Davidow v. Brandt

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 24-1230
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID DAVIDOW; SHERYL DE MERS, No. 24-1230 domestic partners, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01594-RAJ Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v. MEMORANDUM*

TRAVIS BRANDT,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

JANE DOE BRANDT, ZALNATRAV INC, RAVENARK,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 30, 2026**

Before: BENNETT, BADE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Defendant-Appellant Travis Brandt, appearing pro se, appeals several

district court orders in this dispute arising from a contract to manufacture and sell a

boat to Plaintiffs-Appellees David Davidow and Sheryl De Mers. We affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Brandt from selling the boat to a

third party.1 See BNSF Ry. Co. v. County of Alameda, 7 F.4th 874, 878–79 (9th

Cir. 2021) (“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision regarding

preliminary injunctive relief. We review findings of fact for clear error . . . .”

(citation omitted)). On appeal, Brandt raises four arguments to support his claim

that the district court erred in issuing injunctive relief: (1) the district court’s

finding of a threat of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs was improper because the boat

was a prototype; (2) Plaintiffs instructed him to sell the boat; (3) as the

manufacturer, he was the boat’s legal owner under the contract; and (4) he had

only attempted to sell a different boat—not Plaintiffs’ boat—to a third party.

Whether the boat was a prototype is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ threatened injury. The

district court did not clearly err in concluding that Plaintiffs would be harmed by

1 Brandt also argues that the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), which enjoined Brandt from selling the boat to a third party until the district court issued the preliminary injunction. “Because our analysis is substantially identical for the injunction and the TRO, we do not address the TRO separately.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

2 24-1230 the sale of the boat, that Plaintiffs did not instruct Brandt to sell it, and that Brandt

had entered a contract to sell Plaintiffs’ boat. See id. at 879.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brandt’s

motion to compel discovery of Plaintiffs’ financial records. See Mabe v. San

Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We review discovery

rulings for abuse of discretion.”). We will not disturb a decision to deny discovery

without a showing that it will result in “actual and substantial prejudice to the

complaining litigant.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

Brandt fails to demonstrate how the district court’s ruling resulted in actual and

substantial prejudice.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a Daubert

hearing on Brandt’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ forensic experts. See United States v.

Calderon-Segura, 512 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We review the district

court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion” including “its

decisions regarding the type of proceedings required to conduct the gatekeeping

inquiry.”); see also United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 582 (9th Cir. 2007)

(While “[d]istrict courts have a general ‘gatekeeping’ duty . . . [t]his obligation

does not . . . require the court to hold a separate Daubert hearing.” (quoting

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993))). In the district

court, Brandt raised his request for a Daubert hearing only in his motions in

3 24-1230 limine, in which he requested that the district court “[p]revent Plaintiff from

showing to the Jury any part of the CPA reports and so-called CPA Expert

Testimony[].” The district court appears not to have ruled on these motions in

limine, including the request for a Daubert hearing, likely because they were

mooted by the court’s subsequent order granting summary judgment. In any case,

the district court would not have abused its discretion by denying the request

because, while Brandt challenged the experts’ conclusions as “frivolous” and

“lies,” he did not impugn their methodology. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he test under Daubert is not

the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness of his

methodology.”).

4. Applying de novo review, Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1120

(9th Cir. 2021), we conclude that the district court properly granted partial

summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and denied Brandt’s cross-motion for

summary judgment.

a. The district court did not err when it disregarded Zalnatrav,

Inc.’s corporate entity and held Brandt personally liable for Zalnatrav’s debt and

actions. The doctrine of “corporate disregard” has “two essential factors. First, the

corporate form must be intentionally used to violate or evade a duty; second,

disregard must be ‘necessary and required to prevent unjustified loss to the injured

4 24-1230 party.’” Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 645 P.2d 689, 692 (Wash.

1982) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also In re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032,

1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In determining whether alter ego liability applies, we apply

the law of the forum state.”). Through deposition testimony, Brandt—the

president and sole owner of Zalnatrav—admitted that he comingled and spent

Plaintiffs’ money on matters unrelated to the manufacture of the boat and that the

boat remains incomplete. As the district court properly concluded, “[d]isregarding

the corporate form is especially appropriate here given Brandt’s dissolution of

Zalnatrav during the pendency of this matter in an apparent attempt to evade

Plaintiffs’ claims.” And the record demonstrates that Brandt’s actions, through

Zalnatrav, have caused Plaintiffs unjustified loss that the court can only remedy by

holding Brandt personally liable. Therefore, the district court did not err in

disregarding Zalnatrav’s corporate form.

b. The district court properly granted Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment on their breach of contract claim. See Myers v. State, 218 P.3d

241, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (elements of breach of contract claim are “(1) a

contract that imposed a duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) an economic loss as a

result of the breach”). The parties’ contract required Plaintiffs to make several

installment payments to Brandt in exchange for the manufacture and delivery of

the boat. And while Plaintiffs paid the full purchase price of the boat, Brandt never

5 24-1230 delivered it to Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs have experienced an economic loss of the

full purchase price of the boat because of Brandt’s breach. Despite this, Brandt

argues that the contract allowed him additional time to complete and deliver the

boat “because COVID was interrupting every conceivable plan” to build it. But

even assuming the contract could be read to postpone Brandt’s contractual

deadlines in light of difficulties COVID-19 caused, he does not cite any evidence

showing how the pandemic affected his ability to build the boat. Citing to

paragraphs 5, 9, and 16 of the contract, Brandt also contends that he had the “sole

discretion” to terminate the contract for the “sole benefit of the business.” But

none of these paragraphs create a right to terminate the contract after receipt of full

payment. And Brandt’s remaining argument that the boat was intended to be a

“prototype” is not supported by the record and has no bearing on his contractual

obligations. The district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs established

the elements of their breach of contract claim.

c. The district court did not err in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment on their fraud claim. See Stiley v. Block, 925 P.2d 194, 204

(Wash. 1996) (en banc) (listing the nine required elements of fraud claim). Despite

lacking the necessary expertise, Brandt represented to Plaintiffs that he would

build them “the best boat that Nevada had ever seen.” But instead of fulfilling his

contract obligations, Brandt used Plaintiffs’ money to obtain his pilot’s license and

6 24-1230 to pay for other personal and business expenses. He also continued to represent to

Plaintiffs that the boat would be completed, including telling them he was

“plugging away at this beautiful boat 24/7.” But Brandt knew these

representations were false; indeed, he later admitted in his deposition that he did

not have the funds to complete the boat. The record also shows that Brandt never

completed the boat or delivered it to Plaintiffs. The district court therefore

properly concluded that “Plaintiffs relied on Brandt’s untrue statements as to his

progress in manufacturing the [v]essel to their detriment,” and were thus

defrauded.

d. The district court did not err in granting Plaintiffs summary

judgment on their conversion claim. See In re Marriage of Langham & Kolde, 106

P.3d 212, 218 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (“Conversion is the unjustified, willful

interference with a chattel which deprives a person entitled to the property of

possession.” (citation omitted)). The contract required Brandt to manufacture and

deliver the boat to Plaintiffs. Brandt acknowledged that Plaintiffs paid for the boat

“in full,” and Brandt sent Plaintiffs a document “releasing the vessel to [them]

under contract terms.” But Brandt still maintains possession of the boat and

refused to deliver it to Plaintiffs. Brandt has therefore unjustifiably interfered with

property to which Plaintiffs are legally entitled.

e. The district court properly granted Plaintiffs’ motion for

7 24-1230 summary judgment on their Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim.

See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531,

533 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (“[T]o prevail in a private CPA action . . . a plaintiff

must establish five distinct elements: (1) unfair or deceptive act or practice;

(2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to

plaintiff in his or her business or property; (5) causation.”). Considering the

record, we agree with the district court that Brandt’s actions were deceptive and

involved the sale of assets or services in the state of Washington. See Panag v.

Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 204 P.3d 885, 895 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)

(“Deception exists ‘if there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to

mislead’ a reasonable consumer.” (quoting Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. Fed. Trade

Comm’n, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)); RCW 19.86.010(2) (“trade” and

“commerce” in the context of the CPA includes “the sale of assets or services”).

We also agree that Brandt’s actions affected the public interest. “[I]t is the

likelihood that additional plaintiffs have been or will be injured in exactly the same

fashion that changes a factual pattern from a private dispute to one that affects the

public interest.” Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538. Here, it is likely “that

additional plaintiffs have been or will be injured in exactly the same fashion” as

Plaintiffs because Brandt was purchasing targeted advertisements to solicit new

customers for his business in additional markets and planned to raise “cash to pay

8 24-1230 bills” by “selling additional boats.” Brandt’s actions also injured Plaintiffs by

depriving them of the use and enjoyment of the boat, and of the full contract price

for the boat. See Mason v. Mortg. Am., Inc., 792 P.2d 142, 148 (1990) (en banc)

(“A loss of use of property which is causally related to an unfair or deceptive act or

practice” satisfies the CPA’s injury and causation requirements.). Thus, Plaintiffs

established all elements of a CPA violation.2

f. The district court did not err in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment on Brandt’s counterclaims for fraud and breach of contract. As

the district court properly concluded, Brandt produced no evidence showing that

Plaintiffs committed fraud or breached the contract. Accordingly, Brandt’s fraud

and breach of contract counterclaims cannot survive summary judgment. See

Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dep’t of Corr., 789 F.3d 979, 994 (9th

Cir. 2015) (“Argument without evidence is hollow rhetoric that cannot defeat

summary judgment.”).

5. The district court did not err in denying Brandt’s motion to compel

arbitration. See Holley-Gallegly v. TA Operating, LLC, 74 F.4th 997, 1000 (9th

Cir. 2023) (reviewing de novo the district court’s decision on a motion to compel

2 Brandt does not dispute the district court’s factual findings relevant to Plaintiffs’ CPA claim. Rather, he argues that this court should reverse because Plaintiffs failed to “show that [he] acted with scienter.” But the authority Brandt cites does not involve the CPA or establish that scienter is required to prevail on a CPA claim.

9 24-1230 arbitration and reviewing underlying factual findings for clear error). Brandt bases

his demand for arbitration on Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to pay several invoices

relating to the boat. But the controlling arbitration provision in the parties’

contract excludes disputes concerning unpaid or late paid invoices. Accordingly,

reversal is not warranted.

6. More than 30 days after the district court entered a final order and

amended judgment awarding Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees, costs, and post-judgment

interest, Brandt filed an untimely amended notice of appeal. Because the amended

notice was untimely, we lack jurisdiction to review Brandt’s challenge to the

district court’s final order and amended judgment. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc.,

90 F.3d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A notice of appeal must be filed within 30

days of the date of entry of a judgment or an appealable order. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a). This requirement is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” (quoting Browder v.

Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978))).

7. Brandt has forfeited any First, Sixth, and Seventh Amendment

challenges as he failed to raise these issues before the district court. See In re

Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2010)

(explaining that an issue is forfeited if not raised in the trial court); One Industries,

LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distributing, Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).

8. Brandt has forfeited all other issues on appeal as he has not adequately

10 24-1230 developed or supported them in his briefing. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,

634 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Issues raised in a brief which are not supported by argument

are deemed abandoned.”); California Pac. Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 885

F.3d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 2018) (same).

AFFIRMED.

11 24-1230