David Nestler v. Kacie L. Combs and Christopher S. Palmer

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: August 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-1677
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1677 Filed August 6, 2025

DAVID NESTLER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

KACIE L. COMBS AND CHRISTOPHER S. PALMER, Defendant-Appellees. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,

Judge.

A plaintiff appeals the district court’s summary judgment order dismissing

his petition for injunctive relief and denying his request for attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.

David Nestler, Altoona, self-represented appellant.

Sean M. Corpstein of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ. 2

BADDING, Judge.

In 2023, Kacie Combs and Christopher Palmer built a white vinyl privacy

fence in the backyard of their home in Fieldstone Estates, an Altoona subdivision.

At the time, a restrictive covenant required all fences to be “black in color” and

similar in “appearance and design [to] wrought iron fencing.” “Privacy fences” and

other barriers that “detract from the view corridors” of adjoining lots were

prohibited. Unhappy with Combs and Palmer’s non-conforming fence, fellow

Fieldstone Estates resident David Nestler filed a petition for injunctive relief, asking

the court to order the fence be removed.

Combs and Palmer responded by rallying their neighbors’ support for a

change to the rules. In April 2024, while Nestler’s lawsuit was pending, they

recorded an amended covenant expressly permitting “black, white or soft earth

tone” privacy fences and declaring prior violations “null and void.” The amendment

was signed and notarized by eighty-five lot owners, exceeding the simple majority

required to modify Fieldstone Estates’ declaration of covenants.

Nestler declined to dismiss his suit, so Combs and Palmer moved for

summary judgment. In his written resistance, Nestler conceded that “there is now

an amendment to the Covenants” and that “the Defendants’ fence is no longer in

violation.” But he maintained that he was “entitled to attorney’s fees for having to

bring this action.” The district court granted Combs and Palmer’s motion, finding

“both parties agree that the retroactive amendment to the covenants disposes of

the underlying dispute.” It denied Nestler’s request for fees.

Nestler appeals, challenging the district court’s dismissal of his petition for

injunctive relief. Notwithstanding the amended covenant, Nestler contends his 3

claim remained viable because: (1) photographs submitted at summary judgment

show other violations on Combs and Palmer’s property; (2) estoppel principles

prohibit Combs and Palmer from curing their violation through a mid-litigation

amendment; (3) Combs and Palmer failed to plead a “retroactive amendment

defense”; and (4) the amended covenant is void due to signature defects. Our

review is for correction of errors of law. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Drainage Dist.

67 Bd. of Trs., 974 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2022). But we cannot reach any of

Nestler’s contentions in this appeal.

It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that issues must be raised and

decided in the district court before we may consider them. See State v. Chawech,

15 N.W.3d 78, 83 (Iowa 2024) (“[W]e generally don’t decide issues for the first

time.”). We enforce this requirement regardless of whether the opposing party

objects. Halbur v. Larson, 14 N.W.3d 363, 371 (Iowa 2024). Nestler declined to

raise any of his new arguments in resistance to summary judgment, conceding

instead that injunctive relief was foreclosed. The only issue he asked the district

court to resolve was his entitlement to fees for an unsuccessful lawsuit.1 Thus,

none of Nestler’s claims of error are preserved for our review, and we must affirm

the order of the district court without reaching the merits.

1 To the extent we could construe Nestler’s arguments on appeal to challenge the

district court’s ruling on fees, we would find no error. The covenant language that Nestler relies on provides for recovery of attorney fees only when a “violation of . . . this Declaration is established.” We agree with the district court that, by conceding defeat on his request for an injunction, Nestler failed to “establish” a covenant violation, and so he is not entitled to fees.