David McDaniel v. Department of the Treasury

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 27, 2026
DocketDA-0752-24-0262-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of David McDaniel v. Department of the Treasury (David McDaniel v. Department of the Treasury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David McDaniel v. Department of the Treasury, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID MCDANIEL II, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-24-0262-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DATE: February 27, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David Watsky , Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.

Deborah Charette , Esquire, Nichole Lila Jenkins , Esquire, and Isabella Demougeot , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal based on a charge of Conduct Unbecoming a Federal Police Officer. On petition for review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred by discounting the agency’s evidence in support of the charge and by making unsupported credibility determinations. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. We find no error in the administrative judge’s finding that the hearsay evidence concerning the appellant’s alleged statements that served as the basis for the charge, was not sufficiently probative to outweigh the contradictory live testimony from the appellant denying making the statements. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 10-12. As the administrative judge observed, the brief written statements by the two agency officials supporting the charge, untested by the challenge of cross-examination due to agency’s failure to call either witness, are less probative than the appellant’s credible live testimony denying making the alleged statements. Initial Appeal File, Tab 23, Initial Decision at 6-8; see Social Security Administration v. Whittlesey, 59 M.S.P.R. 684, 692 (1993) (observing that, generally, live testimony is more probative than an out-of-court statement), aff’d, 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table); Dubiel v. U.S. Postal Service, 54 M.S.P.R. 428, 432 (1992) (stating that the probative value of unsworn hearsay statements regarding facts at issue is generally reduced when contradicted by live testimony regarding the same matter); Robinson v. Department of Health & Human Services, 39 M .S.P.R. 110, 115 (1988) (finding that hearsay evidence may not be sufficiently probative, in light of contradictory live testimony, to sustain an agency’s burden by preponderant evidence); see also Krbec v. 3

Department of Transportation, 21 M.S.P.R. 239, 242 (1984) (observing that an agency’s failure to subpoena witnesses with firsthand knowledge weighed against assigning significant probative value to the hearsay evidence), aff’d, 770 F.2d 180 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). Accordingly, the administrative judge did not err by declining to credit the hearsay statements over the appellant’s contradictory credible and unchallenged live testimony on the same point. We also decline the agency’s invitation to revisit the administrative judge’s credibility determinations. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-17. The evaluation of witness credibility is a matter within the administrative judge’s discretion; an administrative judge’s credibility determinations are “virtually unreviewable.” Frey v. Department of Labor, 359 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Mithen v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489, ¶ 13 (2015), aff’d, 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Moreover, mere disagreement with an administrative judge’s credibility determinations and findings of fact fail to provide a basis for granting review. Diggs v. Department of Housing & Urban Development , 114 M.S.P.R. 464, ¶ 8 (2010). Based on our review of the entire record, the administrative judge made reasoned, specific, demeanor-based credibility findings and the agency has not provided a sufficiently sound reason to disturb them on review. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). 4

ORDER We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal action and to retroactively restore the appellant to the position of Police Officer, TR-0083-08, effective January 31, 2024. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal Service regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R.

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John H. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts
726 F.2d 730 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Todd R. Haebe v. Department of Justice
288 F.3d 1288 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Gary K. Frey v. Department of Labor
359 F.3d 1355 (Federal Circuit, 2004)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
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David McDaniel v. Department of the Treasury, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-mcdaniel-v-department-of-the-treasury-mspb-2026.