David Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp.
This text of David Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp. (David Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 26 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID MERRITT; SALMA MERRITT, No. 16-16311
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 5:09-cv-01179-BLF
v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 22, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Salma Merritt and David Merritt appeal pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing their action alleging violations of federal and state law arising
from the purchase and financing of their residence. We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th
Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d
918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal based on applicable statute of limitations);
Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal based on res
judicata). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thomson v. Paul,
547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the Merritts’ claims against defendant
John Benson as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the claims were
based on the same primary right the Merritts asserted in a prior state court action.
See Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2005) (“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment federal
courts look to state law. . . . California’s res judicata doctrine is based on a primary
rights theory.” (citation omitted)); In re Estate of Dito, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 286
(Ct. App. 2011) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, all claims based on the same
cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may
not be raised at a later date.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of
certain state court documents without converting Benson’s motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-
2 16-16311 89 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and describing documents that
a district court may take judicial notice of when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
The Merritts’ challenges to the state court proceedings fail because the
district court lacked authority to review state court decisions or issues “inextricably
intertwined” with those decisions. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir.
2003) (“A federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de
facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear the
forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue
raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the
state court in its judicial decision.”); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474
F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim
because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous
judgment” and the relief he sought “would require the district court to determine
that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).
We reject as without merit the Merritts’ contentions that the district court
erred by failing to explain the primary rights doctrine to the Merritts’ prior to
dismissal and by failing to address issues related to claims precluded by the state
court ruling.
The district court properly dismissed the Merritts’ claims for alleged
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
3 16-16311 because the claims are time-barred and the Merritts failed to allege facts sufficient
to state plausible claims for relief. See Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108-09
(9th Cir. 2001) (civil RICO claims have a four-year statute of limitations, which
begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury
underlying the action); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.
2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still
present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Kearns v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s
particularity requirement applies to RICO claims and state law claims that allege
fraudulent conduct).
The district court properly deemed certain claims abandoned because the
Merritts failed to reallege those claims in their third amended complaint. See First
Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F3d 1263, 1274 (9th Cir. 2017) (failure to replead
claims in an amended complaint amounts to abandonment of those claims).
We reject, as unsupported by the record, the Merritts’ contention that the
district court improperly applied a summary judgment standard when dismissing
under Rule 12(b)(6) plaintiff’s claims arising under RICO, the Fair Housing Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
We also reject, as unsupported by the record, the Merritts’ contention that
the district court failed to consider whether the Merritts’ home equity line of credit
4 16-16311 is subject to rescission under the Truth in Lending Act.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Merritts leave
to file a fifth amended complaint because the Merritts already had multiple
opportunities to amend, their proposed amended complaint would not cure the
deficiencies in the previous complaints, and the addition of defendants would
cause prejudice and delay. Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t of
Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.1999) (leave not granted if amendment
“would cause prejudice to the opposing party ... is futile, or creates undue delay.”);
see also Chodos v.
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