David Van Skiver v. Alessandra Miscellaneous Metal Works, Incorported

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: A-2912-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2912-24

DAVID VAN SKIVER,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

ALESSANDRA MISCELLANEOUS METAL WORKS, INCORPORTED,

Respondent-Appellant. ___________________________

Submitted April 15, 2026 – Decided June 18, 2026

Before Judges Paganelli and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Claim Petition No. 2022-24247.

Maria Guerra (Law Office of Jennifer L. Dryer), attorney for appellant.

Laddey Clark & Ryan, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Timothy E. Dinan, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Respondent-employer Alessandra Miscellaneous Metalworks, Inc.,

appeals a Division of Workers' Compensation order imposing monetary

sanctions for failure to comply with a prior court order to timely pay settlement

proceeds to petitioner-employee David Van Skiver. We affirm.

I.

On February 14, 2019, petitioner suffered injuries from a workplace

accident. On December 4, 2024, Workers' Compensation Judge Glenn Kaplan

entered an Order Approving Settlement in the sum of $24,381 for permanent

disability in favor of petitioner. On December 9, petitioner's counsel emailed

the order to respondent's counsel. The next day, respondent's counsel requested

information regarding a child-support lien. Petitioner's counsel promptly

provided the information.

When no payment was received in response to the lien information,

petitioner's counsel sent follow-up emails to respondent's counsel on January 14

and January 16, 2025. No reply was received. On Friday, January 31,

petitioner's counsel advised respondent's counsel that the sixty-day statutory

period for payment would expire on February 2, and requested the check be sent

by overnight delivery to avoid penalties.

A-2912-24 2 On Monday, February 3, petitioner still had not received payment.

Petitioner's counsel again requested that payment be sent by overnight delivery.

On the afternoon of February 3, Michael Forward, a Liberty Mutual claims

adjuster, responded by email stating, "I have the checks that I could release out

earlier today." Petitioner's counsel asked for confirmation the checks had been

mailed but received no response.

On February 4, when neither confirmation of mailing nor delivery of the

check followed, petitioner's counsel filed a motion, with an accompanying

certification, to compel respondent to comply with the December 4 order. On

February 5, petitioner's counsel filed an application for review or modification

of formal award, certifying that respondent had failed to timely issue the

permanency benefits payment. Petitioner received his first permanency check

on February 6, 2025.

On April 9, 2025, Judge Kaplan issued an Order for Compliance, finding

respondent had failed to comply with the December 4 order and awarding

interest and sanctions in the sum of $5,028.18, or twenty-five percent of the

original payment due, plus attorney's fees ($1,523.75) and costs ($750).

Respondent moved for reconsideration.

A-2912-24 3 On May 5, Judge Kaplan presided over a testimonial hearing on the

motion for reconsideration. Respondent called Margaret Hudreck, a claims

manager for Liberty Mutual, who testified she had issued the permanency check

for petitioner on January 31, 2025, and that because "the print cycle starts at

10:30 p.m. that night, then the check is released early the next morning with a

date postmarked the following day." When asked by petitioner's counsel

whether she had "been able to verify that the check was mailed and postmarked

the next day, which would be February 1, 2025[,]" she responded, "I have no

way of verifying postmark dates." On cross-examination, Hudreck

acknowledged she had no proof the check was actually mailed before February

2, stating, "I only have what our protocol is." She also acknowledged she did

not have a copy of the envelope containing the subject payment and had "no way

of obtaining" it.

Based on this testimony and the email from Forward, the judge rendered

an oral decision finding respondent had released the check on February 3, sixty-

one days after entry of the December 4 order. He thus denied respondent's

reconsideration motion and pronounced the April 9 Order of Compliance

awarding sanctions and interest "back in effect."

A-2912-24 4 On appeal respondent argues payment was timely as it was issued on day

fifty-eight.

II.

"[T]he scope of [our] review of factual findings by a judge of

compensation is limited." Renner v. AT&T, 218 N.J. 435, 448 (2014). We "will

not reverse the ultimate determination of an agency unless [we] conclude[] that

it was 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the

evidence, or that it violated legislative policies' expressed or implied in the act

governing the agency." In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permit No. 16, 379 N.J.

Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39

N.J. 556, 562 (1963)); see also Ripp v. Cnty. of Hudson, 472 N.J. Super. 600,

606, 608-09 (App. Div. 2022).

N.J.S.A. 34:15-28 provides:

Whenever lawful compensation shall have been withheld from an injured employee or dependents for a term of 60 or more days following entry of a judgment or order, simple interest on each weekly payment for the period of delay of each payment may, at the discretion of the division, be added to the amount due at the time of settlement. . . .

N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.2 authorizes judges to order proper compensation:

If any employer, insurer, claimant, or counsel to the employer, insurer, or claimant, or other party to a claim

A-2912-24 5 for compensation, fails to comply with any order of a judge of compensation or with the requirements of any statute or regulation regarding workers' compensation, a judge of compensation may, in addition to any other remedies provided by law:

a. Impose costs, simple interest on any moneys due, an additional assessment not to exceed 25% of moneys due for unreasonable payment delay, and reasonable legal fees, to enforce the order, statute or regulation;

b. Impose additional fines and other penalties on parties or counsel in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for unreasonable delay, with the proceeds of the penalties paid into the Second Injury Fund;

....

f. Take other actions deemed appropriate by the judge of compensation with respect to the claim. "In the first instance, N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.2(a) justifies imposition of a

penalty, regardless of its amount, only to 'enforce the order' of the J[udge of

Worker's Compensation], and only if there is an 'unreasonable payment delay'

of the 'moneys due.'" Ripp, 472 N.J. Super. at 609. "N.J.S.A. 34:15-

28.2(a) limits imposition of a penalty to situations justifying the court's

enforcement of its order . . . if there is an 'unreasonable payment delay.'" Ibid.

A-2912-24 6 A judge's decision to impose a penalty is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See

id. at 610.

Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied substantial credible

evidence supports the judge's finding that the check was issued beyond the

statutory deadline. The unexplained delay, lack of communication, and failure

to provide confirmation of mailing all weigh in favor of the judge's

determination the delay was unreasonable. We conclude the judge did not abuse

his discretion in imposing a monetary penalty against respondent, as authorized

by N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.

We add that the sixty-day deadline does not mandate a financial penalty

be imposed. N.J.S.A. 34:15-28 is a permissive statute, outlining that

"[w]henever lawful compensation . . . [is] withheld . . . for a term of 60 or more

days following entry of a judgment or order, simple interest on each weekly

payment . . . may . . . be added." (Emphasis added).

Here, the judge acted within his discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-

28.2, which authorizes a judge to impose penalties against a party who "fails to

comply with any order of a judge." It is sufficient that the judge found there

was an unreasonable delay in payment—in this case, of sixty-one days—due to

respondent's failure to comply with the December 4 order. See Ripp, 472 N.J.

A-2912-24 7 Super. at 609. Thus, the judge was authorized to impose a sanction in his

reasonable discretion. Further, the sanction was not excessive because it

amounted to twenty-five percent of the sum respondent owed petitioner, as

expressly authorized by N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.2(a).

Affirmed.

A-2912-24 8