David M Yang v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 23, 2024
DocketSF-0752-22-0502-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of David M Yang v. Department of the Army (David M Yang v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David M Yang v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID M. YANG, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-22-0502-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: July 23, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Shawn A. Luiz , Esquire, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the appellant.

Walter Joseph Folger , Esquire, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, for the agency.

Patsy M. Takemura , Esquire, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed his indefinite suspension based on the suspension of his access to classified information. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the penalty of an indefinite suspension was not justified, and he reasserts his claims 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

from below that the Director did not have authority to suspend his access to classified information, that his duties did not require him to have access to classified information, that the agency engaged in harmful procedural error, and that the suspension of his access to classified information and subsequent indefinite suspension were the result of discrimination based on race, disability, and age, and reprisal for whistleblowing. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 2 Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

2 The appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 7. Pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), any such reply must be filed within 10 days of the date of service of the response to the petition for review. Here, the agency’s response to the petition for review was filed on March 10, 2023, making any reply thereto due on March 20, 2023. The appellant submitted his reply brief on April 1, 2023, which makes it untimely filed by 12 days. To establish good cause for the untimely filing of an appeal, a party must show that he exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of his excuse and his showing of due diligence, whether he is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune, which similarly shows a causal relationship to his inability to timely file his petition. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). The appellant submitted with his motion a declaration from his counsel, which stated that counsel was out of the country with limited access to the internet from March 7-20, 2023, on vacation with his family and that, upon his return, he was ill. PFR File, Tab 6 at 6. He asserts that his first day back at the office was March 24, 2023. Id. The appellant has not established good cause for the untimely filing. Appellant’s counsel’s explanation that he was on vacation when the filing period ran is not a reasonable excuse for missing a filing deadline. See Dooley v. Department of the Air Force, 57 M.S.P.R. 684, 690-91 (1993). Moreover, by counsel’s own admission, even after returning to work, it took him another week to submit the reply pleading. Thus, we conclude that he did not exercise due diligence upon his return. See Figueroa v. Office of Personnel Management , 81 M.S.P.R. 33, ¶ 9 (1999). It is well settled that an appellant is responsible for the action or inaction of his chosen representative. Sofio v. Internal Revenue Service, 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 670 (1981). Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s motion to waive the filing deadline for his untimely reply. 3

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to supplement the initial decision to find that the penalty of indefinite suspension was reasonable, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 In the initial decision, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s position required a security clearance and eligibility for access to classified information, his access to classified information was suspended, the agency complied with the procedural protections set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b), the agency did not have a policy entitling the appellant to reassignment in lieu of an indefinite suspension, and the indefinite suspension from pay and duty statute included a condition subsequent that would terminate the suspension. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 35, Initial Decision (ID) at 7-16; see Grimes v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 7 (2014); Munoz v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 483, ¶ 15 (2014); Hernandez v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2013). She also correctly found that the appellant failed to establish his affirmative defenses of harmful procedural error, discrimination on the basis of race, age, and disability, and whistleblower reprisal. ID at 17-21. The appellant’s arguments on review do not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision in this regard. The administrative judge further found that a nexus exists between the appellant’s indefinite suspension and the efficiency of the service. ID at 16-17. The appellant has not challenged this finding on review, and we discern no reason to disturb it. 4

¶3 Generally, to sustain an indefinite suspension under chapter 75, the agency must also show that the penalty was reasonable. Hall v. Department of Defense, 117 M.S.P.R. 687, ¶¶ 6, 10 (2012). In the initial decision, the administrative judge did not make a finding regarding the reasonableness of the penalty, and the appellant raises in his petition for review arguments concerning the penalty.

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David M Yang v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-m-yang-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.