David Lynn Johnson v. Matthew David Skaggs and Cheyenne Elaine Skaggs

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 18, 2024
• Docket: 03-24-00498-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00498-CV

David Lynn Johnson, Appellant

v.

Matthew David Skaggs and Cheyenne Elaine Skaggs, Appellees

FROM THE 33RD DISTRICT COURT OF SAN SABA COUNTY NO. 10,244, THE HONORABLE EVAN C. STUBBS, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David Lynn Johnson filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s July 8, 2024

“judgment.” The “judgment” that Johnson seeks to appeal from is the “Order Granting Matthew

David Skaggs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” that the trial court signed on July 8, 2024.

Upon initial review, the Clerk of this Court sent the parties a letter informing them that this Court

appears to lack jurisdiction over the appeal because the order Johnson seeks to appeal does not

appear to be a final and appealable judgment, and our jurisdiction is limited to appeals in which

there exists a final or appealable judgment or order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.012;

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that appeal generally

may only be taken from final judgment that disposes of all pending parties and claims in record

unless statute provides for interlocutory appeal). The Clerk requested a response on or before October 7, 2024, informing this

Court of any basis that exists for jurisdiction. To date, no response has been filed.

In this case, the trial court’s July 8, 2024 “Order Granting Matthew David Skaggs

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” grants appellee Matthew David Skaggs’s motion for

partial summary judgment on his claim seeking to terminate Johnson’s parental rights, but it does

not dispose of Skaggs’s adoption claim or of the claims of intervenor Carolyn Johnson. An order

granting a partial summary judgment that does not resolve all claims of all parties is not an

appealable interlocutory order. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998)

(“Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if

a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction.”); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 51.014 (specifically permitting appeal of various interlocutory orders but not permitting appeal

from grant of partial summary judgment).

There are a few ways for a trial court’s order to become a final judgment without

a trial. See Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of Am.,

L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. 2024). A trial court’s order is final if it (1) actually disposes

of all remaining parties and claims then before the court (regardless of whether it includes

unequivocal finality language), or (2) includes unequivocal finality language that expressly

disposes of all claims and parties. Id. (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200); see also In re

Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. 2005) (orig.

proceeding) (concluding default judgment that did not purport to dispose of all parties and all

claims, did not actually dispose of punitive-damages claim, and lacked unequivocal finality

language was not final and appealable judgment); McNally v. Guevara, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196

(Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“Because the judgment does not appear final on its face, and because it

2 did not dispose of the defendants’ claim for attorney fees, it was not an appealable judgment.”).

In addition, “[a]s a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes

it final.” Sealy Emergency Room, 685 S.W.3d at 820 (quoting Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill,

Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2001)). None of those

circumstances are present here, and accordingly, the partial summary judgment is not yet final

and appealable. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC,

603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s

interlocutory orders merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing

that judgment.”).

For the reasons explained above, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

__________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: October 18, 2024