Davidson v. . Woodruff

36 N.C. 467
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJune 5, 1841
StatusPublished

This text of 36 N.C. 467 (Davidson v. . Woodruff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davidson v. . Woodruff, 36 N.C. 467 (N.C. 1841).

Opinion

Ruffin, C. J.

In 1832 the plaintiff and the defendant, Woodruff, for the accommodation of John Sloan, endorsed a note made by Sloan for the sum of $1635, which was discounted at bank for the benefit of Sloan, who received the money. When application was made to Woodruff to en. ■dorse the note, he refused; and, upon his doing so, the plaintiff, Davidson, also requested him to give his indorsement and agreed that he would guarantee the payment by Sloan, and thereupon Woodruff indorsed. Before the note fell due( Sloan became insolvent, and Woodruff paid the amount.— He then instituted his action against Davidson on, his guar *468 anty, and, in May, 1833, recovered a judgment for the prin- and interest due on the note. At that time all the par' 1 ties lived in the village of Charlotte, m Mecklenburg County; but soon afterwards Woodruff removed to New-Jersey.. — The bill was filed in December, 1836, and states, that, at the rendering of the judgment, the plaintiff was much embarrassed with debt, and had conveyed his property, which was large, to trustees to secure the payment of those debts; which circumstance prevented the plaintiff at law. Woodruff, from getting satisfaction on the executions issued on his judgment. But that, recently before the filing of the bill, Davidson had .discharged the incumbrances on his estate, and that Wood-ruff then .caused an execution to be levied and was about to sell. That, under these circumstances, he then applied to jSloan to know the state of the affair; and, for the first time learned, from Sloan, that prior to the recovery of the judgment against Davidson, namely, in April, 1833, Sloan had made payments to Woodruff, and transferred to him debts and demands against other persons to a greater value than the sum paid by Woodruff on Sloan’s note, and that those payments and transfers were made and accepted .on the express condition, that Woodruff should not proceed at law against Davidson, either as a co-surety or upon his guaranty) until he had used diligent efforts to collect the demands transferred, and had failed therein. The bill then states that, amongst the claims thus received by Woodruff, was an order drawn by Sloan on one Charles Elms for $100 in favor of Woodruff, and also the interest of said Charles Elms in the estate of one George Barnett, deceased, late of South Carolina, which interest was of the value of $2000:” That there were also many other claims, of which the said Sloan took a list or schedule, which, as Sloan informed the plaintiff, he had lost, and that therefore the plaintiff cannot specify any other of the said claims or their value. The bill then .charges, that Woodruff concealed from the plaintiff the payments and assignments aforesaid and the agreement with Sloan, with the intent to prevent him from making a defence at law; and that the plaintiff was wholly ignorant of any of those matters, until a very short time before the filing of the *469 bill; and that the plaintiff is informed by Sloan and believes, that Woodruff has either received, or might with reasonab l e diligence have received, a larger sum on the assignments from Sloan than would have satisfied his judgment. The bill, therefore, seeks a discovery of the debts assigned; what has been received on them, and the steps taken on them, and their present condition; and for an injunction and general relief.

The answer of Sloan admits all the charges of the bill. That of Woodruff admits the statements in the bill in reference to the indorsing of the note, the plaintiff’s guaranty, Sloan’s insolvency, and the taking of the judgment at law. But it denies positively and directly, that Sloan ever made any assignment or conveyance of property or securities, in satisfaction or security of the judgment or the demand on which it is founded, except an order on Elms; or that this defendant ever made any agreement with Sloan, upon that or any other consideration, not to sue the present plaintiff on his guaranty and collect the money from him. The answer admits that Sloan proposed to place in this defendant’s hands some demands, to be collected and applied to the payment of his debt, among which was one relating to the estate of one George Barnet. But this defendant denies that he knows the character or value of that claim or of any one of the others, or that he ever agreed to take them. On the contrary, the answer states, that this defendant only consented to shew them to his counsel and take his advice on them — -being willing to accept them, if worth any thing; and that he did shew them to his counsel, and was informed that they were bad andnot collectable, and was advised not to take them; and that, thereupon, this defendant desired the counsel (a gentleman of the bar, since dead) to return the papers to Sloan, and it was done. The answer admits that Sloan gave this defendant an order on C. Elms for $100, on account of this debt; but it denies that Elms paid any thing on the order, and states that he, this defendant, left it, with other papers, in this State, when he removed to New Jersey; and the answer then avers that the order on Elms was the only claim ever received from Sloan by this defendant, and denies that *470 this defendant ever concealed from the plaintiff any part of the transactions between him and Sloan.

Upon the coming- in of the answers, the court dissolved the injunbtion as to all except $100, being the amount of the order on Elms, and, as to that sum, directed the plaintiff to have credit on the judgment; to which the defendant submitted. The plaintiff then replied to the answer of Wood-ruff. and the cause stood over as upon an original bill, and, proofs having been taken, the cause was set for hearing and transferred to this cSurt.

Among the plaintiff’s proofs is the deposition of Sloan, the principal debtor, taken under an order, subject to all just exceptions. It is objected to on the part of the defendant; and the first question in the case is upon that objection. In the opinion of the court, Sloan is not a competent witness between these parties, to establish satisfaction made to his co-defendant. He could not have been a witness on the trial at law, for that purpose, because his liability to Davidson was for more than that to Woodruff. To the former he would be liable for the debt and the costs of that action paid by his surety, while to the latter he is liable for the debt only. Now, the present proceeding is but a new trial in another forum, upon the ground that the plaintiff lost his defence at law.

The other material evidence is an order of Sloan on Elms to pay Woodruff the sum of $100, and a receipt dated April, 1833, given by Woodruff to Sloan for that order, to be applied to Sloan’s note taken up by Woodruff; and the deposition of Charles Elms. It does not appear from which side the order on Elms comes: whether Elms produced it, or whether it was found among the papers of Woodruff or those of his deceased counsel. It has on it an acceptance by Elms, but no receipt from Woodruff, nor any cancellation.

The Witness Elms states, that in 1821 or 1822, or 1823, he was very largely indebted for merchandise to one Goodman of Charleston, in South Carolina, and confessed judgment thereon for upwards of thirty thousand dollars; and, by way of collateral security, assigned to the creditor bonds and notes to an amount somewhat exceeding $20,000: That Goodman collected upon the assigned elaims about the sum *471

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Bluebook (online)
36 N.C. 467, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davidson-v-woodruff-nc-1841.