Davies v. Lynch

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Davies v. Lynch

4 A.D.2d 1008, 167 N.Y.S.2d 849, 1957 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3958

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 15, 1957

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 4 A.D.2d 1008 (Davies v. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Davies v. Lynch, 4 A.D.2d 1008, 167 N.Y.S.2d 849, 1957 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3958 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1957).

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Opinion

Judgment and order reversed on the law, without costs of this appeal to any party, and a new trial granted. Memorandum: Upon the trial the parties stipulated that the amount of damages sustained by plaintiffs to their personal property was the sum of $4,000. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs in the sum of $2,000 and it was accepted by the trial court. It is possible that a portion of the court’s charge may have led the jury to believe that it had some discretion in the matter. The stipulation, however, constituted a judicial admission and was a substitute for evidence and did away with the need therefor. (9 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.], § 2588.) It is impossible to determine whether the jury was misled by the court’s charge or rendered a compromise verdict. In any event there was no evidence before the jury upon which to base its finding of the amount of plaintiffs’ damage. Therefore, the verdict is inexplicable on any possible hypothesis and must have been reached by some arbitrary computation. It follows that the judgment must be reversed (cf. 4 Carmody-Wait on New York Practice, p. 113). We pass upon no other question. All concur. (Appeal from a judgment of Oneida Trial Term for plaintiffs in an action for damages alleged to have resulted by reason of negligent installation of heating unit in rented property. The order denied a motion for a new trial.) Present—McCurn, P. J., Vaughan, Williams, Bastow and Goldman, JJ.

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Judgment and order reversed on the law, without costs of this appeal to any party, and a new trial granted. Memorandum: Upon the trial the parties stipulated that the amount of damages sustained by plaintiffs to their personal property was the sum of $4,000. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs in the sum of $2,000 and it was accepted by the trial court. It is possible that a portion of the court’s charge may have led the jury to believe that it had some discretion in the matter. The stipulation, however, constituted a judicial admission and was a substitute for evidence and did away with the need therefor. (9 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.], § 2588.) It is impossible to determine whether the jury was misled by the court’s charge or rendered a compromise verdict. In any event there was no evidence before the jury upon which to base its finding of the amount of plaintiffs’ damage. Therefore, the verdict is inexplicable on any possible hypothesis and must have been reached by some arbitrary computation. It follows that the judgment must be reversed (cf. 4 Carmody-Wait on New York Practice, p. 113). We pass upon no other question. All concur. (Appeal from a judgment of Oneida Trial Term for plaintiffs in an action for damages alleged to have resulted by reason of negligent installation of heating unit in rented property. The order denied a motion for a new trial.) Present—McCurn, P. J., Vaughan, Williams, Bastow and Goldman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

4 A.D.2d 1008, 167 N.Y.S.2d 849, 1957 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3958, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davies-v-lynch-nyappdiv-1957.

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