Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission

702 P.2d 417, 74 Or. App. 160, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 3289
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJune 26, 1985
DocketCA A31304
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 702 P.2d 417 (Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 702 P.2d 417, 74 Or. App. 160, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 3289 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions

ROSSMAN, J.

Petitioner seeks review of an order by the Oregon Government Ethics Commission (OGEC) in a contested case under ORS 244.260(3), which determined that he had violated ORS 244.040(1) and ordered him to pay a forfeiture of $2,575. Among other contentions, petitioner asserts that the order is based on an incorrect interpretation of the statute. We disagree and affirm.

ORS 244.040(1) states:

“No public official shall use his official position or office to obtain financial gain for himself, other than official salary, honoraria or reimbursement of expenses, or for any member of his household, or for any business with which he or a member of his household is associated.”

The issue in this case is whether petitioner “use[d] his official position * * * to obtain financial gain.”

Petitioner was vice-president and actuary of the State Accident Insurance Fund (SAIF) at the time of the conduct with which he is charged. In 1982, the management of SAIF decided to buy a fleet of cars. Petitioner was a member of the senior management group which gave its blessing to the plan before it was approved by SAIF’s Board of Directors. However, he was not directly involved in choosing the dealers from whom the purchases were to be made. After bids for the cars were received, another vice-president informed petitioner during a casual conversation that the quoted prices were “extraordinarily good” and that the purchase of a fleet provided any interested individual with a good opportunity to purchase a car for his personal use as an “add-on” to the fleet purchase. Although it is not altogether clear, it appears that only a handful of employes were notified of the opportunity.

Following that conversation, petitioner asked a SAIF staff lawyer for his informal legal opinion as to whether his purchase of a car as an “add-on” would violate the Code of Ethics, ORS 244.040. Petitioner was told that it would not and thereafter ordered a vehicle from SAIF’s director of administrative services, who then relayed the order to the dealer. To take advantage of the price break, it was necessary that the car be ordered in SAIF’s name. On delivery, SAIF paid for the car and was reimbursed by petitioner. The title to the car was [163]*163originally issued to SAIF and was later transfered to petitioner. Petitioner saved almost $1,300 in comparison to the price that was available to an ordinary consumer. Add-ons were not the general rule. In fact, another vice president testified that, since he had joined SAIF in 1980, petitioner’s add-on was the only one he had ever known of.

OGEC found that petitioner’s conduct was a use of “his official position or office to obtain financial gain for himself’ proscribed by ORS 244.040(1). It argues that we should interpret broadly the term “use” to cover the situation in which a public official avails himself of an opportunity to save money presented by the fact of his employment. Petitioner contends that the statute is intended to apply to a more narrow class of situations in which a public official uses, or attempts to use, the power and influence of his office to obtain a financial gain for himself or a member of his household. We must set aside the order if we find that OGEC erroneously interpreted the law. ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A).

Petitioner and the dissent rely on Groener v. Oregon Gov’t Ethics Comm., 59 Or App 459, 651 P2d 736 (1982), to contend that the term “use,” as employed in ORS 244.040(1), means only influence peddling. In Groener, we affirmed OGEC’s order which found a violation of ORS 244.040(1). A state senator, who had received payments for consulting services from Williams, used the influence of his office to obtain business for Williams. On one occasion, the Senator stated that he knew the Governor and could use his influence to obtain a promotion for someone if that person continued to refer business to Williams. On other occasions he used the influence of his position to obtain a directorship for someone and to push through legislation in exchange for the referral of business to Williams. This court held that the evidence supported a conclusion that the Senator had used his position for financial gain. We said:

“[I]t is not necessary for a public official to identify expressly the public office he holds when attempting to influence someone, so long as that someone knows it.” 59 Or App at 471-72. (Emphasis supplied.)

Although the financial gain to the Senator was received indirectly from Williams, it was the quid pro quo for his exercise of the power and influence of his official position.

[164]*164Petitioner’s reliance on Groener is misplaced. Just because Groener involved influence peddling does not mean that influence peddling is the only type of conduct at which the statute is aimed. Three other subsections, ORS 244.040(2), (3) and (5), provide:

“(2) No public official or candidate for office or a member of his household shall solicit or receive, whether directly or indirectly, during any calendar year, any gift or gifts with an aggregate value in excess of $100 from any single source who could reasonably be known to have a legislative or administrative interest in any governmental agency in which the official has any official position or over which the official exercises any authority.
“(3) No public official shall solicit or receive, either directly or indirectly, and no person shall offer or give to any public official any pledge or promise of future employment, based on any understanding that such public official’s vote, official action or judgment would be influenced thereby.
* * * *
“(5) No person shall offer during any calendar year any gifts with an aggregate value in excess of $100 to any public official or candidate therefor or a member of his household if the person has a legislative or administrative interest in a governmental agency in which the official has any official position or over which the official exercises any authority.”

Inasmuch as these provisions expressly cover influence peddling, it seems highly unlikely that the legislature intended “use” as it is employed in ORS 244.040(1) to deal exclusively with that kind of conduct as well. More than likely, ORS 244.040

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Related

Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission
712 P.2d 87 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
702 P.2d 417, 74 Or. App. 160, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 3289, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davidson-v-oregon-government-ethics-commission-orctapp-1985.