Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 31, 2023
DocketB315222
StatusUnpublished

This text of Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2 (Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2, (Cal. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

Filed 10/31/23 Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MIKE DAVIDYAN, B315222

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. v. No. 21VECV00054)

MOHAMMAD MOAYERY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Virginia Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.

Mike Davidyan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Dennis P. Block & Associates, Dennis P. Block and Vicken Hagop Karagueuzian for Defendants and Respondents. _________________________ Appellant Mike Davidyan (Davidyan) was evicted from a property owned by respondents Mohammad Moayery (Moayery) and Parvaneh Moshir Afshar (Afshar) (collectively respondents). Two years later, Davidyan sued respondents for damages caused by mold exposure during his tenancy. The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer, finding that because Davidyan had raised the mold issue as a habitability defense in the unlawful detainer case, his claims were barred by collateral estoppel. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 I. The Unlawful Detainer Action In February 2017, Davidyan entered into a lease for a residential property owned by respondents (the property). In October 2018, Moayery sued Davidyan for unlawful detainer. Davidyan’s answer alleged that the property was not habitable due to, among other things, “fungus” in the home. Two months later, the trial court entered a judgment of possession for Moayery and awarded him nearly $20,000 in holdover damages. Davidyan appealed from the unlawful detainer judgment, arguing that the trial court ignored his testimony that the property had “fungus and mold and . . . is in not habitable [sic].” Davidyan also attached a declaration “which discussed the mold

1 Although we granted Davidyan’s motion to augment the record, the appellate record is incomplete. It contains only four documents: (1) Davidyan’s first amended complaint; (2) respondents’ demurrer to Davidyan’s original, inoperative complaint; (3) the trial court’s ruling; and (4) Davidyan’s notice of appeal. Our summary of the case is compiled from these documents.

2 and [his] health.” The appellate division of the superior court affirmed the unlawful detainer judgment.2 II. Davidyan’s Lawsuit and Appeal In May 2021, Davidyan filed a first amended complaint suing respondents for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 Both claims arose from injuries allegedly caused by mold exposure during his tenancy. Respondents demurred, arguing, among other things, that Davidyan’s claims were barred by collateral estoppel. After reviewing the available record from the unlawful detainer case, the trial court agreed and sustained respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.4 Davidyan timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review “Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard of review for ruling on a demurrer dismissal as follows: ‘On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable

2 As this document does not appear in the appellate record, we presume that the trial court’s order describing it is correct. (See Evid. Code, § 664.)

3 Davidyan’s original complaint, filed four months earlier, included several additional claims not repeated in his amended complaint.

4 Although Afshar was not a party in the unlawful detainer action, the trial court also sustained respondents’ demurrer as to her because, as Moayery’s wife and co-owner of the property, she was his privy and thus equally entitled to the protection of collateral estoppel.

3 interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]” [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.]’” (Payne v. National Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043–1044 (Payne).) “Where ‘all of the facts necessary to show that an action is barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to judicial notice, a trial court may properly sustain a general demurrer. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1076–1077.) II. Applicable Law “Collateral estoppel is one aspect of the broader doctrine of res judicata. [Citation.] ‘Where res judicata operates to prevent relitigation of a cause of action once adjudicated, collateral estoppel operates (in the second of two actions which do not involve identical causes of action) to obviate the need to relitigate issues already adjudicated in the first action. [Citation.]” (Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878.) Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, an issue cannot be relitigated if it is identical to one that was litigated and necessarily decided in a previous proceeding, and if the party seeking to relitigate the issue was either a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party. (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 895–896.)

4 III. Analysis The demurrer in this case, sustained solely on collateral estoppel grounds, was “well taken” (Payne, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1043) and thus must be affirmed. In the unlawful detainer action, Davidyan argued that the property was uninhabitable due to, among other things, significant levels of fungus and mold. He reiterated this argument in his appeal from the judgment, explicitly connecting the mold problem to health issues. In both proceedings, the presiding courts ruled against him. The unlawful detainer judgment thus resolved the issue of the property’s habitability, which is central to Davidyan’s current claims about mold exposure. Davidyan insists that the unlawful detainer judgment should not preclude this lawsuit, due to the summary nature of the unlawful detainer hearing. But while “a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect” due to the “‘summary’ . . . character” of the proceedings, the “‘full and fair’ litigation of an affirmative defense . . . if it is raised without objection, and if a fair opportunity to litigate is provided[,] will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues material to that defense.” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255, 256–257.) In this case, Davidyan twice argued—both at the unlawful detainer trial and on direct appeal—that the property was uninhabitable due to dangerous levels of mold; that argument was twice rejected. Under these circumstances, collateral estoppel attaches to the unlawful detainer judgment and bars Davidyan’s current claims. Davidyan also appears to challenge the trial court’s finding that habitability issues were fully and fairly litigated in the unlawful detainer proceedings. However, because he provides no

5 records or transcripts from the unlawful detainer trial or appeal, he has not presented an adequate record to show that these issues were not fully adjudicated therein. (In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 [“Under well-established rules of appellate procedure, . . . the appellant . . .

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Related

Vella v. Hudgins
572 P.2d 28 (California Supreme Court, 1977)
Evans v. Celotex Corp.
194 Cal. App. 3d 741 (California Court of Appeal, 1987)
Mills v. U.S. Bank
166 Cal. App. 4th 871 (California Court of Appeal, 2008)
Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland
128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (California Court of Appeal, 2002)
Payne v. NATIONAL COLLECTION SYSTEMS, INC.
111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260 (California Court of Appeal, 2001)
Habash v. L.A Pacific Center, Inc.
203 Cal. App. 4th 336 (California Court of Appeal, 2012)
Direct Shopping Network, LLC v. James
206 Cal. App. 4th 1551 (California Court of Appeal, 2012)
Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc.
233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 676 (California Court of Appeals, 5th District, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davidyan-v-moayery-ca22-calctapp-2023.