David Rhodes v. Ricardo Chavez

Ninth Circuit

David Rhodes v. Ricardo Chavez

644 F. App'x 714

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 3, 2016

Docket13-17368

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 644 F. App'x 714 (David Rhodes v. Ricardo Chavez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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David Rhodes v. Ricardo Chavez, 644 F. App'x 714 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

David Thomas Rhodes, a former federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging that he was incarcerated beyond the term of his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008). We vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed Rhodes’ action as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); W. Ctr. For Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2000) (for Bivens claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and federal law for determining accrual). However, as appel-lees concede, the dismissal was improper because Rhodes was pursuing habeas relief when he was released from custody, and thus his claim did not accrue before his release. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (“[A prisoner’s 42 U.S.C.] § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”); Erlin v. United States, 364 F.3d 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2004) (explaining that under Heck, a cause of action for miscalculation of a prisoner’s release date does not accrue until the prisoner has won a writ of habeas corpus); Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir.1996) (order) (“Heck applies to Bivens actions.”).

Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of Rhodes’ action to the extent that the district court concluded it was barred by the statute of limitations, and remand for further proceedings. We express no opinion on whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over defendants Johnson and Watts.

Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid *716 ed by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

David Thomas Rhodes, a former federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging that he was incarcerated beyond the term of his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008). We vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed Rhodes’ action as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); W. Ctr. For Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2000) (for Bivens claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and federal law for determining accrual). However, as appel-lees concede, the dismissal was improper because Rhodes was pursuing habeas relief when he was released from custody, and thus his claim did not accrue before his release. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (“[A prisoner’s 42 U.S.C.] § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”); Erlin v. United States, 364 F.3d 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2004) (explaining that under Heck, a cause of action for miscalculation of a prisoner’s release date does not accrue until the prisoner has won a writ of habeas corpus); Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir.1996) (order) (“Heck applies to Bivens actions.”).

Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of Rhodes’ action to the extent that the district court concluded it was barred by the statute of limitations, and remand for further proceedings. We express no opinion on whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over defendants Johnson and Watts.

Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid *716 ed by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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