Davider v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry.

31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 261, 20 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 165
CourtCuyahoga Circuit Court
DecidedMay 27, 1912
StatusPublished

This text of 31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 261 (Davider v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Cuyahoga Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davider v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry., 31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 261, 20 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 165 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1912).

Opinion

MARVIN, J.

The parties here are as they were in the court below. The plaintiff brought suit against the Pennsylvania Company, and later by amendment of the petition, the present defendant in error was made a party defendant. The purpose of the action was to recover for injuries received by the plaintiff on May 31, 1907, when driving in a one-horse buggy across the track of the Pennsylvania Company on Grace street, in the village of Bedford, in this county.

At the close of the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, the court directed a verdict for the defendant, the' Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Verdict was accordingly rendered and judgment entered on such verdict, dismissing the petition as against said last named defendant. By proper proceedings, the action of the court in that regard is here for review.

The tracks of the two railroad companies run nearly parallel to each other, and the direction is nearly south and north. Grace street, on which the plaintiff was driving, crosses the tracks of the two companies nearly, at right angles. The locomotive on a train of the Pennsylvania Company, proceeding west, collided with the buggy in which the plaintiff was driving, resulting in injuries to her.

The distance between the track of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry. and the track of the Pennsylvania Company, on which the plaintiff was injured, is something like 15 feet. The track of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry. is east of the track of the Pennsylvania Company on which the accident occurred. The plaintiff was driving toward the west and had to cross the track of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry. before reaching the Pennsylvania Com-[263]*263party's track where she was injured. As she approached the Wheeling & L. E. By. track, there was a freight train standing upon such track, and she was detained for a considerable time by reason of this train. She was finally able to drive across this track by the cutting of the train, leaving an opening sufficient between the cars to allow her to drive across the track, and she says that she was signalled by an employe of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry. to drive across.

On a side-track of the Pennsylvania Company, which was east of the track on which she was injured, there were cars standing, so that, she says, she was unable to see the train approaching on the Pennsylvania track.

The acts of negligence charged against the Wheeling & L. E. Ry. are that it failed to establish methods of warning other than by bell and whistle, at a crossing alleged to be more dangerous than the usual crossing, by reason of obstruction to view by a freight train on the Wheeling & L. E. Ry., passing same ; freight cars on the Pennsylvania storage track, and buildings, fences and bushes erected and permitted on the rights of way of both companies. Further, that there was unnecessary blocking of the crossing by the train on the Wheeling & L. E. Ry.

One of the errors alleged in the petition is that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; in any event, that there was evidence tending to show negligence on the part of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry., and that there being such evidence, the court was bound to have submitted the case as between the plaintiff and the last named defendant to the jury.

For reason explained by the court on the hearing of this case, this question can not be considered by us, and it is not necessary to discuss it further here. The evidence is not ail before us, and under rulings of this court, affirmed by the Supreme Court, we have no authority to examine into the question of the facts in this proceeding.

It is urged, however, that there is error manifest in the record in the ruling which the court made upon the admission of evidence.

Attention is first called to an alleged error of this sort ap[264]*264pearing at page 7 of the record. Frank William Karber was a witness who had been called by the plaintiff, and testified as to the location of the tracks and his observations and experiments made at the place where the accident occurred. From the evidence it appears that there was a tool house situated on the right-of-way of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry., and it was claimed that this tool house was so situated as to render it impossible for one driving on Grace street, as this plaintiff was, to see along the track of the Pennsylvania Company for a sufficient distance to avoid collision with trains coming on that road from that direction.

After the witness had told that he had made some experiments to determine the effect that the location of this tool house had upon the view of one from Grace street along the Pennsylvania track, he was asked this question:

“What did you do?”'

This was objected to by the defendant; the objection, however, was overruled by the court, and the witness answered:

“I stood on the south track of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry;, on the south rail of the main track, and observed that the tool house obstructed the view of the westbound track, beginning at a point about 1000 feet back and extending for quite a distance.
“Q. Back from where? A. Standing on the south rail of the main track.”

Then his attention is called to the fact that at that particular point although the general direction of the road is east and west, as it passes through this village, it runs practically north and south, and the track which is oil the left hand side as trains are coming toward Cleveland, is spoken of among the railroad people as the southerly track, although at this particular point it is the westerly track.

The witness then says:

“Standing on the westerly rail I observed that the tool house obstructed the view of the west bound track, beginning at a point approximately 1000 feet back from the center line of Grace street.”

The defendant moved that this answer be takén from the jury and this motion was sustained.

It is said that there is error in this, because the point which [265]*265the plaintiff was seeking to make was that the Wheeling'& L. E. Ry. had erected a building on its right-of-way at such a point that it obstructed the view of the Pennsylvania, and that therefore this was negligence on the part of the Wheeling & L. E. Ry.

Other questions were asked of a similar nature immediately following the questions to which attention has been called, and objection to some of them being answered was sustained, and answers to others were taken from the jury.

It is urged on the part of the defendant in error that the rulings were proper because, it is said, to say that a building obstructed one’s view is to state a conclusion.

We are not impressed with the soundness of this reasoning. It seems to us exceedingly technical to say that one may not testify that a building obstructed his view. However, we are unable to see that the plaintiff suffered from this ruling, by reason of what immediately followed.

The witness was asked to describe the tool house, size and height. He had already, given its location, and he answered to this question, as follows:

‘ ‘

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 261, 20 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davider-v-wheeling-l-e-ry-ohcirctcuyahoga-1912.