Davila v. Deml

• Court: Vermont Superior Court
• Decided: July 25, 2024
• Docket: 23-cv-3062
• Status: Published

Opinion

7ermont Superior Court Filed 06/20/24 Washington Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT KY VE CIVIL DIVISION Washington Unit Case No. 23-CV-03062 65 State Street Montpelier VT 05602 802-828-2091 www.vermontjudiciary.org

Julio Davila v Nicholas Deml

Opinion and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

The uncontested summary judgment record establishes that Plaintiff JJulio Davila

absconded from furlough in Vermont, and a Commissioner's warrant for his arrest was

issued. See 28 V.S.A. § 808e(b). While at large, he picked up new charges in

Massachusetts, and was arrested and incarcerated there in part, due to the Vermont

warrant. When the Massachusetts charges were resolved in his favor, he was released

from Massachusetts custody and returned to Vermont custody. The Vermont

Department of Corrections ("DOC") stopped giving Mr. Davila credit on his Vermont

sentence when he absconded and did not resume giving him credit until he was returned

to Vermont custody. In this case, Mr. Davila claims that he is entitled to credit on his

Vermont sentence while in Massachusetts custody from the moment he was arrested in

Massachusetts. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment addressing

whether Mr. Davila is entitled to any credit against his Vermont sentence related to his

incarceration in Massachusetts.

The Court makes the following determinations.

I. Procedural Standard

Summary judgment procedure is "an integral part of the... Rules as a whole,

which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every Order Page 1 of 5 23-CV-03062 Julio Davila v Nicholas Deml action.’” Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 363 (1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence in the

record, referred to in the statements required by Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), shows that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 163 Vt. 83, 86 (1994)

(summary judgment will be granted if, after adequate time for discovery, a party fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the case on which the

party will bear the burden of proof at trial). The Court derives the undisputed facts from

the parties’ statements of fact and the supporting documents. Boulton v. CLD

Consulting Engineers, Inc., 2003 VT 72, ¶ 29, 175 Vt. 413, 427. A party opposing

summary judgment may not simply rely on allegations in the pleadings to establish a

genuine issue of material fact. Instead, it must come forward with deposition excerpts,

affidavits, or other evidence to establish such a dispute. Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621,

628 (1991). Speculation is insufficient. Palmer v. Furlan, 2019 VT 42, ¶ 10, 210 Vt. 375,

380. Where, as here, there are cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties

opposing summary judgment “are entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubts and

inferences.” Montgomery v. Devoid, 2006 VT 127, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 154, 156.

II. Analysis

Generally, inmates are entitled to sentence credit for time spent on furlough. See

28 V.S.A. § 726 (“Each day an offender is supervised in a conditional reentry program

shall be counted as one day served for the total effective sentence.”). Obviously, once an

inmate absconds, he is no longer being supervised on furlough and is not otherwise

incarcerated. Thus, when Mr. Davila absconded from furlough, the DOC stopped giving

Order Page 2 of 5 23-CV-03062 Julio Davila v Nicholas Deml him sentence credit. Mr. Davila does not object to that. He argues, instead, that, once he

was arrested in Massachusetts, the Vermont DOC was required to start giving him credit

again under both 28 V.S.A. § 808e(c) and 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c). The Court is not

persuaded.

Once Mr. Davila absconded, he was no longer being supervised on furlough for

purposes of 28 V.S.A. § 726, and the DOC properly stopped crediting him as though he

were being supervised at that point. Mr. Davila relies in the first instance on 28 V.S.A. §

808e(c), which provides: “A person for whom an arrest warrant is issued pursuant to this

section [after absconding] shall not earn credit toward service of the person’s sentence for

any days that the warrant is outstanding.” Mr. Davila contends that the warrant in his

case was no longer outstanding once he was arrested in Massachusetts. He then takes

the statute to mean that, once the warrant is no longer outstanding, no matter the

circumstances, the DOC must resume giving the inmate sentence credit.

Section 808e(c), however, does not speak affirmatively as to when sentence credit

resumes after a furloughee absconds. It merely says that there can be no credit between

when the warrant issued and when the abscondee is taken back into custody. There is no

allegation that the DOC violated § 808e(c) in that regard. Had Mr. Davila been arrested

in Vermont, then his Vermont incarceration and supervision would have resumed, and it

would be true that his right to sentence credit would have as well. But that is not what

happened in this case. Section 808e(c) merely prohibits sentence credit in certain

circumstances. Mr. Davila turns it on its head by interpreting it as an affirmative

declaration to award proactively credit in circumstances where credit would not

Order Page 3 of 5 23-CV-03062 Julio Davila v Nicholas Deml otherwise be appropriate. Nowhere does Mr. Davila claim that he was under DOC

supervision while incarcerated in Massachusetts.

Mr. Davila additionally maintains that he is entitled to credit while incarcerated

in Massachusetts under 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c). That statute provides: “If any such person is

committed to a jail or other place of detention to await transportation to the place at

which his or her sentence is to be served, his or her sentence shall commence to run from

the date on which he or she is received at the jail or the place of detention.” He claims

that when he was arrested in Massachusetts, he promptly waived extradition, and

thereafter was just waiting to be returned to Vermont. This argument completely

distorts the basic and undisputed facts of this case.

The undisputed record shows that Mr. Davila’s incarceration in Massachusetts

lasted as long as his Massachusetts charges did. He was not simply waiting to be

returned to Vermont. He was also waiting for his Massachusetts charges to be resolved

and subject to $20,000 bail in that jurisdiction. As a result, his Vermont sentence was

not the only basis for his detention in Massachusetts.

Under such circumstances, Vermont law is clear: “Where a Vermont defendant

seeks presentence credit for days spent in custody in another jurisdiction, he bears the

burden of establishing that the charge on which sentence is imposed was the sole basis of

the custody at issue.” State v. Coe, 150 Vt. 448, 452 (1988) (emphasis added). Mr. Davila

simply cannot make that showing in this case. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff were

somehow correct as to his interpretation of Section 808e(c), Coe would preclude him from

receiving credit under the circumstances of this case.

Order Page 4 of 5 23-CV-03062 Julio Davila v Nicholas Deml Ultimately, Mr. Davila has failed to prove that the DOC improperly failed to give

him sentence credit during his incarceration in Massachusetts.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Davila’s summary judgment motion is denied; the

State’s is granted.

Electronically signed on Wednesday, June 19, 2024, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).

_______________________ Timothy B. Tomasi Superior Court Judge

Order Page 5 of 5 23-CV-03062 Julio Davila v Nicholas Deml