David Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 24, 2024
DocketDE-3330-18-0231-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of David Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs (David Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID R. SHAW, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-3330-18-0231-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 24, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David R. Shaw , Wichita, Kansas, pro se.

Zane P. Schmeeckle , Kansas City, Missouri, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to incorporate the Board’s finding in Oram v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 30, into the initial decision’s analysis of the opportunity-to-compete provision in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f), and to address the appellant’s claim as to the rating and ranking of applications, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND The appellant is a preference-eligible veteran and was appointed to a career-conditional appointment as a GS-12 IT Specialist (INFOSEC), effective July 1, 2012. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 33. The agency posted a vacancy announcement for a competitive-service GS-13 IT Specialist (INFOSEC) position, which was open from January 3 to 4, 2018. Id. at 15, 24-32. The announcement identified the appointment type as permanent and stated that the position was open to the public. Id. at 25. The announcement also indicated that the position was being filled through “the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Government-Wide Direct-Hire Authority” and that, while traditional veterans’ preference rules did not apply, qualified veterans would be given full consideration for the position. Id. at 26, 29. The appellant did not apply to the vacancy. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. 3

Subsequently, the appellant filed a VEOA complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL). Id. at 7-10. After exhausting his remedies with DOL, id. at 11-12, the appellant filed a Board appeal in which he argued that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights by not allowing him to apply and compete for the job announcement in violation of his right to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). 2 Id. at 1, 5. He requested a hearing. Id. at 2. The administrative judge issued an order finding Board jurisdiction over the appellant’s allegation that he was denied the opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f). IAF, Tab 8 at 1. The administrative judge determined that there was no genuine dispute of material fact, and the appeal could be adjudicated without a hearing. IAF, Tab 10. Based on the written record, the administrative judge issued an initial decision denying the appellant’s request for corrective action under VEOA. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID). He found that the appellant established that he had exhausted his remedy with DOL; there was no dispute that he was a veteran within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1); and he established that the action challenged took place after December 10, 2004. ID at 3-4. He further found that neither 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1), nor any other law or regulation related to veterans’ preference, was violated because the appellant had the opportunity to compete for the vacancy, even though he did not submit an application before the vacancy closed. ID at 5. The appellant timely filed a petition for review. 3 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency filed a response to the petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

2 During the adjudication of this VEOA appeal, the appellant seemed to raise an employment practices claim, which the administrative judge docketed as a separate appeal. See Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-300A-18-0232-I-1. 3 The petition for review also contains the appellant’s arguments for his employment practices appeal which we address in our decision in that separate appeal. See Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-300A-18-0232-I-1. 4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW In Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the opportunity-to-compete provision in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f) is not applicable to a veteran who is already employed in the Federal civil service. Kerner, 778 F.3d at 1338-39. Here, it is undisputed that the appellant is a current Federal employee with the agency. IAF, Tab 7 at 23, 33. Therefore, he is not entitled to recovery on his claim as a matter of law. Oram v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 17; see Haasz v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 108 M.S.P.R. 349, ¶ 9 (2008) (holding that the Board has authority to decide a VEOA appeal on the merits, without holding a hearing, when one party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law). Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s denial of corrective action, as modified to reflect that the basis for doing so is the appellant’s status as a Federal employee. On review, the appellant again contends that the agency’s use of direct-hire authority violated his veterans’ preference rights. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; IAF, Tab 1 at 5. The administrative judge did not address this claim. It is undisputed that the agency advertised the IT Specialist position under OPM’s Direct Hiring Authority. IAF, Tab 7 at 26. When an agency exercises direct-hire authority pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3304

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Related

Kerner v. Department of the Interior
778 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Cyril Oram v. Department of the Navy
2022 MSPB 30 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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David Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-shaw-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.