Davien Long v. County of Los Angeles

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedSeptember 3, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-04683
StatusUnknown

This text of Davien Long v. County of Los Angeles (Davien Long v. County of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davien Long v. County of Los Angeles, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 COREY CARTER (SBN 269611) CARTER LAW FIRM, APC 2 27240 Turnberry Lane, Suite 200 3 Valencia, CA 91355 Tel: (323) 825 - 5529 4 Fax: (323) 450-2222 Email: corey@themainstreetattorney.com 5 Attorney for Plaintiff

6 Tomas A. Guterres, Esq. (State Bar No. 152729) 7 Megan K. Lieber, Esq. (State Bar No. 272413) Bianca M. Bonjean, Esq. (State Bar No. 342297) 8 COLLINS + COLLINS LLP 9 790 E. Colorado Boulevard, Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 10 (626) 243-1100 – FAX (626) 243-1111 11 Email: tguterres@ccllp.law Email: mlieber@ccllp.law 12 Email: bbonjean@ccllp.law 13 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16 DAVIEN LONG, an individual Case No. 2:24-CV-04683-WLH-RAO

17 Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 18 ORDER. 1 vs. 19 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a 20 public entity, OFFICER BLAKE RUNGE, an individual, OFFICER 21 ZACHARY CORRALES, an individual, and DOES 1-10 22 23 Defendants.

25 26 27 1 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 2 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 3 proprietary or private information for which special protection from public 4 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may 5 be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to 6 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this 7 Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to 8 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends 9 only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment 10 under the applicable legal principles. 11 12 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 13 The parties contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 14 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace 15 officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for 16 the following reasons. 17 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 18 privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 19 that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective 20 procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 21 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies 23 to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege 24 law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying 25 [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 26 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based 27 “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. 1 contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten 2 the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 3 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 4 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 5 information privilege, and federal law enforcement privilege interests in the 6 personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace 7 officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, or internal 8 deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis – potentially including but not 9 limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports 10 and/or evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports. See Sanchez, 11 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 12 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. 13 City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 14 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007). Defendants further contend that such 15 personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian 16 of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is 17 likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection 18 of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law 19 enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion 20 regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public 21 entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be 22 required. 23 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same 24 rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to 25 the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 26 compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 27 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 1 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 2 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 3 impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 4 frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, 5 preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace 6 officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, 7 and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 8 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does 9 result in litigation. 10 Although Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants’ 11 contentions stated above, Plaintiffs do agree that there is good cause for a Protective 12 Order so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties. Plaintiffs recognize 13 that, absent this Stipulated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege 14 interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulated Protective Order may 15 mitigate such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk 16 that confidential information will become matters of public record. 17 The parties agree that no term or provision of this Stipulated Protective Order 18 is intended to compel or require the production of information, records, or other 19 evidence protected from disclosure under California or federal law by the attorney- 20 client privilege and/or attorney work product protection including, but not limited 21 to, any communications for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice or 22 analysis and/or any reports prepared at the direction of counsel or for the purpose of 23 obtaining or rendering legal advice. Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 24 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 Because of these sensitive interests, a Court Order should address these 26 documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. 27 /// 1 C. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER SEAL 2 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this 3 Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information 4 under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed 5 and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court 6 to file material under seal. 7 There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial 8 proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, 9 good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v.

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Davien Long v. County of Los Angeles, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davien-long-v-county-of-los-angeles-cacd-2024.