Davidson v. Davidson

42 Ark. 362
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 15, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 42 Ark. 362 (Davidson v. Davidson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davidson v. Davidson, 42 Ark. 362 (Ark. 1883).

Opinion

Eakin, J.

The object of this suit was to effect the cancellation or reformation of a certain conveyance of lands, upon the alleged alternative grounds, that, either it was a forgery; or, if not, that there was such a mistake as to its provisions as required reformation. It was intended thereby to quiet the title of complainants to certain lands which had in his lifetime been owned by Jackson Davidson, deceased. *

Outside of the question of forgery, in case it should be established, there would arise the supervening question of adverse possession by the defendants, beyond the period of limitation. The facts are as follows :

On the fourteenth of March, 1868, Jackson Davidson, being the owner of a large body of lands, conveyed to George W. Davidson a portion of them lying contiguous to the others. The lands so conveyed were the northeast quarter of section twelve, and the east half of the southwest quarter, and the west half of the southeast quarter of section one, making a tolerably compact body of three hundred and twenty acres.

To eighty acres of this Jackson Davidson had then no title of record, to wit, the north half of the northeast quarter of section twelve. He had received a conveyance of it from two parties, Belknap and Marquis, which had been lost. After his death, however, Belknap who had acquired the title to the whole, conveyed this half quarter to Sallie E., the wife of George W. Davidson, with the latter’s consent. This deed was executed on the twenty-fourth of April, and filed for record on the twenty-fifth of June, 1877. The expressed consideration was $100. Jackson had died intestate on the nineteenth of January, 1873, leaving lands and personalty. Amongst his heirs was a brother, Matthew O. Davidson, the uncle of George W., who was the son of a deceased brother.

There were other heirs, six in all. No administration was taken upon his estate. They all agreed that Matthew 0. should take the property as his own, pay the debts, and make of it what he could, and to carry that out, intended to execute to him a deed of release of all their interests. They did so, and the controversy in this case regards that instrument. Whether the deed copied from the records and relied upon by the defendant, Price, who claims under Matthew, be the real deed of relinquishment, or whether the real one has been suppressed and this be a forgery, is the pivotal question. Complainants, G. W. and wife and grantee, contend that the real relinquishment was only general in its terms wfith re-garcl to all interests in Jackson Davidson’s estate, describing no lands specifically; and that George W., in signing it, did not pass, nor mean to pass the lands conveyed to him by Jackson -in his lifetime, which lands were no part of his estate at death. The original instrument attacked, and which it is sought to cancel, has been brought before us by “subpoena duces tecum” for our examination. It specifically describes as part of the lands of the estate, the tracts claimed by complainants. It bears no date, but purports to have been acknowledged before Thomas J. Atwood, a justice of the peace, on the twentieth day of March, 1873. It is written without erasures Or interlinea-tions, on a sheet of foolscap, occupying only one leaf of the sheet. The deed itself and signatures taking up a page and a half of the reverse- — -the acknowledgment filling out the second page, leaving the other leaf of the sheet blank. It is signed by all the heirs of Jackson, save Matthew.

It bears upon its face nothing suspicious except that it may be noted the lands conveyed formerly to George W. are not included in the mass of lands properly belonging to the estate, but are added in another clause ; which may nevertheless have been ah innocent afterthought. The deed was not then recorded. The complainants, George W. and wife and Mary T. Butler, to whom George W. afterwards conveyed all of his interest, insist, that this is not the instrument which George W. and the other heirs actually executed; that the real instrument was a very short document, of not exceeding twelve or fifteen, lines, containing a sweeping and general release of their interest in Jackson’s eatate, without any descriptions of property. George W. says that when he signed there were two or three signatures of other heirs already attached; whereas, in the instrument in question, his own appears first.

On the twenty-fifth of December, 1875, M. 0. Davidson,, by a short instrument, in consideration of one dollar, released to Isaac M. Rowan, “ all my rights, titles and interest to and unto the estate of my deceased brother, Jackson Davidson.” No property was described. The release was witnessed and duly acknowledged, but does not appear to have been recorded.

. On the thirty-first of January, 1876, as appears by an indorsement on the instrument here shown, Rowan paid the fee, and caused it to be recorded as the genuine relinquishment of the heirs of Jackson to M. 0. Davidson.

If genuine, it ends the controversy, unless George W. signed' it under such mistake as a court of chancery will, under the circumstances, correct — a matter to be considered later.

The defendants hold under Rowan by several mesne conveyances, all the lands in the body once owned by Jackson, including those in controversy. Valuable considerations in the several transfers have been paid by the-purchasers, and there is nothing to affect them with notice of anj^ trusts. When this instrument was executed and recorded, the wife of George W. Campbell had not acquired any interest, save a possibility of dower, which she of course can not now assert, during coverture, if ever. It would be a question whether Belknap had any title left in him to convey to her, and her husband’s assent would .amount to nothing after he had conveyed all his estate to Mathew 0.

The proofs which tend to show foi’gery are substantially these : George W. Davidson swears positively that this is not the relinquishment he signed, and that he never acknowledged any. The paper he signed contained only about fourteen or fifteen lines, on a piece of account paper;, that there were then signatures on it above his. He-does not suspect that the forgery was done by his uncle, M. 0.

John B. Butler, the ¡Ifcusband of M. E. Butler, one of the heirs, says that he signed a relinquishment, with other heirs, of his wife’s interest, after the death of Jackson Davidson. His name does not appear on that in question. His wife did not sign at the time, or if she ever did, witness does not know it. "Witness never acknowledged his signature before any officer. The paper he signed was a very short one, about half a sheet on one side of the paper, foolscap size. None of the heirs of Jackson Davidson claimed the lands in controversy as belonging to his estate.

Sarah M. Coldcleugli, (formerly "Willis) and one of the heirs, says she executed, with others, an instrument of release, which she read before signing, but which she never acknowledged, so far as she can remember. The instrument described no lands, simply conveying their interest in the estate. It was quite short, in about fifteen lines, leaving space below the signatures. Her name was about the third. In that exhibited her name is fourth.

Thomas J. Atwood, the justice of the peace, whose name appears to the certificate, .denies all recollection of having taken the acknowledgment; does not think he ever did.

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Bluebook (online)
42 Ark. 362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davidson-v-davidson-ark-1883.