Davies Farm, LLC v. Davies

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Davies Farm, LLC v. Davies

298 A.D.2d 353, 751 N.Y.S.2d 377, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9391

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 7, 2002

StatusPublished

This text of 298 A.D.2d 353 (Davies Farm, LLC v. Davies) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Davies Farm, LLC v. Davies, 298 A.D.2d 353, 751 N.Y.S.2d 377, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9391 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action for specific performance of an option to purchase real property, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherwood, J.), dated June 13, 2001, which granted the plaintiff’s motion, in effect, for summary judgment on their complaint, to dismiss the first and second affirmative defenses and counterclaims, and to sever the remaining counterclaims, and denied their cross motion for summary judgment on their first and second counterclaims to rescind two option agreements dated May 21, 1996, and November 26, 1996, respec[354]*354lively, and (2) a judgment of the same court, dated July 23, 2001, entered upon the order, which is in favor of the plaintiff and against them.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, the motion is denied, and the order is modified accordingly; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the appellants.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

There are issues of fact requiring the denial of summary judgment. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion and the defendants’ cross motion must be denied. O’Brien, J.P., Krausman, Townes and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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In an action for specific performance of an option to purchase real property, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherwood, J.), dated June 13, 2001, which granted the plaintiff’s motion, in effect, for summary judgment on their complaint, to dismiss the first and second affirmative defenses and counterclaims, and to sever the remaining counterclaims, and denied their cross motion for summary judgment on their first and second counterclaims to rescind two option agreements dated May 21, 1996, and November 26, 1996, respec[354]*354lively, and (2) a judgment of the same court, dated July 23, 2001, entered upon the order, which is in favor of the plaintiff and against them.