Davis v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 27, 2024
Docket1:22-cv-06656
StatusUnknown

This text of Davis v. City of New York (Davis v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. City of New York, (E.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------------X JAMES DAVIS, MEMORANDUM & Plaintiff, OPINION

-against- No. 22-CV-6656 (Gujarati, J.) CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., (Marutollo, M.J.)

Defendants. -------------------------------------------------------------------X

JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff James Davis brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, the United States Constitution, and state law, against Defendants City of New York, Detective Matthew Hutchison, Detective Edward Vasquez, Detective “Larry” Eggers, Detective “John” Whelan, Sergeant “John” McCormack, and ten John and Jane Doe detectives (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff brings claims of, inter alia, malicious prosecution, denial of due process, and municipal liability. Plaintiff requests “an order directing [that] the depositions of Defendants Hutchison and Vasquez take place before the deposition of non-party witness Jamel Black.” See Dkt. No. 39. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. I. Relevant Background1 According to Plaintiff, “[t]he thrust of [P]laintiff’s complaint is that he was wrongfully convicted in the 2004 shooting death of Blake Harper because of improprieties committed by the NYPD detectives named as defendants herein.” See Dkt. No. 39, at 3; see also Dkt. No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants “suppressed exculpatory evidence they received from

1 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the general factual and procedural background of this case. a non-party, Jamel Black, who claimed that he had witnessed the shooting incident, and had identified the shooter to NYPD detectives” as a different individual than Plaintiff. See id. On August 22, 2023, Defendants’ counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel by email to “schedule a deposition with Jamel Black.” See Dkt. No. 39 at 4; see Dkt. No. 39-2 at 3. In that

same email, Defendants’ counsel asked Plaintiff’s counsel about their availability for Mr. Black’s deposition “for the last two weeks of September” 2023. See id. On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel responded, via email, to Defendants’ counsel and stated that they “will confer and get back to [Defendants’ counsel].” Dkt. No. 39-2 at 2. In that same email, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Defendants’ counsel the following: “[o]n Jamel Black’s deposition, can you propose some dates for the first two weeks of October?” Id. at 2. On August 29, 2023, Defendants’ counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel back, stating that they were “pretty flexible in those first two weeks [of October 2023] – any dates that do not work for you?” Id. Defendants’ counsel added, “[t]hinking ahead on coordinating with Attica,” presumably because Mr. Black was in custody at the Attica Correctional Facility and the attorneys

would need to travel to the facility for Mr. Black’s deposition.2 On September 5, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel advised Defendants’ counsel, via email, that they would “prefer” to schedule Mr. Black’s deposition after they received the records that they had requested from the Kings County District Attorney’s Office (“KCDAO”). See Dkt. No. 39-2. Plaintiff received the KCDAO records on or about November 24, 2023. See Dkt. No. 39, at 4 (“On or about November 24, 2023, defendants received the aforesaid documents from KCDAO and immediately provided them to plaintiff”).

2 Upon information and belief, Mr. Black is currently in the custody of the Attica Correctional Facility. See https://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ (Last visited January 27, 2024). On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel noticed the depositions of Defendants Hutchison and Vasquez. See Dkt. No. 39. On December 7, 2023, Defendants’ counsel notified Plaintiff’s counsel via email that Defendants cannot depose “Hutchison and Vasquez on the dates [Plaintiff] noticed them for.” See Dkt. No. 39-1.

The parties now dispute the order in which the depositions shall occur. On January 23, 2024, the parties filed a joint letter with the Court to address this dispute and set forth their arguments therein. See Dkt. No. 39. II. Discussion A. Legal Standard “It was once well settled that priority in depositions went to the party first serving a notice of examination, absent compelling reasons to the contrary.” Guidehouse LLP v. Shah, No. 19- CV-09470 (MKV), -- F. Supp. 3d -- , 2020 WL 13927593, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020); see Comercio e Industria Continental, S. A. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 265, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (“It is undisputed that defendant [] was the first party in this action to serve its notice to take

a deposition pursuant to Rules 26 and 30(a). Therefore, said defendant is entitled to priority of examination in accordance with the prevailing rule that, in the absence of some special and good reason, examinations should proceed in the order in which they are demanded.”). “That rule, however, was abolished in 1970 with the promulgation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d).” Guidehouse LLP, 2020 WL 13927593, at *1. Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d), “[u]nless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise for the parties’ and witnesses’ convenience and in the interests of justice[,] [] methods of discovery may be used in any sequence; and [] discovery by one party does not require any other party to delay its discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3). “[T]he advisory committee notes to the 1970 amendment, which created subdivision (d) of Rule 26, states that ‘the principal effects of [Rule 26(d)] are first, to eliminate any fixed priority in the sequence of discovery, and second, to make clear and explicit the court’s power to establish priority by an order issued in a particular case.’” Nairobi Holdings Ltd. v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., No. 02 Civ. 1230 (LMM), 2005

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4300, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) advisory committee notes); see also In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2724; 16- MD-2724, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235460, *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2022) (“The amendment was aimed at a [] deposition practice [] in which a party that noticed certain depositions before the opposing party noticed other depositions could take all of the first-noticed depositions before the other party’s later-noticed depositions.”). “District courts ‘faced with the question of priority have, in the main, concluded that the first party to serve a notice of deposition is entitled to priority of questioning at that deposition.’” Guidehouse LLP, 2020 WL 13927593, at *3 (quoting Schlein v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., No. 105-CV- 014, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189857, 2012 WL 10359554, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2012)

(collecting cases)). “While it is not mandated by law, some courts select this order of priority as a matter of fairness.” Guidehouse LLP, 2020 WL 13927593, at *3 (citation omitted). Ultimately, an order regarding the sequence of discovery is at the discretion of the trial judge. See Cruden v. Bank of New York, 957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir.1992). “[T]rial courts enjoy . . . broad discretion under Rule 26(d)(3) to control the timing and sequence of discovery.” Walls v. Diesel Auto Express, No. 23-CV-1037 (LDH) (MMH), 2023 WL 3895790, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

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