Davis Mfg. Co. v. Levin Bros.

8 F.2d 972, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3415
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedNovember 4, 1925
DocketNo. 7013
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 8 F.2d 972 (Davis Mfg. Co. v. Levin Bros.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis Mfg. Co. v. Levin Bros., 8 F.2d 972, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3415 (8th Cir. 1925).

Opinion

VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, a Minnesota corporation, is the owner of letters patent numbered 1,381,172, issued January 14, 1921. The subject of the patent is a davenport bed. The particular object of the invention is “to provide cushions for the davenport which, during the daytime or before the bed is made up, will have all the appearance of loose movable [973]*973cushions, but when the extension is drawn out they may he tilted over upon it and cooperate with the seat cushion of the davenport to form a bed.”

Appellant’s structure by day has the appearance of an ordinary davenport sofa, upon the seat of which apparently are superimposed three cushions. At night, a bed extension, or attachment, is drawn out from below upon which the pseudo top cushions are tilted over, forming, together with the seat cushions proper, the mattress upon which the bed clothing is placed. These three top cushions form what is called in the patent a “cushion section.” All are attached, a little hack from the front, to the seat cushion by a flexible fabric which acts as a hinge and forms the entire top surface of the seat cushion and likewise the upper surface of the top cushions when'tho latter are tilted over upon the extension frame for tho purpose of forming a bed. These so-called top cushions are not attached to each other, nor at the sides and back of the davenport frame, and can be turned over individually upon the bed extension frame; hut, inasmuch as all are attached by the same fabric toward tho front of the seat cushion, they cannot be removed from the davenport at any time. This method of attachment, a little back from the front edge of the davenport, is designed, as the specifications say, “to present to a person standing in front of the davenport the appearance of loose, readily removable cushions, a gap being (thus) provided between the forward edge of tho seat cushion and the movable cushions, so that a casual observer would readily assume that the upper cushions wore independent and removable instead of being attached to the seat cushion.”

Appellee’s structure in all essential features is identical with that of appellant. The davenport, by day, to the casual observer, presents the same appearance of three apparently 'movable cushions placed upon a davenport seat, with a gap at the front edge creating the illusion of removability. The three top cushions, while distinct, are joined along the entire bottom surface instead of at the front merely. They are separated at their sides, however, and present the same appearance to the casual observer standing at the front of tho davenport. This distinction between the structures in nowise involves the principle of the invention, which will be discussed later, and could be detected only by attempting to remove the cushions; in which ease the true nature of both structures would he disclosed.

The trial court sustained the patent in suit, but was of opinion that the invention was of a nature so narrow that it should be limited to the specific structure above first described and preferred in the drawings and specifications. Because of the difference above stated, and some others of an incidental nature, and entirely disconnected with the principle of the invention, that court held that the patent was not infringed. These other incidental differences in construction, to which reference has just been made, are those:

In appellee’s structure the bed extension frame may be detached to form an independent bed; and in such ease, the flexible apron element by which the top cushions are attached to the davenport proper may he released. That apron in appellee’s structure is attached to the frame of the davenport at the hack and partly along the sides by a detachable device. With this use of appellee’s structure and these differences incidental to that use, we are not concerned, because this detachable feature forms no part of the invention claimed in appellant’s patent.

It is conceded by counsel for appellant that no part of the combination presented, standing alone, is new. He agrees that this is a crowded art, and that the flexible connection functioning as a hinge is not new in this art, nor generally, and, of course, that is the primary mechanical element in this combination, upon which, with its resulting utility, the patentability of the entire device depends. If wo were to stop here, certainly the substitution of a flexible connection of fabric for a metal hinge would fall rather under the head of mechanical ingenuity than of patentable invention; but another consideration, and that not unimportant, enters into the conception of the patentee. This product is to serve a dual purpose — a sofa or davenport by day, and a bed by night. This idea, of course, was not new, but there ran with it the desire and the continuous effort to make this piece of furniture more presentable by day without the obvious intrusion of its utility at night. Such a result -would, of course, make it far more useful to the purchaser and would increase its salability. A hinge, or other mechanical device, readily disclosing its true nature, would greatly detract from its appearance; therefore the substitution of the fabric would of itself add efficiency in the sense just stated, but this was not enough. If the maker could go further and create the added illusion of cushions placed upon the permanent seat, so that the “casual observer” in the room, as the patentee says, would [974]*974readily assume that these cushions were independent and removable, instead of being attached to the seat cushions, a further disguise would be accomplished and a more artistic piece of furniture would be created; to this end the attachment was to be made a little back from the front so that the edges of the permanent seat and of the cushion section would not be drawn together, and that there might be a gap or space between them. Thus the extension cushions would have the appearance of being loose and separable; this, added to the exclusion of the metal hinge or other similar device in combination, was the feature of novelty upon which this patent was granted. In view, therefore, of the artistie effect obtained, the resulting desirability and salability achieved, the commercial value added, and the presumption attending the issue of the patent, we concur in the judgment of the trial court that the patent should be sustained.

Turning now to the remaining question, we are unable, after careful consideration, to perceive how the structure of appellee can escape the charge of infringement. Before resorting to comparison, it may be well to recall and restate some established principles in the law of patents.

The Supreme Court, in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 S. Ct. 748, 52 L. Ed. 1122, pointed out that its previous decisions are not to be construed as holding that only pioneer patents are entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents, but that the range of equivalents depends upon the decree of invention, and that infringement of a patent not primary is therefore not averted merely because defendant’s structure may be differentiated.

In National Hollow Brake-Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake-Beam Co., 106 F. 693, 45 C. C. A. 544, this court held that a patentee is protected against those who use the very device or improvement described and claimed, or colorable evasions .thereof. Further that: .

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Related

Burman v. Larkey
22 F. Supp. 633 (D. Minnesota, 1938)
Levin Bros. v. Davis Mfg. Co.
72 F.2d 163 (Eighth Circuit, 1934)
Johns-Manville Co. v. R. V. Aycock Co.
45 F.2d 817 (W.D. Missouri, 1927)

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Bluebook (online)
8 F.2d 972, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-mfg-co-v-levin-bros-ca8-1925.