Davien Long v. County of Los Angeles

District Court, C.D. California·Decided September 3, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-04683·Unknown

Opinion

COREY CARTER (SBN 269611) CARTER LAW FIRM, APC 27240 Turnberry Lane, Suite 200 Valencia, CA 91355 Tel: (323) 825 - 5529 Fax: (323) 450-2222 Email: corey@themainstreetattorney.com Attorney for Plaintiff

Tomas A. Guterres, Esq. (State Bar No. 152729) Megan K. Lieber, Esq. (State Bar No. 272413) Bianca M. Bonjean, Esq. (State Bar No. 342297) COLLINS + COLLINS LLP 790 E. Colorado Boulevard, Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 (626) 243-1100 – FAX (626) 243-1111 Email: tguterres@ccllp.law Email: mlieber@ccllp.law Email: bbonjean@ccllp.law

DAVIEN LONG, an individual Case No. 2:24-CV-04683-WLH-RAO

Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER. 1 vs. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity, OFFICER BLAKE RUNGE, an individual, OFFICER ZACHARY CORRALES, an individual, and DOES 1-10 Defendants.

1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the following reasons. First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, and federal law enforcement privilege interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, or internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports and/or evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does result in litigation. Although Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants’ contentions stated above, Plaintiffs do agree that there is good cause for a Protective Order so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties. Plaintiffs recognize that, absent this Stipulated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulated Protective Order may mitigate such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk that confidential information will become matters of public record. The parties agree that no term or provision of this Stipulated Protective Order is intended to compel or require the production of information, records, or other evidence protected from disclosure under California or federal law by the attorney- client privilege and/or attorney work product protection including, but not limited to, any communications for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis and/or any reports prepared at the direction of counsel or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Because of these sensitive interests, a Court Order should address these documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. /// C. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER SEAL The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002); Makar-Welbon v. Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and le

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