Davis, Clinton Manning
This text of Davis, Clinton Manning (Davis, Clinton Manning) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
NO. WR-84,487-03
EX PARTE CLINTON MANNING DAVIS, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 22,163-A IN THE 258TH DISTRICT COURT FROM POLK COUNTY
YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion in which SLAUGHTER, J., joined. CONCURRING OPINION
In 2013, Applicant, Clinton Manning Davis, pled guilty and was convicted of
indecency with a child and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. In 2020, Applicant
filed this application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, alleging his plea
was involuntary because counsel told him he would receive a sixty-year sentence if he did
not take the State’s plea offer of fifteen years. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.
Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to further develop the
record. I agree this application should be remanded, and so I join the Court’s order doing
so. But I write separately, as I have previously, to address my thoughts concerning the
doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d
661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte consider DAVIS — 2
the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Sepeda, No. WR-92,711-01, 2021 WL 2450089 (Tex.
Crim. App. June 16, 2021) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (Yeary, J.,
concurring) (reviewing Ex parte Smith’s holding and the principles that justify a trial
court’s sua sponte authority to consider laches).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant’s
trial occurred in 2013, but this application was not filed until almost six and a half years
later. 1 In addition, the record is silent with regard to circumstances that may excuse
Applicant’s delay.
Consistent with this Court’s precedent, the trial court may, sua sponte, give
Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay. It may also give the State
and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant’s delay has
caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant’s claims. And ultimately,
the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine
of laches in its response to this Court’s remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court’s order.
FILED: September 29, 2021 DO NOT PUBLISH
1 “Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final.” Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Davis, Clinton Manning, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-clinton-manning-texcrimapp-2021.