David Simmons v. Paul Caspari

Eighth Circuit

David Simmons v. Paul Caspari

73 F. App'x 901

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedAugust 26, 2003

Docket03-1651

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 73 F. App'x 901 (David Simmons v. Paul Caspari) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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David Simmons v. Paul Caspari, 73 F. App'x 901 (8th Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Missouri inmate David Simmons appeals from the district court’s 1 denial of his Fed *902 eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motions requesting that the district court reopen its dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. For reversal, Simmons argues the district court erred because it did not specifically state that it had conducted an inquiry and had concluded his allegations amounted to a second or successive habeas petition. He also raises several arguments not included in his Rule 60(b) motions, which we decline to review. See Briley v. Carlin, 172 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir.1999).

Upon careful review of the record, we reject Simmons’s argument. For the most part, Simmons’s motions clearly attack his conviction and sentence, and thus were properly denied as an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); cf. United States v. Patton, 309 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (affirming denial of Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) motion where motion was actually successive habeas petition which inmate did not request authorization to file). To the extent that his Rule 60 motions raise fraud as grounds to set aside the dismissal of his section 2254 petition, his motions were untimely as they were not filed within one year of the dismissal. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d 764, 766-67 (8th Cir.1989).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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PER CURIAM.

Missouri inmate David Simmons appeals from the district court’s 1 denial of his Fed *902 eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motions requesting that the district court reopen its dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. For reversal, Simmons argues the district court erred because it did not specifically state that it had conducted an inquiry and had concluded his allegations amounted to a second or successive habeas petition. He also raises several arguments not included in his Rule 60(b) motions, which we decline to review. See Briley v. Carlin, 172 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir.1999).

Upon careful review of the record, we reject Simmons’s argument. For the most part, Simmons’s motions clearly attack his conviction and sentence, and thus were properly denied as an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); cf. United States v. Patton, 309 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (affirming denial of Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) motion where motion was actually successive habeas petition which inmate did not request authorization to file). To the extent that his Rule 60 motions raise fraud as grounds to set aside the dismissal of his section 2254 petition, his motions were untimely as they were not filed within one year of the dismissal. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d 764, 766-67 (8th Cir.1989).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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73 F. App'x 901, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-simmons-v-paul-caspari-ca8-2003.

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