Davis v. Commonwealth

109 S.W.2d 2, 270 Ky. 53, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 19
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedOctober 5, 1937
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 109 S.W.2d 2 (Davis v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W.2d 2, 270 Ky. 53, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 19 (Ky. 1937).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Baird

Affirming.

Luther T. (Pat) Davis was convicted by a jury and adjudged guilty of voluntary manslaughter in the "Whitley circuit court. His punishment was fixed at two years in the state reformatory. He appeals.

His counsel relies solely and alone on one alleged error. In fact, he specifically waives all other error-3 that might be in the record.. He insists that the evidence *54 offered and produced by tbe Commonwealth was not adequate or sufficient to authorize, a verdict of guilty; that the court erred in refusing to direct the jury to find the defendant not guilty and that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.

At the outset, we are of the opinion that the jury was authorized by the evidence to render the verdict they did; that such a verdict, if there was any evidence at all, could not have resulted from passion or prejudice, for the jury gave the defendant the benefit of every •doubt and fixed its verdict at two years, the lowest penalty authorized under the law.

The killing of Craig Phelps was witnessed by no one except Nannie Earls, Mary Phelps, and Blain Bolton. The defendant admits that he shot and killed Phelps. Consequently, the only issue that was left for the jury was whether or not the defendant was justifiable or excusable in shooting and killing the deceased under the law of self-defense and apparent necessity. On this question the evidence is conflicting and contradictory; therefore, it was the prerogative of the jury to reconcile the contradictions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. There is a sharp conflict in the testimony of Nannie Earls and Blain Bolton in many respects; also, between Nannie Earls and the defendant, as to how the killing occurred. The jury are the sole .judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and this court has no right, there being a conflict in the testimony, to take from the jury that prerogative of passing upon the credibility of the witnesses. The jury that tried the defendant has the opportunity and the privilege of observing the witnesses when testifying, noting their deportment, interest, and bias, if any, and possessed the power only of selecting such testimony offered that they believed to be sufficient to establish the truth. In the •exercise of that right, they concluded that the defendant was not justified in shooting and killing Phelps, but did believe, however, that the killing was not premeditated, but was the result of a sudden affray or sudden heat and passion. They therefore convicted him of the lesser degree of the charge of the killing; to wit, voluntary manslaughter.

A summary of the facts produced by the record is that Craig Phelps was at the time to some extent under the influence of liquor; that he entertained an antipathy *55 or dislike for the defendant on account of the improper relations that he thought existed between the defendant and his sister, Mary Phelps; the defendant at the time being a married man. It is in evidence that on a former occasion the defendant had been assaulted by the deceased while under the influence of liquor. The circumstances and facts concerning the assault or encounter between the defendant and the deceased on another occasion were given by the witnesses to the jury without any objection on the part of the Commonwéalth, which was in the main incompetent, and which necessarily was to the advantage of the defendant. On the night of the trouble the defendant was at the home of Nannie Earls, a cousin of the deceased, as was Mary Phelps, his sister. He went to the home of his cousin in his shirt sleeves, purporting to be in search of his wife. It was in the month of August and rather warm weather. The door of the home of Nannie Earls was partly ajar. He, without asking permission or giving any notice of his coming into the house, according to the evidence of Nannie Earls, and without knocking, came into the partly opened door sideways. The defendant, at the time, was sitting on the bed on the other side of a radio that was being operated by Mary Phelps. On entering the door he said: “Has Esther been here?” “Esther” was the name of his wife. Her answer was that she had not. At the time he came in he had his hand in his shirt and his shirt was ‘ ‘ all bloused out. ’ ’ He was in his shirt sleeves. His right hand was the one he had in his shirt. She exhibited to the jury how he was carrying his hand. The next thing he said, after asking for his wife was that his wife said she was going to Tine Engle’s, her father; that he repeated the inquiry about his wife twice, looking all the time at the defendant, indicating that he was about to pull something from his bosom. She told him that his wife was not there; that she had probably “gone to her Daddy’s.” His sister, Mary Phelps, came to him at that time and had a talk with him. All the time he kept his eyes upon the defendant, who was sitting on the bed, but she never looked down at the defendant at any time; she was watching Phelps all the time; that she heard him say: “Pat, don’t you go for that pillow, I am going to kill you”.; that Pat was sitting on the bed; had a big pillow sitting up leaning against the bed. She said that was the first word that Phelps had said to Pat. He did not speak to him at any time, but Phelps was standing up by the door facing; that he had never *56 been any further in the room, just barely inside of the door. She did not see the shooting because- she was looking at Phelps. She did see Mary Phelps get up and go to him and heard her say: “Brother, don’t do that”'; .when she did that Phelps “shoved” her away with his loose hand. His right hand was at all times in his bosom. She did not see a gun at any time, but stated that he kept his hand in his bosom all'the time he was in the house; that Davis at no time said a word; that when he “shoved” his sister, Mary, out in the floor, he then lost his balance and went up against the door; that he then stepped another step forward and had his eyes in the direction of Davis. She then heard a shot, but did not know who did the shooting -at that time; that when the shot fired she was looking right in the face of Phelps. She did not know whether he was shot or whether Mary was shot; that he began sinking and fell down upon the floor; that she put some pillows and quilts under and over him. She did not state at any time who did the shooting because at the time she was looking at Phelps, but heard the shot, and, after the smoke had passed away, she found the deceased was shot and killed. This in substance was her testimony.

Blain Bolton testified that he was a farmer living a short distance from the home of Nannie Earls; that just before the shooting he met Phelps in the highway a short distance from her home and saw him when he went into the home of Nannie Earls; that he started in the door and he heard him ask about his wife; that he, at the time, was about 50 or 60 feet from him. "When he asked for his wife, his sister, Mary, grabbed him and said: “Don’t you go in there”; that at the time there was a light in the room; that Phelps was at the door, but had never gone inside. The door was halfway open. He only walked up to it. "When his sister, Mary, told him not to come in, he heard Phelps use this language: “Pat, don’t you come with nothing from under that pillow”; that he did not see Pat Davis at the time.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
109 S.W.2d 2, 270 Ky. 53, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-commonwealth-kyctapphigh-1937.