges the prisoner with poisoning the well of one Thomas Stewart, by putting therein a certain poison, known as strychnine, in order that the water so poisoned might be drunk by the said Thomas Stewart and other persons, with intent to kill and injure the said Thomas Stewart and other persons.

The prisoner demurred to the indictment on the ground that the use of the words “and other persons” was not a sufficient designation of said other persons whose names were well known at the time of the finding of the indictment.

Whether or not the County Court erred in overruling the demurrer, and in refusing to strike out the words “and other persons,” depends upon whether or not section 3997 of the Code applies to this case. That section is as follows:

“Where an intent to injure, defraud, or cheat is required to constitute an offence, it shall be sufficient, in an indictment or accusation therefor, to allege generally an intent to injure, de¡fraud, or cheat, without naming the person intended to be injured, defrauded, or cheated; and it shall be sufficient, and not be deemed a variance, if there appear to- be an intent to injure, [840]*840defraud, or cheat the United States, or any State or county, corporation, officer, or person.”

That section was first engrafted upon our system of criminal statutes as sec. 9, chap. 20, Acts of 1847-8, relating to indictments, presentments, and information, and process thereon, and has retained the same classification, and without material change’ or 'amendment, until the present time. Sec. 3997 of the Oode of 1887.

There is nothing, therefore, in the history of the section to limit it, as contended for by counsel for the prisoner, to the of-fences of forgery, cheating, and the like.

The word injured is more apposite to the offence of poisoning, or attempting to poison, than to the offence of forgery or cheating, and like offences. The County Court did not err in overruling the prisoner’s demurrer to the indictment.

After some evidence had been introduced, and it had appeared that the wife of the prisoner was, along with Thomas Stewart and others, accustomed to use and drink the water out of the well alleged to have been poisoned, the wife was introduced as a witness for the Commonwealth, whereupon the prisoner objected to the witness on the ground that the wife was not competent to testify against the prisoner, as the indictment alleged no offence against her person, and she had not been first called in his behalf. The court overruled the objection, and allowed the witness to testify, and this ruling constitutes prisoner’s second assignment of error.

Had the indictment charged the prisoner with poisoning the well in question with intent to kill and injure Ms wife, clearly she would have been a competent witness to testify on behalf of the Commonwealth against the prisoner; and since the provisions of sec. 3997 of the Code, supra, applies to the case, the same rule as to the competency of the wife to testify governs as if the indictment named her as the person, or one of the persons, intended to be killed or injured by poisoning the well.

[841]*841There is nothing in the act of March 3, 1898, Acts of 1897-8, p. 753, in conflict with this view. That act makes husband and wife competent witnesses for and against each other in civil cases, with certain exceptions, and the second section of the act provides that in criminal cases they shall be allowed to testify in behalf of each other, but neither shall be compelled to testify .against the other. If either, however, be examined in any case as a witness in behalf of the other, the one so examined shall be deemed competent to testify in such case as well against as in behalf of such other, &c.

The third section provides that neither husband nor wife shall, ■without the consent of the other, be examined in any case as to any communication made, by one to the other while married, nor ■shall either of them be permitted, without such consent, to. reveal in testimony after the marriage relation ceases any such communication made while the marriage subsisted; “provided that this exclusion shall not apply to a criminal proceeding for a ■criminal offence committed by one against the other, but as to such proceedings the existing rules of evidence shall remain unchanged.”

It is plain that it was the intention of the Legislature that the statutory restrictions upon the competency of husband and cvife to testify in behalf of or against each other, and upon the revealing in testimony by the one against the other of communication's by the one to- the other during marriage, or after the marriage relation ceases, shall not apply to proceedings for a criminal offence committed by one against the other, but as to such proceedings to leave the existing rules of evidence unchanged, i. e., .as at common law.

It having been made to appear in this case that the prisoner’s wife, in common with Thomas Stewart and others, as the prisoner knew, was accustomed to drink the water out of the well that the indictment charges him with having poisoned, the offence is as much against the person of the wife as of Thomas Stewart, and [842]*842she was a competent witness against him at common law—1 Greenleaf’s Ev., sec. 341; 1 Bish. Cr. Pr., 1151-55; Whar. Cr. Ev., 393: And, there being no abridgment -by statute of her competency in this respect, the County Court did not err in overruling the prisoner’s objection to her testifying in this case.

During the progress of the trial the attorney for the Commonwealth, in arguing before the court, upon an objection to a question propounded to a witness for the prosecution, stated in the-hearing of the jury that Judge Eicol had set aside the verdict in the former trial of this case upon a technical point, but that Judge ETicol hated to do it, to which statement the prisoner by counsel objected, and embodied the objection in a bill of exception made a part of the record.

■Such remarks by counsel in the hearing of the jury, although-thoughtlessly or unguardedly made, may well be regarded as-prejudicial to a fair and impartial trial, but, as the trial judge endeavored to remove all injury to the prisoner by the remarks of the attorney for the Commonwealth complained of, and as this cause of complaint is not likely to arise, if there be another trial in the ease, it is unnecessary for us to say more upon the-subject.

This brings us to the remaining assignment of error requiting our consideration, which is to the refusal of the County Court to award the prisoner a new trial, on the ground that the verdict is contrary to law and the evidence.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 S.E. 191, 99 Va. 838, 1901 Va. LEXIS 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-commonwealth-va-1901.