David Servin v. State
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Opinion
NUMBER 13-15-00369-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DAVID SERVIN, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
On June 30, 2014, David Servin entered a plea of guilty to the offense of online
solicitation of a minor, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.021
(West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The trial court deferred adjudication and placed
Servin on community supervision for a period of four years and imposed various conditions of community supervision.
On February 17, 2015, the State filed a motion to adjudicate Servin’s guilt alleging
that he violated various terms of his community supervision, including: committing two
separate driving-while-intoxicated offenses, see id. § 49.04 (West, Westlaw through 2015
R.S.); committing the offense of failing to identify, see id. § 38.02 (West, Westlaw through
2015 R.S.); using alcohol while on community supervision; and failing to report to his
probation officer. After pleading not true to these allegations, a hearing was held on the
State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, where testimony was received from his probation
officer, as well as the two officers who arrested Servin for his various criminal offenses.
After the hearing, the trial court found, among other allegations, that Servin had
committed the criminal offenses as alleged in the State’s motion and adjudicated him
guilty of online solicitation of a minor. See id. § 33.021. The trial court sentenced Servin
to seven years’ confinement with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Institutional
Division. Servin’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Pursuant to Anders v. California, Servin’s court-appointed appellate counsel has
filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record
yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id.
Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief
need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must
2 provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal
authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State and Kelly v. State, Servin’s counsel carefully
discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s
judgment. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978);
Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Servin’s appellate
counsel also notified this Court that he: (1) notified Servin that he has filed an Anders
brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Servin with copies of both pleadings; (3)
informed Servin of his rights to file a pro se response, review the record preparatory to
filing that response,1 and seek discretionary review if we concluded that the appeal is
frivolous; (4) provided Servin with a pro se motion to access the record; and (5) informed
Servin that the pro se response, if any, should identify for the Court those issues which
he believes the Court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any
meritorious issues. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; Stafford,
813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. A reasonable
amount of time has passed, and Servin had not filed a pro se brief.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether to case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23 (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
3 proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). A court of appeals has two options when an Anders brief and a
subsequent pro se response are filed. After reviewing the entire record, it may: (1)
determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it finds
no reversible error; or (2) determine that there are arguable grounds for appeal and
remand the case to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel. Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If the court finds arguable
grounds for appeal, it may not review those grounds until after new counsel has briefed
those issues on appeal. Id.
We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found
nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See id. at 827–28 (“Due to the nature
of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the
briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals
met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d
at 509. There is no reversible error in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, Servin’s attorney has asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel for Servin. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffrey v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must
withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the
appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
4 appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw. Within five days of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send
a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Servin and advise him of his right to
file a petition for discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re
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