Davis Cheng v. Department of Agriculture

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 8, 2024
DocketCH-0432-21-0254-I-2
StatusUnpublished

This text of Davis Cheng v. Department of Agriculture (Davis Cheng v. Department of Agriculture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis Cheng v. Department of Agriculture, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVIS W. CHENG, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0432-21-0254-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DATE: January 8, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jennifer Duke Isaacs , Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Bradly Siskind , Riverdale, Maryland, for the agency.

Sandy S. Francois , Kenner, Louisiana, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal from Federal service for unacceptable performance. For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to provide further analysis addressing the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

question of whether the appellant established that his whistleblowing disclosure was a contributing factor in his removal, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge examined its charge under a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the substantial evidence standard applicable to chapter 43 appeals. Petition For Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 17, 24-25. It also disagrees with the administrative judge’s conclusion that its performance standards were invalid. Id. at 7-16. ¶3 Regarding the agency’s argument concerning the standard applied by the administrative judge to his review of the agency’s charge, after reviewing the record, we are not persuaded. PFR File, Tab 1 at 24-25. The administrative judge properly cited to, and applied, the substantial evidence standard of review. Cheng v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. CH-0432-21-0254-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-5. ¶4 As to the agency’s argument regarding the validity of the performance standards applicable to the critical elements at issue, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency failed to meet its burden to prove that the standards were valid. 2 To prove that a performance standard is valid, an agency must demonstrate that the standard permits, to the maximum extent feasible, the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of objective criteria related to the job in question. Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 29 (2010). Standards must be reasonable, realistic, attainable, and clearly stated in writing. Id. Provided those requirements are met, the Board will defer to managerial discretion in determining what agency employees must do in order to perform acceptably in their positions. Id.

2 The administrative judge found that the agency failed to demonstrate that either critical element one or two was valid, and the agency does not challenge the finding as to critical element one in its petition for review. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the agency did not prove that the first critical element is valid. 3

¶5 Critical Element 2, titled “Monitors Plant and Processing Operations Results,” includes several individual requirements, and we agree with the administrative judge that those requirements were vague and did not provide the appellant with a firm benchmark toward which to direct his performance. The agency correctly points out on review that it provided evidence of weekly meetings held with the appellant during the improvement period, at which specific errors and deficiencies in his performance were noted and he was offered guidance and instruction aimed at helping him comply with applicable rules and policies. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-16; Initial Appeal File, Tab 7 at 22-28, Tab 12 at 9, 46-52. However, we agree with the administrative judge that there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that the agency informed the appellant of the performance threshold he was required to meet in order to be considered Fully Successful on Critical Element 2. In other words, although the standards and the feedback provided by the agency described how the appellant was to perform specific tasks, neither “set forth a level of performance that []he was required to meet in order to be considered acceptable.” Bronfman v. General Services Administration, 40 M.S.P.R. 184, 187 (1989), 40 M.S.P.R. 184, 187. Thus, we find that the agency did not prove by substantial evidence that the standard for Critical Element 2 was valid. ¶6 Regarding the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal defense, the administrative judge found that the appellant proved that he made a protected disclosure in April 2019 to his former supervisor that the supervisor illegally took eggs from a plant for his personal consumption. ID at 22-23; I-2 AF, Tab 36 at 4. However, the administrative judge concluded that the appellant did not prove that his disclosure was a contributing factor in his removal. ID at 23-24. In so finding, the administrative judge relied on the appellant’s failure to prove that anyone involved in the decision to remove him knew of his disclosure. ID at 24-25. ¶7 To prove that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action, the appellant need only demonstrate the fact of, or the content of, the disclosure 4

was one of the factors that tended to affect the personnel action in any way. Covington v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 5, ¶ 43. One way to establish contributing factor is the knowledge/timing test. Smith v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 19. An appellant can satisfy the test by proving that the official taking the action had actual or constructive knowledge of the disclosure, and the action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action. See id. (addressing proof of actual knowledge); Abernathy v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 37, ¶ 15 (indicating that the knowledge portion of the knowledge/timing test can be met with allegations of either actual or constructive knowledge). ¶8 To the extent that the administrative judge concluded that the appellant failed to prove contributing factor because he did not demonstrate that his supervisor as of the time of his removal, or the officials who proposed and decided his removal, were aware of his disclosure, we modify this finding. A lack of actual knowledge by a single official is not dispositive to the issue of contributing factor. Karnes v. Department of Justice, 2023 MSPB 12, ¶ 20. Nonetheless, because the appellant only claimed that his former supervisor and a coworker were aware of his disclosure, we agree that the appellant did not prove actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the deciding official; therefore, he did not satisfy the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test. I-2 AF, Tab 36 at 4-5; Karnes, 2023 MSPB 12, ¶¶ 19-20 (explaining that an appellant can prove contributing factor by showing that an individual with actual or constructive knowledge of the protected disclosure influenced an official taking a personnel action). ¶9 However, the knowledge/timing test is not the only way to prove contributing factor. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012).

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Davis Cheng v. Department of Agriculture, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-cheng-v-department-of-agriculture-mspb-2024.