David W. Ashby v. BWX Technologies and Ace American Insurance Co.
This text of David W. Ashby v. BWX Technologies and Ace American Insurance Co. (David W. Ashby v. BWX Technologies and Ace American Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Russell and Athey UNPUBLISHED
Argued by teleconference
BWX TECHNOLOGIES AND ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.
v. Record No. 1683-19-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS DAVID W. ASHBY MAY 5, 2020
DAVID W. ASHBY
v. Record No. 1735-19-3
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Michael P. Gardner (Erin B. Ashwell; Christopher W. Stevens; Frank K. Friedman; Woods Rogers PLC, on briefs), for BWX Technologies and Ace American Insurance Co.
Philip B. Baker (Sanzone & Baker, L.L.P., on briefs), for David W. Ashby.
On September 20, 2019, the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”),
despite finding that David W. Ashby (“Ashby”) did not unjustifiably refuse selective
employment, denied his claim for temporary partial disability benefits because he presented no
evidence that he marketed his residual capacity. All parties before the Commission appeal. In
their appeal, BWX Technologies (“BWX”) and Ace American Insurance Co. (“Ace American”)
contend the Commission erred in holding Ashby did not unjustifiably refuse selective
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. employment. In his appeal, Ashby argues that the Commission erred in sua sponte finding that
he failed to adequately market his residual capacity.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2017, Ashby sustained a cervical injury while working for BWX as a hot
sizing mill operator. In June 2018, after a period of temporary total disability, Ashby returned to
his pre-injury position and worked with restrictions. However, after a functional capacity
evaluation in August 2018, BWX human resources informed Ashby that he could no longer
continue in the same job. BWX then offered Ashby three jobs within his capacity. All three
positions operated on different shifts, and Ashby selected the position that paid the lowest hourly
rate because that position operated on the day shift.
On January 8, 2019, Ashby filed a hearing request seeking temporary partial disability
beginning October 15, 2018. Following the hearing, the deputy commissioner found that there
was no unjustified refusal because, by the very nature of offering three jobs, Ashby was required
to refuse two. Nevertheless, despite BWX not pleading or raising the issue, the deputy
commissioner then sua sponte noted the fact that Ashby failed to produce evidence that he
marketed his residual work capacity and ultimately denied Ashby’s claim on that basis. Ashby
and BWX filed requests for review before the full Commission.
On September 20, 2019, the full Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner’s
decision for the reasons set forth by the deputy commissioner. Specifically, with respect to
Ashby’s failure to market his residual capacity, the Commission held that a claimant seeking
temporary partial disability has “an affirmative duty to prove that he marketed his residual
capacity.” This appeal and cross-appeal follow.
-2- II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The Commission’s findings of fact, if supported by credible evidence, will not be
disturbed on appeal. Crisp v. Brown’s Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App. 503, 504 (1986)
(citing Lewis v. Lynchburg Foundry Co., 204 Va. 303, 305 (1963)). We construe the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party below on the respective appeals before us. Id.
Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Humphrey, 41
Va. App. 147, 155 (2003) (citing Sinclair v. Shelter Constr. Corp., 23 Va. App. 154, 156-57
(1996)).
B. Marketing Residual Capacity
When an employee sustains a work-related injury that causes a temporary partial
disability, the “claimant will receive compensation in the amount of two-thirds ‘of the difference
between his average weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is
able to earn thereafter.’” Nat’l Linen Serv. v. McGuinn, 8 Va. App. 267, 270 (1989) (emphasis
added) (quoting Code § 65.1-55 (current version at Code § 65.2-502)). Thus, “[a] partially
disabled employee ‘who seeks compensation of the wage differential between his new and his
old jobs, has the burden of proving that he has made a reasonable effort to market his full
remaining work capacity.’” Va. Nat. Gas, Inc. v. Tennessee, 50 Va. App. 270, 282 (2007)
(emphasis added) (quoting McGuinn, 8 Va. App. at 270). The determination of whether a
partially disabled employee has adequately marketed his residual work capacity lies within the
fact-finding judgment of the Commission, and its decision on that question, if supported by
credible evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal. Wall St. Deli, Inc. v. O’Brien, 32 Va. App.
217, 220-21 (2000).
-3- As a prerequisite to prevailing on his claim for temporary partial disability benefits,
Ashby had an affirmative duty to present evidence from which the Commission could find that
he made a reasonable effort to market his remaining capacity to work or that his injury left him
no capacity to market. Accordingly, his argument that he only needed to present evidence on
marketing if it was placed in issue by his employer as a defense in discovery or at the hearing is
without merit. Moreover, Ashby was on notice that he needed to present evidence on marketing
after the hearing before the deputy commissioner and could have presented such evidence to the
full Commission. Because Ashby failed to present any evidence on marketing, the
Commission’s decision is supported by credible evidence.
Although Ashby contends that the marketing issue is related to the vocational
rehabilitation issue that the deputy commissioner docketed for a separate hearing date, the
vocational rehabilitation issue is a separate claim for benefits and that record is not made part of
this appeal. Ashby’s affirmative duty to market his residual capacity and present evidence of
such marketing was not relieved by the existence of a separate and unrelated claim for vocational
training benefits. By failing to present evidence of efforts to market his residual work capacity,
Ashby failed to meet his burden to obtain an award of temporary partial disability benefits and
the Commission did not err in denying his claim.
Because we find that, based on the record before us, Ashby was not entitled to benefits,
we need not and do not address whether he justifiably refused selective employment. See Va.
Dep’t of State Police v. Elliott, 48 Va. App. 551, 554 (2006) (defining our duty to not render
advisory opinions as the duty “not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before
it” (quoting Hankins v. Town of Va. Beach, 182 Va. 642, 644 (1944))). We therefore dismiss
BWX and Ace American’s appeal.
-4- III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the Commission in Record No.
1735-19-3 and dismiss the cross-appeal in Record No. 1683-19-3.
Record No. 1683-19-3, appeal dismissed. Record No. 1735-19-3, affirmed.
-5-
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