Davies v. Kelley

146 N.E. 888, 112 Ohio St. 122, 112 Ohio St. (N.S.) 122, 3 Ohio Law. Abs. 164, 1925 Ohio LEXIS 342
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 10, 1925
Docket18797
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 146 N.E. 888 (Davies v. Kelley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davies v. Kelley, 146 N.E. 888, 112 Ohio St. 122, 112 Ohio St. (N.S.) 122, 3 Ohio Law. Abs. 164, 1925 Ohio LEXIS 342 (Ohio 1925).

Opinion

Matthias, J.

The record in this case presents the question of the liability of a landlord for an *125 injury resulting from the defective condition of a stairway and porch erected and maintained for the purpose of accommodating several tenants occupying different portions of the premises.

From the undisputed facts in the record it appears that the several apartments of a 20-suite apartment building owned by Mrs. Kelley, were rented by her to various tenants without written lease, and upon an agreed rental, payable monthly; that although there was no express reservation by the landlord of control over, or responsibility for, any portion of such premises, or of the stairs or porches appurtenant thereto, it is clear that the porch and stairway in question provided a rear exit for, and was used in common by, the two tenants occupying adjoining, second floor apartments; and that neither of the tenants occupying the two apartments, for which such porch and stairway furnished the means of rear ingress and egress, had or exercised control thereover, but that during their tenancy the owner, through her janitor, who had charge of such building, did care for such stairway and porch.

The fact is undisputed that the plaintiff, then two years of age, living in one of the- first floor apartments of such building with his parents, while returning from a visit with Mrs. Weaver, a tenant of one of the two second floor apartments above referred to, fell from the porch, and sustained injuries, which evidence in the record tends to show resulted from the defective condition of the railing on such porch.

The cases heretofore reported by this court, involving the duty of a landlord to a tenant and *126 others rightfully upon leased premises, and his responsibility for failure to keep the same in proper repair, have had to do only with instances where the tenant himself had full possession and complete control over the property, as was the situation in the cases of Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St., 393, 20 Am. Rep., 767, and Shindelbeck v. Moon, 32 Ohio St., 264, 30 Am. Rep., 584, or where there was an express reservation, as in Stackhouse v. Close, 83 Ohio St., 339, 94 N. E., 746.. In none of those cases was the responsibility for the condition of a portion of leased premises used jointly by several tenants involved. As stated in the opinion in Burdick v. Cheadle, supra, at page 396:

“The duty here referred to does not arise upon the contract of lease, but is one which the law imposes upon the owners of property, and is expressed in the maxim, ‘sic utere tuo ut alimrnn non laedas.’”

And in the further discussion it is stated:

“This principle ordinarily applies only to persons in possession, and having control of the property, either as owners or tenants. But in case a landlord undertakes with his tenant to keep the premises in repair, having thus reserved the control to the extent necessary for making repairs, his duty to the public in relation to the property is not affected by the lease, and he remains responsible, under the doctrine of the above maxim, for defects arising from the want of repairs during the continuance of the lease.”

The principle applicable to all oases is stated as follows in Shindelbeck v. Moon, supra, at page 267:

*127 “Whoever had control of the premises at the time the cause of injury originated, that person is liable in damages; which simply means that the party in fault must respond.”

The rule particularly applicable to a situation such as here presented is stated in 16 Ruling Case Law, p. 1072, as follows:

“So where premises are let to several tenants, each occupying different portions, but all enjoying or using certain portions in common, such as the entrances, halls, stairways, etc., of the tenements or apartment houses, the landlord is held to be in control, and owes not only to his tenants, but to those lawfully on the premises as the servants, guests, and customers of the tenants, the duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep such parts in safe condition, and for failure to do this he is liable to such servants, guests, etc., injured in consequence of his negligence, and without fault on their part.”

The author proceeds to set forth cogent reasons for the rule stated, being in substance that when houses, which can only be reached by the use of a common passage, are rented for dwellings, the necessity of such use for the beneficial enjoyment of the thing demised establishes a right to such use, and imposes an obligation upon the landlord to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the passage safe for such use; and, further, that the duty of the landlord to all persons visiting such tenant upon lawful occasions is similar to that which he owes the tenant.

While in the case at bar it did appear that one of the tenants of the two apartments in question *128 could reach, the rear yard by going down his inside front stairway, and thence through a passageway to the rear of the apartment, yet, as heretofore stated, the kitchen door of each of the apartments opened onto this' second-floor porch reached by the rear outside stairway, and it was thereby clearly designed and maintained for use, and in fact was used, by both of said tenants. True, a mere amicable joint user, not required by the character of the premises or authorized by the landlord, would not bind him; but here a joint user was clearly contemplated by the character of construction, its design for joint user by the several tenants, and its maintenance therefor, in addition to the necessarily known manner of occupancy and use of that portion of the premises.

In a situation such as the facts here disclose it is quite apparent that neither of the tenants could have exclusive control or exclusive use and occupancy of the stairway and porch which served as a means of rear entrance and exit for both apartments, and therefore that neither would have any responsibility to keep that portion of the premises, so necessarily jointly used, in repair and in proper condition for the use of the other. The occupants of these two apartments were several and not joint tenants of the owner. The record further discloses that the defendant construed the relationship between herself and tenants served jointly by such stairway and porch, to be such that the obligation remained upon her to care for that portion of the premises, for, not only had her janitor previously cared for and made some repairs thereon during such tenancy, but in her *129 testimony she stated that she had not seen that there were any spindles ont, but “if there had been I would have given the carpenter orders to have them put back.”

Many cases could be cited supporting the text above quoted from Ruling Case Law, but we will note only those deemed especially in point. In. Looney v. McLean,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 N.E. 888, 112 Ohio St. 122, 112 Ohio St. (N.S.) 122, 3 Ohio Law. Abs. 164, 1925 Ohio LEXIS 342, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davies-v-kelley-ohio-1925.