David S. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 1:24-cv-03190
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Mar 23, 2026 1 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 8 DAVID S., No. 1:24-CV-03190-JAG

9 Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING 10 v. DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 11 FRANK BISIGNANO, LAW JUDGE 12 Commissioner of Social Security,1

13 Defendant. 14 15 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and the 16 Commissioner’s Brief in response. ECF Nos. 10, 12. Attorney Jeffrey Schwab 17 represents David S. (Plaintiff); Special Assistant United States Attorney Jennifer 18 Forsyth represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant). The parties 19 20 have consented to proceed before the undersigned by operation of Local Magistrate 21 Judge Rule (LMJR) 2(b)(2), as no party returned a Declination of Consent Form to 22 the Clerk’s Office by the established deadline. ECF No. 5. After reviewing the 23 administrative record and briefs filed by the parties the Court AFFIRMS the 24 Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision. 25 26

27 1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano 28 is substituted as the defendant in this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 1 I. JURISDICTION 2 Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and 3 Supplemental Security Income on May 3, 2022, alleging disability since 4 September 12, 2016, due to severe osteoarthritis, prosthetic hips, heart arrhythmia, 5 and bipolar disorder. Tr. 17. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on 6 reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an ALJ. Tr. 17, 90, 118. A 7 hearing was held on April 4, 2024, at which time Plaintiff amended the alleged 8 disability onset date to September 1, 2019. Tr. 17. Vocational expert Mark Mann, 9 and Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified. Tr. 33-61. ALJ Malcolm 10 Ross presided. Tr. 33. The ALJ denied benefits on May 1, 2024. Tr. 14-28. The 11 Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1. The ALJ’s decision became the final 12 decision of the Commissioner, which is appealable to the district court pursuant to 13 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on November 21, 14 2024. ECF No. 1. 15 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 16 The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings 17 and the ALJ’s decision and are only briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was born in 18 1963 and was 52 years old on the alleged onset date. Tr. 90. Plaintiff’s past jobs 19 include street sweeper and security guard Tr. 27. 20 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 22 23 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 24 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 25 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 26 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 27 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 28 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 1 2 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 3 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. 4 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one 5 rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 6 ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 7 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the 8 administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either 9 disability or non-disability, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. 10 Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision 11 supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards 12 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. 13 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 14 IV. SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 15 The Commissioner established a five-step sequential evaluation process for 16 determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); 17 see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through four, the 18 burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of 19 entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is 20 met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him 21 from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 22 23 If a claimant cannot do his past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and 24 the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can make an 25 adjustment to other work; and (2) the claimant can perform specific jobs that exist 26 in the national economy. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 27 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in 28 the national economy, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 1 2 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 3 V. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS 4 On May 1, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled 5 as defined in the Social Security Act. 6 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 7 gainful activity since September 1, 2019. Tr. 19. 8 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of cervical 9 spine degenerative disk disease and status post-bilateral hip joint replacement. 10 Tr. 20. 11 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment 12 or combination of impairments that meets or medically equal one of the listed 13 impairments in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 14 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). Tr. 22. 15 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 16 (“RFC”) to perform medium work, except Plaintiff cannot: 17 frequently climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; frequently reach 18 bilaterally; frequently handle and finger bilaterally; and frequent 19 exposure to extreme cold and vibrations. 20 Tr 23. 21 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform past relevant work 22 as a street sweeper and a security guard. Tr. 27. 23 At step five, the ALJ found that, based on the testimony of the vocational 24 expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 25 Plaintiff was also capable of performing jobs that existed in significant numbers in 26 the national economy, including the jobs of floor waxer, hand launderer, and 27 industrial cleaner. Tr. 28 28 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the 1 2 meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through 3 the date of the decision. Tr. 28. 4 VI. ISSUES 5 The question presented is whether substantial evidence exists to support the 6 ALJ's decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper 7 legal standards. 8 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) Improperly finding Plaintiff’s 9 shoulder impairment was not severe; (2) Improperly rejecting medical opinions of 10 Ms. Dahl and Ms. Newman; (3) Improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony; and 11 (4) Failing to conduct Step Four Assessment properly. 12 VII. DISCUSSION 13 A. Step Two- Shoulder Impairment. 14 At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine 15 whether the claimant has any medically determinable severe impairments. 20 16 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(ii), 416.920(a)(ii). The impairment “must result from 17 anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown by 18 medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. 19 §§ 404.1521, 416.921. The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that an 20 impairment is medically determinable and severe. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 21 Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 23 The step-two analysis is “a de minimis screening device used to dispose of 24 groundless claims.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). An 25 impairment is “not severe” if it does not “significantly limit” the ability to conduct 26 “basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). Basic work activities are 27 “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). “An 28 impairment or combination of impairments can be found not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on 1 2 an individual’s ability to work.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 3 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 At Step Two the ALJ found that the bilateral shoulder pain was not severe 5 because the symptoms were mild, transient, or otherwise caused no more than 6 minimal functional impairment. Tr. 20. Plaintiff argues that while the shoulder 7 symptoms fluctuated with time, the medical evidence supports a finding of a more 8 than minimal impairment caused by shoulder pain. ECF No. 10. Any error arising 9 from failure to include an impairment at Step Two is harmless when the ALJ 10 includes limitations that address the impairment, as the ALJ did in this case. Lewis 11 v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir 2007). 12 B. Medical Opinions. 13 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ must consider and 14 evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical 15 findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) and (b), 20 C.F.R. 16 § 404.1520c(c). The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions 17 and prior administrative findings include supportability, consistency, the source’s 18 relationship with the claimant, any specialization of the source, and other factors 19 (such as the source’s familiarity with other evidence in the file or an understanding 20 of Social Security’s disability program). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(5), 20 C.F.R. 21 § 404.1520c(c). 22 23 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and the ALJ 24 must explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2), 20 25 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). The ALJ may explain how the ALJ considered the other 26 factors, but is not required to do so, except in cases where two or more opinions 27 are equally well-supported and consistent with the record. Id. Supportability and 28 consistency are explained in the regulations: (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence 1 and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to 2 support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 3 finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be. 4

5 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other 6 medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more 7 persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be. 8 9 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). 10 The Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of whether the regulatory 11 framework displaces the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide 12 specific and legitimate reasons to reject an examining provider’s opinion. Woods 13 v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). In Woods, the court held that the 14 2017 regulations eliminate any hierarchy of medical opinions, and the specific and 15 legitimate standard no longer applies. Id. at 788-89, 792. The court reasoned the 16 “relationship factors” remain relevant under the new regulations, and thus the ALJ 17 can still consider the length and purpose of the treatment relationship, the 18 frequency of examinations, the kinds and extent of examinations that the medical 19 source has performed or ordered from specialists, and whether the medical source 20 has examined the claimant or merely reviewed the claimant’s records. Id. at 790, 21 792. Even under the new regulations, an ALJ must provide an explanation 22 supported by substantial evidence when rejecting an examining or treating doctor’s 23 opinion as unsupported or inconsistent. Id. at 792. 24 Here, the ALJ considered opinions from consultative examiner Marquetta 25 26 Washington, ARNP, state agency consultant Dr. Magdaleno, MD, state agency 27 consultant Dr. Gerrish, MD, treating provider Carissa Dahl, ARNP, and Chelsea 28 Newman, PA-C, finding the first three persuasive and the latter two unpersuasive. The ALJ addressed the supportability and consistency of the opinions of each of 1 2 the providers. Plaintiff complains that the ALJ’s reasoning was based on 3 inaccurate analysis of the evidence and unsupported by Plaintiff’s treatment record. 4 1. Carissa. Dahl, ARNP: 5 The ALJ’s conclusions were supported by the ALJ’s review of the record 6 and consistent with Plaintiff’s treatment history. The ALJ found Carissa Dahl’s 7 opinion that Plaintiff be limited to sedentary work unpersuasive because, according 8 to the ALJ, Ms. Dahl relied on little more than range of motion deficits and lack of 9 support in the treatment record. The ALJ supported the finding based on lack of 10 left shoulder problems, only episodic right shoulder pain, and little to no mention 11 of pain or complaints regarding the hips or cervical spine. Tr. 26. Consequently, 12 the ALJ permissibly concluded that the treatment record was inconsistent with the 13 opinion that Plaintiff be limited to sedentary work. Tr. 26. 14 2. Chelsea Newman, PAC: 15 On December 15, 2017, Chelsea Newman opined that Plaintiff’s was limited 16 to sedentary work due to bilateral hip osteoarthritis, due to mild interference with 17 standing and heavy lifting as well as moderate interference with stooping and 18 crouching. Tr. 329. The ALJ found Chelsea Newman’s opinion unpersuasive 19 because the opinion “was issued nearly two years prior to the period at issue, 20 which began on the alleged onset date of disability of September 1, 2019.” Tr. 26. 21 Plaintiff argues that the limitations Ms. Newman opined continue indefinitely and 22 23 therefore the ALJ erred in “disregarding” Ms. Newman’s opinion. ECF No. 10 at 24 17. However, the ALJ did not disregard Ms. Newman’s opinion, rather the ALJ 25 considered the opinion, but found that Ms. Newman’s opinion conflicted with 26 opinions issued during the period consistent with Plaintiff’s alleged period of 27 disability. The ALJ found that the contemporaneously issued opinions were more 28 persuasive than one issued two years prior to the alleged onset date. Tr. 26. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Ms. Newman’s opinion conflicted with the 1 2 medical record which reflected conservative treatment for hip pain and little 3 mention of pain or clinical findings. Tr. 26. Such an analysis is not in error and is 4 supported by the treatment record. 5 C. Plaintiff’s Subjective Statements. 6 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting his subjective 7 complaints. ECF No. 10 at 17-21. It is the province of the ALJ to make 8 determinations regarding a claimant’s subjective statements. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 9 1039. However, the ALJ’s findings must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. 10 Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Once the claimant 11 produces medical evidence of an underlying medical impairment, the ALJ may not 12 discredit testimony as to the severity of an impairment merely because it is 13 unsupported by medical evidence. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 14 1998). Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting 15 the claimant’s testimony must be “specific, clear and convincing.” Smolen, 80 16 F.3d at 1281; Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. “General findings are insufficient: rather the 17 ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines 18 the claimant’s complaints.” Lester at 834; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 19 (9th Cir. 1993). 20 Here, the ALJ supported his rejection of the intensity, persistence and 21 limiting effects of claimant’s symptoms with specific references to the record. At 22 23 the 2024 hearing, Plaintiff complained of stiffness and described his symptoms: “It 24 wasn’t so bad five years ago, but the arthritis and other things that are happening to 25 me it takes me a few hours just to get moving in the morning…I can’t lift like I 26 used to, I can’t walk like I used to.” Tr. 44. In assessing Plaintiff’s testimony, the 27 ALJ noted that following a recovery period from the injuries and hip replacement 28 routine treatment notes “reflect little evidence of specific complaints, treatment, or findings regarding neck or hip pain.” Tr. 24. Regarding the shoulder pain, the 1 2 ALJ found that the record showed scant evidence of complaints of shoulder pain or 3 treatment for either shoulder. Tr. 25. 4 The ALJ cited to a consultative exam performed in 2023 wherein Plaintiff 5 demonstrated normal range of motion, normal strength, and normal muscle bulk 6 and tone. Tr. 25. Providers recommended conservative treatment and Plaintiff 7 required no prescriptions for pain. Tr. 25. Unexplained or inadequately explained 8 reasons for failing to seek medical treatment can cast doubt on a claimant’s 9 subjective complaints. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); Macri v. 10 Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1996)(finding the ALJ’s decision to reject the 11 claimant’s testimony was supported by the fact that claimant was not taking pain 12 medication). Further, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s self-reported activities, such as 13 bike riding and walking for transport contradicted the limitations asserted. Tr. 25. 14 D. Step Four Assessment. 15 A claimant has the burden of showing that she can no longer perform her 16 past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 404.1520(f). Although the 17 claimant has the burden of proof at step four, an ALJ must still make “the requisite 18 factual findings” to support his conclusions. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 844. An ALJ’s 19 determination at step four “must be developed and explained fully” and contain the 20 following specific findings of fact: (1) the claimant’s residual functional capacity; 21 (2) the physical and mental demands of the past relevant job/occupation; and (3) 22 23 that the claimant’s residual functional capacity would permit a return to her past 24 job or occupation. See S.S.R. 82-62. 25 Plaintiff argues that (1) the RFC improperly excluded limitations set forth by 26 Ms. Dahl and Ms. Newman; (2) the ALJ failed to make findings regarding the 27 specific demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work; and (3) the ALJ failed to 28 compare the specific demands to Plaintiff’s past work with his specific functional 1 || limitations. As discussed above, the Court finds that the limitations found by the ALJ were supported by the record. Regarding the second and third assignments of 3|| error, although the ALJ did not go into extensive detail regarding the basis for the 4|| findings, the ALJ solicited testimony from Plaintiff regarding how he performed 5|| his past relevant work and made an RFC finding that was supported by the record. 6|| Consequently, the finding that Plaintiff could perform past relevant work as was actually and generally performed was supported by the record. Tr. 27. In the alternative, the ALJ properly relied upon vocational expert testimony in finding 9|| that Plaintiff could perform as a floor waxer, hand launderer, or industrial cleaner, in light of his residual functional capacity. Tr. 28 i VIII. CONCLUSION 12 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ's findings, the Court concludes the I3 ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal error. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1. Defendant’s request to affirm the ALJ’s decision, ECF No. 12, is : GRANTED. 13 2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment/ request for remand, ECF 19 No. 10, is DENIED. 0 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant and the file shall be 97 || CLOSED. 23 DATED March 23, 2026.

25 JAMES A. GOEKE 26 [” UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28