Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC19-1511 ____________
DAVID PUZIO, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
June 24, 2021
LAWSON, J.
We accepted review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
decision in the juvenile sentencing case of Puzio v. State, 278 So. 3d
82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), because it expressly and directly conflicts
with our decision in Williams v. State, 242 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2018),
on the same question of law. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The
conflict turns on the proper remedy for a harmful Alleyne error that
occurs where, in sentencing a juvenile offender under section
775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), the trial court enhances the
sentence under section 775.082(1)(b)1. without a jury finding of the fact that authorizes the enhancement, namely whether the juvenile
offender “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the
victim.” 1 See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013)
(“Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt.”); see also Williams, 242 So. 3d at 288 (holding
that the section 775.082(1)(b) finding authorizing the enhancement
“is an ‘element’ of the offense, which Alleyne requires be submitted
to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt”).
In Williams, we held that the “proper remedy” for a harmful
Alleyne error in this context “is to resentence the juvenile offender
pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2.,” 242 So. 3d at 282, which
applies to a juvenile offender “who did not actually kill, intend to
kill, or attempt to kill the victim.” Id. at 287 (quoting
§775.082(1)(b)2.). In Puzio, however, the Fourth District remanded
for the trial judge to remedy the same harmful error through a
1. The 2016 version of section 775.082(1)(b) applied to the resentencing in Williams, whereas the 2017 version applied to the resentencing at issue here. However, there is no substantive difference between these versions or the current version of the statute.
-2- “ministerial correction” of sentence, for which “[t]he defendant need
not be present.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86. Because the remedy
approved by the Fourth District falls short of the de novo
resentencing that Williams requires, we quash the district court’s
decision and remand with instructions to remand to the trial court
for resentencing as required by Williams.
BACKGROUND
In 1994, when Petitioner David Puzio was a juvenile, he and
two adults perpetrated a carjacking, in which two victims were shot
and killed. Id. at 84. The jury found Puzio guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder and one count of armed carjacking, and the
State sought the death penalty for the two homicide convictions. Id.
Puzio’s jury recommended life, and the trial court sentenced Puzio
to life in prison without parole on all three counts. Id.
In 2017, Puzio was resentenced following the United States
Supreme Court’s decision that “mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012)). With respect to the
homicide convictions, the trial court considered whether Puzio
should be resentenced, as argued by the State, pursuant to section
-3- 775.082(1)(b)1.—the sentencing statute applying to juveniles “who
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim”—or,
as argued by Puzio, pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2.—the
sentencing statute applying to juveniles “who did not actually kill,
intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 84
(quoting § 775.082(1)(b) 1.-2., Fla. Stat. (2017)).
While Puzio faced a possible life sentence under both
provisions, if sentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)1., he would
also receive a mandatory minimum of at least forty years in prison,
with entitlement to a sentencing review after twenty-five years. See
§§ 775.082(1)(b)1., 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat (2017). In contrast, if
sentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)2., the mandatory minimum
would not apply, and if Puzio was sentenced to more than fifteen
years in prison, he would be entitled to a sentencing review after
fifteen years. See §§ 775.082(1)(b)2., 921.1402(2)(c).
Puzio argued that he should be resentenced under section
775.082(1)(b)2. “because the jury was not asked to find, and did not
find, that he actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the
victims, as required under section 775.082(1)(b)1.” Puzio, 278 So.
3d at 85. He supported this argument by highlighting that the
-4- verdict form failed to ask his jury to differentiate between felony
murder and premeditation when determining whether he was guilty
of first-degree murder. Additionally, Puzio argued that his penalty-
phase jury made a contrary finding when it wrote the word “yes”
next to the following mitigating factor: Puzio “was an accomplice in
the offense . . . but the offense was committed by another person
and [Puzio]’s participation was relatively minor.”
Ultimately, the trial court applied section 775.082(1)(b)1. and
resentenced Puzio on both homicide counts “to sixty years in
prison, with entitlement to review after having spent twenty-five
years in prison.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 85. However, contrary to
section 775.082(1)(b)1., the trial court failed to state that Puzio
would be imprisoned for “at least forty years on the first[-]degree
murder counts.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 85. Puzio appealed to the
Fourth District, which temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the
trial court to comply with section 775.082(1)(b)3., which requires a
written finding by the trial court “as to whether a person is eligible
for a sentence review hearing under s. 921.1402(2)(a) or (c),” based
upon “whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or
attempted to kill the victim.” § 775.082(1)(b)3.
-5- During the relinquishment, this Court decided Williams.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a written sentencing order in
Puzio’s case, in which it explained that “although it proceeded
under subsection 775.082(1)(b)(1) [in resentencing Puzio] . . . it
equally finds a sixty-year sentence appropriate under section
775.082(1)(b)(2) in light of the facts of this case.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d
at 85. Almost two weeks later, without holding a hearing or
notifying the parties, the trial court also issued a new disposition
order—adding a mandatory forty-year minimum to Puzio’s
sentences for the homicide convictions. Id.
Puzio’s appeal then proceeded before the Fourth District. The
district court applied this Court’s decision in Williams to conclude
that the trial court committed an Alleyne error when resentencing
Puzio under section 775.082(1)(b)1. because “no jury has found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually killed, intended to kill,
or attempted to kill the victims.” Id. at 85-86. The district court
further held that the Alleyne error was harmful because “[t]he
record does not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a
rational jury would have found the defendant killed, intended to
-6- kill, or attempted to kill the victim[s].” Id.
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Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC19-1511 ____________
DAVID PUZIO, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
June 24, 2021
LAWSON, J.
We accepted review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
decision in the juvenile sentencing case of Puzio v. State, 278 So. 3d
82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), because it expressly and directly conflicts
with our decision in Williams v. State, 242 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2018),
on the same question of law. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The
conflict turns on the proper remedy for a harmful Alleyne error that
occurs where, in sentencing a juvenile offender under section
775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), the trial court enhances the
sentence under section 775.082(1)(b)1. without a jury finding of the fact that authorizes the enhancement, namely whether the juvenile
offender “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the
victim.” 1 See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013)
(“Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt.”); see also Williams, 242 So. 3d at 288 (holding
that the section 775.082(1)(b) finding authorizing the enhancement
“is an ‘element’ of the offense, which Alleyne requires be submitted
to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt”).
In Williams, we held that the “proper remedy” for a harmful
Alleyne error in this context “is to resentence the juvenile offender
pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2.,” 242 So. 3d at 282, which
applies to a juvenile offender “who did not actually kill, intend to
kill, or attempt to kill the victim.” Id. at 287 (quoting
§775.082(1)(b)2.). In Puzio, however, the Fourth District remanded
for the trial judge to remedy the same harmful error through a
1. The 2016 version of section 775.082(1)(b) applied to the resentencing in Williams, whereas the 2017 version applied to the resentencing at issue here. However, there is no substantive difference between these versions or the current version of the statute.
-2- “ministerial correction” of sentence, for which “[t]he defendant need
not be present.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86. Because the remedy
approved by the Fourth District falls short of the de novo
resentencing that Williams requires, we quash the district court’s
decision and remand with instructions to remand to the trial court
for resentencing as required by Williams.
BACKGROUND
In 1994, when Petitioner David Puzio was a juvenile, he and
two adults perpetrated a carjacking, in which two victims were shot
and killed. Id. at 84. The jury found Puzio guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder and one count of armed carjacking, and the
State sought the death penalty for the two homicide convictions. Id.
Puzio’s jury recommended life, and the trial court sentenced Puzio
to life in prison without parole on all three counts. Id.
In 2017, Puzio was resentenced following the United States
Supreme Court’s decision that “mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012)). With respect to the
homicide convictions, the trial court considered whether Puzio
should be resentenced, as argued by the State, pursuant to section
-3- 775.082(1)(b)1.—the sentencing statute applying to juveniles “who
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim”—or,
as argued by Puzio, pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2.—the
sentencing statute applying to juveniles “who did not actually kill,
intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 84
(quoting § 775.082(1)(b) 1.-2., Fla. Stat. (2017)).
While Puzio faced a possible life sentence under both
provisions, if sentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)1., he would
also receive a mandatory minimum of at least forty years in prison,
with entitlement to a sentencing review after twenty-five years. See
§§ 775.082(1)(b)1., 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat (2017). In contrast, if
sentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)2., the mandatory minimum
would not apply, and if Puzio was sentenced to more than fifteen
years in prison, he would be entitled to a sentencing review after
fifteen years. See §§ 775.082(1)(b)2., 921.1402(2)(c).
Puzio argued that he should be resentenced under section
775.082(1)(b)2. “because the jury was not asked to find, and did not
find, that he actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the
victims, as required under section 775.082(1)(b)1.” Puzio, 278 So.
3d at 85. He supported this argument by highlighting that the
-4- verdict form failed to ask his jury to differentiate between felony
murder and premeditation when determining whether he was guilty
of first-degree murder. Additionally, Puzio argued that his penalty-
phase jury made a contrary finding when it wrote the word “yes”
next to the following mitigating factor: Puzio “was an accomplice in
the offense . . . but the offense was committed by another person
and [Puzio]’s participation was relatively minor.”
Ultimately, the trial court applied section 775.082(1)(b)1. and
resentenced Puzio on both homicide counts “to sixty years in
prison, with entitlement to review after having spent twenty-five
years in prison.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 85. However, contrary to
section 775.082(1)(b)1., the trial court failed to state that Puzio
would be imprisoned for “at least forty years on the first[-]degree
murder counts.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 85. Puzio appealed to the
Fourth District, which temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the
trial court to comply with section 775.082(1)(b)3., which requires a
written finding by the trial court “as to whether a person is eligible
for a sentence review hearing under s. 921.1402(2)(a) or (c),” based
upon “whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or
attempted to kill the victim.” § 775.082(1)(b)3.
-5- During the relinquishment, this Court decided Williams.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a written sentencing order in
Puzio’s case, in which it explained that “although it proceeded
under subsection 775.082(1)(b)(1) [in resentencing Puzio] . . . it
equally finds a sixty-year sentence appropriate under section
775.082(1)(b)(2) in light of the facts of this case.” Puzio, 278 So. 3d
at 85. Almost two weeks later, without holding a hearing or
notifying the parties, the trial court also issued a new disposition
order—adding a mandatory forty-year minimum to Puzio’s
sentences for the homicide convictions. Id.
Puzio’s appeal then proceeded before the Fourth District. The
district court applied this Court’s decision in Williams to conclude
that the trial court committed an Alleyne error when resentencing
Puzio under section 775.082(1)(b)1. because “no jury has found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually killed, intended to kill,
or attempted to kill the victims.” Id. at 85-86. The district court
further held that the Alleyne error was harmful because “[t]he
record does not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a
rational jury would have found the defendant killed, intended to
-6- kill, or attempted to kill the victim[s].” Id. at 86 (summarizing
conflicting evidence and arguments in the record).
As to the proper remedy, however, rather than ordering the
resentencing required by Williams, the Fourth District reversed and
remanded for “ministerial correction” of Puzio’s sentences for the
two homicide offenses under section 775.082(1)(b)2., with a right to
review after Puzio spent fifteen years in prison. Puzio, 278 So. 3d at
86. The Fourth District further directed that Puzio “need not be
present for this ministerial correction” and offered the following
reasoning for why Puzio was not entitled to the resentencing
required by Williams:
[T]he trial court already stated that “it equally finds a sixty-year sentence appropriate under section 775.082(1)(b)(2) in light of the facts of this case.” . . . [T]he trial court’s comments conclusively show that the court would have imposed the same sentence.
Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86.
This Court accepted discretionary jurisdiction based on
express and direct conflict between the “ministerial correction”
remedy ordered in Puzio and the resentencing remedy ordered in
Williams. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
-7- ANALYSIS
We quash the Fourth District’s decision because its remedy of
a “ministerial correction” of sentence at which “[t]he defendant need
not be present,” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86, falls short of the remedy of
resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., which Williams
establishes is “the appropriate remedy for” the harmful Alleyne
error at issue, Williams, 242 So. 3d 280 at 292. “[R]esentencing is a
new proceeding.” State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008).
Therefore, resentencing under Williams must transpire “de novo on
all issues bearing on the proper sentence,” Teffeteller v. State, 495
So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1986), pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. in
order to provide “the full panoply of due process considerations” to
which the defendant is entitled, State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220
(Fla. 1983).
We recognize that the Fourth District based its “ministerial
correction” remedy on the trial court’s statement during
relinquishment that it would have imposed the same sentences for
the homicide offenses had it resentenced Puzio in the first instance
under section 775.082(1)(b)2. See Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86.
However, “[i]t is no answer to say that [Puzio] could have received
-8- the same sentence with or without” the presence of the harmful
Alleyne error. Williams, 242 So. 3d at 287 (quoting Alleyne, 570
U.S. at 115). Moreover, as ministerial corrections do not function
“to make substantive changes affecting a party’s rights,” United
States v. Suarez-Perez, 484 F. 3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2007), the
harmful Alleyne error that deprived Puzio of a constitutional
resentencing in 2017 cannot be cured through a ministerial
correction that, by definition, would continue to deny Puzio the
constitutional sentencing proceeding he has yet to receive. Cf.
Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335, 339 (Fla. 2014) (“[A] resentencing
at which the trial judge has judicial discretion is not a ministerial
act.”). Rather, we hold that Puzio is entitled to the de novo
resentencing required by Williams.
Although our holding resolves the conflict issue, the State has
asked us to go further by expanding Williams to afford it the
opportunity to empanel a jury on resentencing to make the finding
required to enhance Puzio’s sentence pursuant to section
775.082(1)(b)1. In support of its argument, the State cites our
decision in Gaymon v. State, 288 So. 3d 1087, 1093 (Fla. 2020),
-9- where we authorized such a remedy on resentencing under a
different statutory provision.
We decline to decide this issue for a couple of reasons. First,
Puzio argues that his jury already found that he did not actually
kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victims. Regardless of
whether or not he is correct, the unique facts of Puzio’s case make
it a less-than-ideal vehicle for revisiting the double-jeopardy
concerns that caused the Williams court to forego the possibility of
empaneling a jury and hold instead that the remedy of
“resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. is the more
prudent course.” Williams, 242 So. 3d at 293. Moreover, and
perhaps even more critically, the State neither asked the trial court
to empanel a jury nor raised the issue in the district court, and the
potential double jeopardy implications of empaneling a jury have
not been fully briefed. Accordingly, we limit our holding to the
jurisdictional issue. See Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla.
1982) (“[A]uthority to consider issues other than those upon which
jurisdiction is based is discretionary with this Court and should be
exercised only when these other issues have been properly briefed
and argued . . . .”).
- 10 - CONCLUSION
The Fourth District’s “ministerial correction” remedy falls
short of the remedy of de novo resentencing under section
775.082(1)(b)2., which Williams establishes is the proper remedy for
the harmful Alleyne error at issue. Accordingly, we quash the
Fourth District’s decision in Puzio and remand with instructions to
remand to the trial court for resentencing as required by Williams.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D17-3034
(Broward County)
Kevin J. Kulik, Coral Springs, Florida; and Ashley D. Kay, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Kevin Golembiewski, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Celia Terenzio, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and James J.
- 11 - Carney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
- 12 -