An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-1027
Filed 3 September 2025
N.C. Industrial Commission, No. 21-716264
GORAN DAVIDOVIC, Employee, Plaintiff,
v.
ALLBOUND CARRIER, INC., Alleged Employer, and TOTALLY QUALITY LOGISTICS, INC., LLC (Freight Brokerage Firm), Alleged Statutory Employer, OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier (BROADSPIRE, Third-Party Administrator), Defendants.
Appeal by Defendants from opinion and award entered 6 August 2024 by
Commissioner Adrian A. Phillips of the North Carolina Industrial Commission.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2025.
Deuterman Law Group, by Zachary B. Marquand and Juliana Vergara Duque, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Richard T. Granowsky for Defendant-Appellant Allbound Carrier, Inc.
Goodman McGuffey LLP, by Adam E. Whitten, for Defendant-Appellant Total Quality Logistics, LLC.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendants Total Quality Logistics, LLC (“TQL”), and Allbound Carrier, Inc.
(“Allbound”), appeal from an opinion and award issued by the Full Commission (“the DAVIDOVIC V. ALLBOUND CARRIER, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Commission”) holding TQL and Allbound liable for Plaintiff Goran Davidovic’s
injuries sustained in a trucking accident. Defendants appeal raising separate legal
issues.
TQL contends the Commission erred by (1) finding Plaintiff is entitled to
workers’ compensation, holding TQL liable under section 97-19.1(a) of the North
Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act; and (2) finding the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) does not pre-empt the North Carolina
Workers’ Compensation Act for claims levied against freight brokers. Allbound
contends the Commission erred by (1) finding section 97-19.1(b) of the North Carolina
Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply to Allbound; and (2) finding Plaintiff
totally incapacitated from earning wages. We hold the Commission did not err.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff, originally from Serbia, moved to the United States in November 1977.
Plaintiff completed high school and received a two-year training in machinery in
Bosnia. In 1999, Plaintiff moved to Thomasville, North Carolina, where he completed
truck driving school and obtained a commercial driver’s license (“CDL”). In 2004,
Plaintiff purchased his first commercial truck and worked for multiple companies as
an owner/operator.
In 2013, Plaintiff began transporting goods for Coach Logistics, a company that
became Allbound in 2015 or 2016. Instead of working as a company driver, Plaintiff
worked as an independent owner/operator for Allbound. Plaintiff drove his own
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truck, was paid by the load instead of by the mile, and could choose the loads he
wanted to transport. Additionally, once Plaintiff accepted a load, he could choose the
route he wanted to take, and he could plan his breaks. Plaintiff annually registered
his truck in his name, but Allbound maintained a fuel license, the vehicle’s U.S.
Department of Transportation (“USDOT”) Number, and required Plaintiff to place
Allbound signage on the truck.
On 14 June 2018, Plaintiff incorporated his own trucking company, Gogi
Transport, Inc. (“Gogi”), and designated himself as the president. On 18 January
2019, the owner of Allbound, Bobby Srbinov, requested Plaintiff sign an independent
contractor agreement. Srbinov explained the terms of the contract to Plaintiff in
Serbian. The agreement classified Allbound as “carrier” and Gogi as “contractor.”
The contract expressly provided that “contractor and contractor’s workers/drivers
[are] not employees of carrier.” Gogi agreed to provide Allbound with Plaintiff’s truck
and all labor needed to operate the vehicle and perform the services contemplated in
the contract. Plaintiff reserved the right to use the truck for other motor carriers
with Allbound’s consent, and Plaintiff was free to “accept or reject any shipment
offered by Allbound.” Plaintiff testified nothing about his job changed after the
creation of Gogi and signing the agreement.
TQL is a transportation broker licensed by the USDOT, Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration. As a brokerage company, “TQL is authorized by its customers
to negotiate and arrange for the transportation of freight with motor carriers.” TQL
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does not own any trucking equipment or employ any drivers. Rather, TQL
coordinates loads that need to be delivered with various trucking companies.
In July 2016, TQL entered into a non-exclusive broker-carrier agreement with
Allbound. Under the agreement, TQL could “use the services of [Allbound], on a
nonexclusive basis, to pickup, secure, transport and deliver customers’ freight.”
Allbound agreed to only use vehicles and drivers that were licensed and insured
under Allbound’s name and policies, and Allbound was prohibited from
“subcontracting, transferring, leasing, assigning, or interlining the transportation of
shipments to any other person or entity without authorization from TQL.” TQL was
responsible for ensuring “the freight being transported for its customers was
delivered to the correct location at the correct time and by the method specified.”
Allbound was required to follow “all state and federal laws[,]” to “carry the required
insurance, including workers’ compensation with limits required by applicable state
law[,]” and to provide TQL with a certificate of proof of insurance.
TQL did not provide workers’ compensation insurance to cover the employees
of any carrier with whom it contracted to transport freight, including Allbound.
Allbound and Gogi did not carry workers compensation coverage for Plaintiff, and
TQL never requested a certificate of proof of insurance from either company.
“As compensation for its services, TQL was paid the difference between what
its customers paid for transport of the shipment and the rate it negotiated to pay
Allbound for the transportation.” “TQL provided 1099 tax forms to Allbound.”
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In 2020, TQL arranged for Allbound to transport a load of paper chili cups from
Innopak in Columbus, Ohio, on 12 March 2020, and deliver it to a Harris Teeter in
Greensboro, North Carolina, on 13 March 2020. Allbound then subcontracted the
assignment to Plaintiff. On 13 March 2020, while transporting the load, a tire popped
on Plaintiff’s truck causing him to lose control of the vehicle and drive off an overpass
onto the street below. Plaintiff suffered multiple traumatic injuries and was
diagnosed with a “T12 burst fracture, traumatic hematoma without loss of
consciousness, fracture of the right T11, left T12 and right L1 transverse processes,
possible ventral epidural hematoma from T12 through L4, and L1 and L2 superior
endplate fractures.”
On 5 April 2021, Plaintiff filed a Form 18 Workers’ Compensation Claim
against Allbound in the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“NCIC”). In
response, on 11 May 2021, Allbound filed a Form 61 Denial of Workers’ Compensation
Claim denying that Plaintiff was an employee of Allbound but rather an employee of
Gogi. On 12 July 2021, Plaintiff amended his claim to include TQL. On 2 February
2022, TQL filed a Form 61 Denial of Workers’ Compensation Claim denying that an
employer-employee relationship existed between Defendants and Plaintiff at the time
of the incident. On 5 October 2022, TQL filed an Amended Form 61 asserting that
the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) pre-empted the
North Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act for tort claims against freight brokers,
precluding them from liability.
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Plaintiff requested a hearing with the NCIC, and the NCIC granted Plaintiff’s
request. On 7 October 2022, Plaintiff’s claim came on for hearing before Deputy
Commissioner Celeste Harris in Kernersville, NC. At the close of the hearing, Deputy
Commissioner Harris entered an order setting deadlines for post-hearing depositions.
On 13 February 2023, Deputy Commissioner Harris entered a post-hearing order
instructing the parties to submit their contentions and proposed opinions by 15
March 2023.
On 8 June 2023, Deputy Commissioner Harris entered an opinion and award
finding TQL liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. TQL was ordered to pay for Plaintiff’s
medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation, and twenty-five percent
of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.
On 20 and 21 June 2023, Defendants appealed Deputy Commissioner Harris’s
opinion and award to the Full Commission. On 21 November 2023, Plaintiff’s claim
came before the Commission. The Commission “reviewed the prior [o]pinion and
[a]ward based upon the record of the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner,”
and heard oral arguments of the parties. The Commission considered testimony from
Plaintiff; Dr. Beck McAllister, Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon; Dr. O. Del Curing, a
neurosurgeon who evaluated Plaintiff for a determination of future medical needs;
Maria Vargas, a vocational consultant who performed a vocational assessment for
Plaintiff; and Marc Bostwick, the Risk Manager for TQL. The Commission entered
its opinion and award on 6 August 2024. The Commission found both Defendants,
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TQL and Allbound, liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants were ordered to provide
Plaintiff with all medical treatment reasonably necessary, temporary total disability
compensation, and twenty-five percent of Plaintiffs attorney’s fees. Defendants
timely appeal from the Commission’s opinion and award.
II. Analysis
Defendants appeal from an opinion and award issued by the Full Commission
of the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Under North Carolina law, either
party may “appeal from the decision of the Commission to the Court of Appeals for
errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals from the
superior court to the Court of Appeals in ordinary civil actions.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-
86 (2023).
Our Supreme Court has established “(1) the full Commission is the sole judge
of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and (2) appellate courts reviewing
Commission decisions are limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence
supports the Commission’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support
the Commission's conclusions of law.” Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109,
116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). “The Commission's conclusions of law are reviewed
de novo.” Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LCC, 367 N.C. 414, 423, 760 S.E.2d 732,
738 (2014) (citation and internal marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
Defendants raise separate issues on appeal. We address Defendants’
arguments separately.
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A. TQL’s Appeal
TQL contends the Commission erred by (1) finding Plaintiff is entitled to
workers’ compensation, holding TQL liable under section 97.19.1(a); and (2) finding
the FAAAA does not pre-empt the North Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act for
claims levied against freight brokers.
1. Section 97-19.1(a)
TQL contends the Commission erred by finding Plaintiff is entitled to workers’
compensation, holding TQL liable under section 97.19.1(a). Specifically, TQL argues
Plaintiff is an independent contractor and is not entitled to workers’ compensation.
Even if Plaintiff were entitled to workers compensation, TQL argues it is not liable
under the statute because TQL is a transportation broker, not a principal contractor.
Additionally, TQL argues it is shielded from liability under section 97-19.1(b). We
disagree.
Section 97-19.1(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the following:
(a) An individual in the interstate or intrastate carrier industry who operates a truck, tractor, or truck tractor trailer licensed by a governmental motor vehicle regulatory agency may be an employee or an independent contractor under this Article dependent upon the application of the common law test for determining employment status.
Any principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor, irrespective of whether such contractor regularly employs three or more employees, who contracts with an individual in the interstate or intrastate carrier industry who operates a truck, tractor, or truck tractor trailer licensed by the United States Department of
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Transportation and who has not secured the payment of compensation in the manner provided for employers set forth in [section] 97-93 for himself personally and for his employees and subcontractors, if any, shall be liable as an employer under this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits on account of the injury or death of the independent contractor and his employees or subcontractors due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the performance of the work covered by such contract.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19.1(a) (2023).
Here, the Commission found TQL liable as a principal contractor and Allbound
liable as an intermediate contractor to Plaintiff, an independent contractor. The
Commission reasoned “TQL entered into a contract with Innopak, LLC for the
purpose of ensuring the delivery of Innopak’s goods.” TQL then contracted with
“Allbound, an interstate carrier ‘who operates a truck, tractor, or truck tractor trailer
licensed by the United States Department of Transportation and who has not secured
the payment of compensation in the manner provided for employers set forth in
section 97-93 for himself personally and for his employees and subcontractors.’”
Allbound subsequently “subcontracted the work to Plaintiff, an independent
contractor without workers’ compensation insurance.” Accordingly, both TQL and
Allbound were liable under the statute.
TQL disagrees with the Commission’s conclusion and first contends Plaintiff is
not entitled to workers’ compensation because the Commission found that he was an
independent contractor. We disagree.
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Whether the Commission found Plaintiff to be an independent contractor or
employee is inconsequential for the purposes of the statute. In either situation,
section 97-19.1(a) provides the principal, intermediate, or subcontractor “shall” be
liable as a statutory employer if it contracts with “an individual in the interstate or
intrastate carrier industry who [1] operates a truck, tractor, or truck tractor trailer
licensed by the United States Department of Transportation and who [2] has not
secured the payment of compensation in the manner provided for employers set forth
in [section] 97-93[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19.1(a). If the answer is yes to both
conditions, the principal, intermediate, or subcontractor is liable “for the payment of
compensation and other benefits on account of the injury or death of the independent
contractor and his employees or subcontractors due to an accident arising out of and
in the course of the performance of the work covered by such contract.” Id. Thus,
based on the plain language of the statute, independent contractors are protected,
and section 97-19.1(a) is not exclusive to employees. Id. Accordingly, TQL’s
argument that Plaintiff is not entitled to receive workers’ compensation because
Plaintiff is an independent contractor is without merit. Id.
Next, TQL argues even if Plaintiff is entitled to receive workers compensation,
TQL is precluded from liability under section 97-19.1(a) because TQL is not a
principal contractor, but rather a transportation broker. We disagree.
In Atiapo v. Goree Logistics, Inc., we addressed this issue under similar factual
circumstances. 240 N.C. App. 1, 5, 770 S.E.2d 684, 687 (2015). In Atiapo, this Court
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affirmed a decision of the Industrial Commission holding a licensed transportation
broker liable under section 97-19.1(a) as a principal contractor where the broker
functioned more as a contractor and the subcontractor did not have the proper
insurance. Id.
In Atiapo, “Owen Thomas, Inc. (Owen Thomas), a licensed transportation
broker, entered into a ‘Broker-Carrier Agreement’ with Goree Logistics, Inc. (Goree).”
Atiapo, 240 N.C. App. at 2, 770 S.E.2d at 685. Owen Thomas would arrange for the
transportation of goods for its clients, and Goree, a motor carrier, would transport the
load. Id. at 2, 770 S.E.2d at 685–86. “The agreement provided that Goree would
exercise full control over the work it performed in transporting the goods, and that
Goree would assume responsibility for payment of all taxes, unemployment, and
workers’ compensation, and other related fees.” Id. The plaintiff drove a tractor
trailer for Goree. Id. at 2, 770 S.E.2d at 686. While transporting a delivery for Sunny
Ridge Farms, a client of Owen Thomas, the plaintiff was involved in a trucking
accident. Id. at 2–3, 770 S.E.2d at 686. At the time of the injury, Goree did not carry
workers’ compensation insurance. Id. at 2, 770 S.E.2d at 686.
The plaintiff then filed a workers compensation claim and the Commission
found Owen Thomas liable as principal contractor under section 97-19.1(a). Id. at 3,
770 S.E.2d at 686. The Commission reasoned that although Owen Thomas was a
“federally licensed ‘freight broker’ authorized by its customers to negotiate and
arrange for the transportation of shipments in interstate commerce[,] . . . use of the
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word ‘broker’ [was] a distinction without a difference.” Id. at 4, 770 S.E.2d at 687
(citation modified). Owen Thomas could “use its own judgment in selecting a carrier
for its client,” and “retained a portion of what it received for the contract.” Id.
Because Owen Thomas acted more as a principal contractor, and because Goree did
not provide workers’ compensation insurance, the Commission held Owen Thomas
liable under section 97-19.1(a). Id.
This Court affirmed the decision of the Commission and explained that Owen
Thomas acted as principal contractor based on the following facts:
Owen Thomas contracted with Sunny Ridge to ship its goods. Owen Thomas was to be paid by Sunny Ridge for this service and would retain any monies not paid to the trucking company it hired. It had discretion in selecting a carrier. Owen Thomas provided 1099 tax forms to Goree. Owen Thomas controlled not only the outcome of the task, namely the delivery of goods, but the method by which the task would be performed, including how frequently Goree would report to Owen Thomas, and specifications on the temperature that would be maintained during transport. Sunny Ridge paid Owen Thomas “for insuring a delivery.”
Id. at 5, 770 S.E.2d at 687.
Based on these facts, we held the Commission did not err in finding Owen
Thomas liable under section 97-19.1(a) because (1) Owen Thomas acted as a
contractor; and (2) contracted with Goree, “a subcontractor without workers’
compensation insurance coverage[.]” Id.
Here, like the facts Atiapo, TQL is a federally licensed freight broker
functioning as a principal contractor. Like Owen Thomas, TQL contracted with its
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client, Innopak, LLC, to transport its goods; “TQL was paid the difference between
what its customers paid for transport of the shipment and the rate it negotiated to
pay Allbound for the transportation;” TQL had discretion to select a carrier as it
entered into a non-exclusive agreement with Allbound; TQL provided 1099 tax forms
to Allbound; TQL was responsible for ensuring “the freight being transported for its
customers was delivered to the correct location at the correct time and by the method
specified;” TQL could arrange specific requirements for the load, such as if
refrigeration was required; and could “call Allbound dispatchers, and sometimes
drivers, to receive updates on the status and location of goods to be delivered.”
Accordingly, similar to Atiapo, we hold these findings support the
Commission’s determination that TQL acted as a principal contractor hired by
Innopak for the purpose of ensuring the transportation and delivery of its goods.
Moreover, because TQL contracted with Allbound, who did not provide workers
compensation insurance, TQL is liable to Plaintiff under section 97-19.1(a).
Lastly, TQL contends section 97-19.1(b) shields TQL from liability. We
In relevant part, section 97-19.1(b) provides that notwithstanding section 97-
19.1(a), a principal, intermediate, or subcontractor shall not be liable under section
97-19.1 if the independent contractor is “an individual licensed by the United States
Department of Transportation” and “personally is operating the vehicle solely
pursuant to that license.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19.1(b) (2023).
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Here, and as discussed at length in the section below, Plaintiff was not
individually licensed by the USDOT. Although Plaintiff had a CDL at the time of the
crash, Plaintiff was operating the vehicle with a USDOT Number registered to
Allbound. Thus, we hold the Commission correctly determined section 97-19.1(b)
does not apply.1
2. FAAAA
TQL contends the Commission erred by finding that the FAAAA does not pre-
empt North Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act for claims levied against brokers,
such as workers’ compensation claims. Specifically, TQL argues federal law
precludes states from regulating interstate commerce. TQL relies on section
14501(c)(1) - Federal authority over instrastate transportation. 49 U.S.C. §
14501(c)(1). We disagree and hold the Commission did not err.
Section 14501(c)(1) provides the following in relevant part:
[A] State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier (other than a carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier covered by section 41713(b)(4)) or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.
1 TQL contends if TQL is held liable for Plaintiff’s injuries, Allbound should be required to
indemnify TQL. This argument was not raised at trial and cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal. See N.C. R. App. P. 10 (2023); Welch v. Welch, 288 N.C. App. 627, 630, 886 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2023) (“[W]here a theory argued on appeal is not raised before the trial court, the argument is deemed waived on appeal.” (citation and internal marks omitted)).
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49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
TQL cites to several federal cases arguing that “claims seeking to impose
liability on freight brokers for contracting with allegedly unsafe or unqualified motor
carriers affect brokers’ prices, routes, or services and are therefore preempted.”
TQL fails to recognize that this Court has already addressed section
14501(c)(1) in relation to North Carolina’s workers’ compensation insurance
requirements, and we are bound by precedent. See In re Civ. Penalty, 324 N.C. 373,
384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the
same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound
by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.”); In re Fifth Third
Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 216 N.C. App. 482, 488, 716 S.E.2d 850, 855 (2011) (“‘North
Carolina appellate courts are not bound, as to matters of federal law, by decisions of
federal courts other than the United States Supreme Court.’” (quoting Enoch v.
Inman, 164 N.C. App. 415, 420–21, 596 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2004)).
This Court has expressly held “the federal preemption established in [section]
14501(c)(1) does not apply to [section] 97-19.1, which imposes liability upon those who
employ persons or entities that fail to procure required workers’ compensation
insurance.” Atiapo 240 N.C. App. at 6, 770 S.E.2d at 688. In reaching this conclusion,
we reasoned that North Carolina’s workers’ compensation insurance requirements
are not a regulation of prices, routes, or services. Atiapo, 240 N.C. App. at 6, 770
S.E.2d at 688 (“We see no reason why a statute requiring financial responsibility as
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to workers’ compensation should be considered a regulation of prices, routes, or
services.”). Moreover, section 14501(c)(2)(A) expressly provides that section
14501(c)(1) does not apply to insurance requirements. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).
Additionally, even if the federal statute applied, for the reasons explained in
the section above, TQL was not acting as a broker at the time of Plaintiff’s injury but
rather as a principal contractor. TQL was hired by Innopak, LLC, to ensure the
transportation and delivery of its goods. “TQL then contracted its work to Allbound,
an interstate carrier ‘who operates a truck, tractor, or truck tractor trailer licensed
by the United States Department of Transportation and who has not secured the
payment of compensation in the manner provided for employers set forth in [section]
97-93 for himself personally and for his employees and subcontractors.’” Allbound
then “subcontracted the work to Plaintiff, an independent contractor without
workers’ compensation insurance.” Thus, we hold the Commission properly held TQL
liable to Plaintiff as a principal contractor under section 97-19.1(a).
B. Allbound’s Appeal
Allbound contends the Commission erred by (1) finding section 97.19.1(b) does
not apply to Allbound; and (2) in finding Plaintiff totally incapacitated from earning
wages.
1. Section 97-19.1(b)
Allbound contends it should have been precluded from liability under section
97-19.1(b) and the Commission erred in its interpretation of the statute. Specifically,
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Allbound argues the Commission erroneously interpreted “an individual licensed by
the United States Department of Transportation” under section 97-19.1(b) to refer to
a USDOT Number rather than a CDL. We disagree.
“Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo on
appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010).
“Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes
its own judgment for that of the Commission.” In re Appeal of Greens of Pine Glen
Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003).
N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-19.1(b) provides an exemption for contractor liability and
states the following:
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor shall not be liable as an employer under this Article for the payment of compensation on account of the injury or death of the independent contractor if the principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor (i) contracts with an independent contractor who is an individual licensed by the United States Department of Transportation and (ii) the independent contractor personally is operating the vehicle solely pursuant to that license.
N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-19.1(b) (2023).
Here, the Commission concluded section 97-19.1(b) does not apply to Allbound
because Plaintiff was not an independent contractor who was individually licensed
by the USDOT. Although Plaintiff had a CDL at the time of the crash, Plaintiff was
operating the vehicle with a USDOT Number registered to Allbound. The
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Commission reasoned a CDL is a “state issued license” required to drive a commercial
vehicle, but a “[US]DOT number is required to drive a commercial vehicle on
interstate routes[.]” “[T]he [US]DOT number in this matter was registered to
Allbound . . . [and] Plaintiff was operating his vehicle pursuant to Allbound’s
[US]DOT license, rather than his own[.]” Accordingly, the Commission concluded
section 97-19.1(b) does not apply to Allbound because Plaintiff was not operating the
vehicle with his own USDOT number.
Allbound disagrees with the Commission’s interpretation of the statute and
argues “an individual licensed by the [USDOT][,]” is one who carries a CDL. Because
Plaintiff was operating the vehicle pursuant to his own CDL, Allbound argues it is
exempt from liability pursuant to section 97-19.1(b). We disagree.
“The principal goal of statutory construction is to accomplish the legislative
intent.” Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001). When
interpreting a statute, “[w]e first look to the plain language, as the actual words of
the legislature are the clearest manifestation of its intent. Our primary task is to
determine legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its natural and
ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise.” Cohane v. Home Missioners
of Am., 387 N.C. 1, 7–8, 911 S.E.2d 43, 48 (2025) (citation modified).
Section 97-19.1 was first enacted in 2003 and did not include the exemption
stated in section 97-19.1(b). In 2006, the statute was amended to include an
exemption from contractor liability where the independent contractor was “(i)
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licensed by a governmental motor vehicle regulatory agency and (ii) the independent
contractor [was] operating the vehicle pursuant to that license.” 2006 N.C. Sess.
Laws 26. The statute has since been amended to include the language now relevant
to the present case. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-19.1(b).
A CDL is a state issued commercial driver’s license that in North Carolina is
issued by the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-37.12
(2023). In 2006, when section 97-19.1 was amended to incorporate section 97-19.1(b),
a CDL would have satisfied the exemption because the North Carolina Division of
Motor Vehicles would qualify as “a governmental motor vehicle regulatory agency[.]”
See 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 26. However, as discussed above, the statute was later
amended and now states “licensed by the United States Department of
Transportation[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19.1(b). A USDOT Number is a federal
identifier required to operate a commercial vehicle on interstate highways. 49
U.S.C.A. § 31134(a). Without it, drivers are not legally qualified to drive interstate.
By the plain language of the statute—“licensed by the United States Department of
Transportation”—the legislature clearly intended this to mean a USDOT Number,
and not merely a CDL issued by a state governmental agency. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-
19.1(b).
Moreover, the absence of any reference to a CDL, despite the legislature’s
ability to include section 97-19.1(b), indicates the legislature did not intend to include
it. See McLaughlin v. Bailey, 240 N.C. App. 159, 171, 771 S.E.2d 570, 579 (2015)
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(“The fact that the legislature had the option to include this language, but chose not
to, is presumptive evidence that it intended that the provision not encompass such
options.” (citation and internal marks omitted)); Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of
Adjustment, 196 N.C. App. 249, 255, 674 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2009) (“One of the long-
standing rules of interpretation and construction in this [S]tate is expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” (emphasis
in original)).
Moreover, as Plaintiff correctly points out, Allbound’s interpretation of section
97-19.1(b) would lead to absurd results. If we were to interpret “an individual
licensed by the United States Department of Transportation” to mean an individual
with a CDL, this would prevent all independent contractors with a CDL from ever
recovering from contractor liability. A CDL is required to operate a vehicle
commercially. 49 U.S.C. § 31301. Functionally, this would mean entities who only
contract with individuals who do not have a CDL, those who are driving illegally,
would not be exempt from contractor liability.
Thus, we hold the Commission did not err in its interpretation of the statute
and properly concluded section 97-19.1(b) does not apply to Allbound.
2. Disability
Allbound contends the Commission erred in finding Plaintiff totally disabled
and entitled to temporary disability compensation. Specifically, Allbound argues that
because Plaintiff was not an employee or statutory employee under section 97-19.1,
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Plaintiff is not eligible for benefits, and Allbound is precluded from liability under the
Workers’ Compensation Act. Additionally, Allbound argues Plaintiff failed to present
competent evidence that he is physically or mentally incapable of work as a
consequence of the work-related injury. We disagree.
Having concluded the Commission did not err in its interpretation of section
97-19.1, and Allbound is not precluded from liability on Plaintiff’s Workers’
Compensation Claim, we address Allbound’s argument that Plaintiff presented
insufficient evidence to support his disability claim.
Our review is limited to “whether competent evidence supports the
Commission’s findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission’s
conclusions of law. This [C]ourt’s duty goes no further than to determine whether
the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.” Richardson v.
Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008)
(citation modified).
Disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act is defined as “incapacity
because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2023). To
support a conclusion of disability, the Commission must find the following:
(1) that [the] plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in the same employment, (2) that [the] plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in any other employment, and (3) that this
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individual’s incapacity to earn was caused by [the] plaintiff’s injury.
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982).
The plaintiff carries the burden of proof to show the existence and degree of
the disability. Hall v. Chevrolet Co., 263 N.C. 569, 575, 139 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1965).
The Commission may consider the following evidence to support its determination:
(1) “medical evidence” that the plaintiff is “physically or mentally, as a consequence
of the work related injury, incapable of work in any employment;” (2) “evidence that
he is capable of some work, but that he has, after a reasonable effort on his part, been
unsuccessful in his effort to obtain employment;” (3) “evidence that he is capable of
some work but that it would be futile because of preexisting conditions, i.e., age,
inexperience, lack of education, to seek other employment;” or (4) “evidence that he
has obtained other employment at a wage less than that earned prior to the injury.”
Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457
(1993).
Here, after hearing the evidence presented, the Commission concluded that “as
a result of [Plaintiff’s] compensable back injuries, Plaintiff has been totally
incapacitated from earning his pre-injury wages in the same or any other employment
beginning March 13, 2020.” Accordingly, the Commission determined Plaintiff is
entitled to temporary total disability compensation. Contrary to Allbound’s
contention, this conclusion of law is supported by findings that show the Commission
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considered medical evidence that showed the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries; the
duration of his hospitalization and rehabilitation; post-rehabilitation process; and
continued treatment. The Commission heard testimony from Plaintiff and reviewed
the reports of several doctors and medical professionals who had treated Plaintiff as
a result of his injuries.
The findings are supported by record evidence showing Plaintiff sustained
multiple injuries as a result of the incident including several fractures and
neurological trauma. While hospitalized, “Plaintiff was also diagnosed with
neurogenic bowel and bladder issues, intermittent bowel incontinence, and
insomnia.” Plaintiff testified “he has constant pain in his spine” and “continues to
use a walker for assistance[.]” He lives at home with his son and daughter who assist
him with daily tasks such as “preparing meals, cleaning the home, and doing
laundry.”
Dr. Beck McAllister, an orthopedic surgeon, performed Plaintiff’s surgery, and
continued to see Plaintiff for post-operation appointments. Dr. McAllister
documented Plaintiff had “chronic neuropathic pain and chronic right lower
extremity weakness,” and that Plaintiff’s “neurologic status was likely to be
permanent with no further recovery.” Dr. McAllister “opined to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty that, more likely than not, the motor vehicle incident on March
13, 2020 caused the injuries to Plaintiff’s back.” He testified “Plaintiff reached
maximum medical improvement as of March 25, 2021, and that Plaintiff’s right lower
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extremity weakness would hamper his ability to do a job.” He also stated, “it was
unlikely that Plaintiff would make further neurological recovery” and that “Plaintiff
needs long-term pain management or physical management and rehabilitation
services.” Further, Dr. McAllister opined “Plaintiff could not return to driving trucks
due to the documented incoordination and weakness in Plaintiff’s right leg.”
Plaintiff was also evaluated by Dr. O. Del Curling, a board-certified
neurosurgeon, for a determination of future medical needs. Dr. Curling “opined to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, more likely than not, that the motor vehicle
incident of March 13, 2020, caused the injuries to Plaintiff’s back, as well as Plaintiff’s
hip pain and urological issues, which followed his back injury.” Dr. Curling explained
Plaintiff’s recovery process would be extensive and that “Plaintiff would not be
capable of performing his previous job as a truck driver.”
Maria Vargas, a vocational consultant and certified rehabilitation counselor,
performed a vocational assessment for Plaintiff. After meeting with Plaintiff and
reviewing his medical records, Vargas “opined that ‘given the extensive nature of
Plaintiff’s disability and the fact that he actually needs home care to perform tasks,
that he would not be able to return to his prior work or any type of gainful
employment.’”
Based on these findings, supported by competent evidence, we hold the
findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law that as a result of the incident
Plaintiff “has been totally incapacitated from earning his pre-injury wages in the
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same or any other employment beginning 13 March 2020” and Plaintiff is entitled to
total disability compensation. Accordingly, we hold the Commission did not err.
III. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, we hold the Commission did not err, and we
affirm its opinion and award.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STADING and FREEMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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