David W. Wilson v. Stuart Sherman, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 17, 2026·No. 1:22-cv-00874·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID W. WILSON, Case No.: 1:22-cv-00874-JLT-SKO (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 13 v. DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE EXHAUSTION 14 STUART SHERMAN, et al., (Doc. 50) 15 Defendants. 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 16

17 Plaintiff David W. Wilson is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims 21 against Defendants Cisneros, Collins, Florez, Leahy, Lines, Marsh, Morales, Phillips, Rocha, 22 Sherman, Smith and Williams. 23 On March 27, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment alleging Plaintiff 24 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his claims against Defendants Leahy and Lines. 25 (Doc. 50.) Plaintiff filed an opposition (Doc. 56), and Defendants replied (Doc. 59).1 26

27 1 In arriving at these findings and recommendations, the Court reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections, and other papers totaling more than 1,100 pages filed by the parties. Omission of reference to 1 II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 2 A. Summary Judgment 3 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 4 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 5 Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine 6 issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 7 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by 8 “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 9 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, 10 interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the 11 absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 12 evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears 13 the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of 14 evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 15 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 16 Summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing 17 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 18 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of 19 proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 20 facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, 21 “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 22 summary judgment … is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 23 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 24 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with 25 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 26 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 27

consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the 1 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is 2 mandatory and “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 3 211 (2007). Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in accordance 4 with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in 5 federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies 6 to all inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of 7 the relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 8 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 9 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the 10 defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. The defendant bears the burden of 11 producing evidence that proves a failure to exhaust; and, summary judgment is appropriate only if 12 the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff 13 failed to exhaust. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 14 On a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must prove (1) the existence of an 15 available administrative remedy; and (2) that the plaintiff failed to exhaust that remedy. Albino, 16 747 F.3d at 1172 (citation omitted). If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff then “has the 17 burden of production. That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence 18 showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 19 available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. (citation omitted). 20 “However, … the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant.” Id. 21 An inmate “need not exhaust unavailable [remedies].” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 22 (2016). An administrative remedy is unavailable “when (despite what regulations or guidance 23 materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end with officers unable or consistently 24 unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; or when “an administrative scheme [is] so 25 opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use, [i.e.,] some mechanism exists to 26 provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate [the mechanism]”; or “when 27 prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through 1 When the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted administrative 2 remedies on a claim, “the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt v. 3 Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by 4 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168-69. “If a motion for summary judgment is denied, disputed factual 5 questions relevant to exhaustion should be decided by the judge.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170. If the 6 court finds that remedies were not available, the prisoner exhausted available remedies, or the 7 failure to exhaust available remedies should be excused, the case proceeds to the merits. Id.

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