David Lorenza Joyner v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 4, 2021
Docket01-18-00875-CR
StatusPublished

This text of David Lorenza Joyner v. the State of Texas (David Lorenza Joyner v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Lorenza Joyner v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

Order issued May 4, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-18-00875-CR ——————————— DAVID LORENZA JOYNER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 351st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1554289

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Currently pending before this Court is appellant David Lorenza Joyner’s pro

se “Motion and Affidavit for the Recusal of the Entire First Court of Appeals from

Presiding Over the Appeal . . . And for the Appeal to Be Transferred to the 14th

Court of Appeals.” Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 16.3 prescribes the procedure to be

followed for recusal of an appellate justice:

Before any further proceeding in the case, the challenged justice or judge must either remove himself or herself from all participation in the case or certify the matter to the entire court, which will decide the motion by a majority of the remaining judges sitting en banc. The challenged justice or judge must not sit with the remainder of the court to consider the motion as to him or her.

TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b). When, as in this case, a party challenges all the members of

the court, the court decides the motion under the procedures set forth in Rule 16.3.

See id.; see, e.g., Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775, 775–77 (Tex. 1979)

(denying motion to disqualify entire Texas Supreme Court); Cogsdil v. Jimmy

Fincher Body Shop, LLC, No. 07-16-00303-CV, 2016 WL 7321788, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2016, order) (treating recusal motion as addressed to entire

court).

Accordingly, upon the filing of appellant’s motion and before any further

proceedings in this appeal, each of the challenged justices of this Court considered

the motion in chambers. See TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b); see also Cogsdil, 2016 WL

7321788, at *1; Cannon v. City of Hurst, 180 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2005, order). Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman, Landau,

Hightower, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris each found no reason to

recuse themselves and certified the matter to the remaining members of the en banc

court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b); Cogsdil, 2016 WL 7321788, at *1; Cannon, 180 2 S.W.3d at 601. This Court then followed the accepted procedure set out in Rule

16.3. See TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b); Cannon, 180 S.W.3d at 601. The justices

deliberated and decided the motion to recuse with respect to each challenged justice

by a vote of the remaining participating justices en banc. See TEX. R. APP. P.

16.3(b); Cogsdil, 2016 WL 7321788, at *1; Cannon, 180 S.W.3d at 601. No

challenged justice sat with the other members of the Court when his or her

challenge was considered. See TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b); Manges v. Guerra, 673

S.W.2d 180, 185 (Tex. 1984); Cogsdil, 2016 WL 7321788, at *1; McCullough v.

Kitzman, 50 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, order).

Having considered the motion as to each challenged justice, and finding no

basis for recusal, appellant’s motion to recuse is denied with respect to each

challenged justice. See Manges, 673 S.W.2d at 185; McCullough, 50 S.W.3d at 89.

The Court enters the following orders:

ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO CHIEF JUSTICE RADACK

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Chief Justice Radack,

it is ordered that the motion is denied.

The Court consists of: Justices Kelly, Goodman, Landau, Hightower,

Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris.

3 ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE KELLY

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Kelly, it is

ordered that the motion is denied.

The Court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Goodman, Landau,

Hightower, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris.

ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE GOODMAN

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Goodman, it

is ordered that the motion is denied.

The Court consists of: Court consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices

Kelly, Landau, Hightower, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris.

ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE LANDAU

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Landau, it is

The Court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman,

ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE HIGHTOWER

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Hightower, it

The Court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman,

Landau, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris.

4 ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE COUNTISS

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Countiss, it is

The Court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman,

Landau, Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris.

ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE RIVAS-MOLLOY

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Rivas-Molloy,

The Court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman,

Landau, Hightower, Countiss, Guerra, and Farris.

ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE GUERRA

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Guerra, it is

ordered that the motion to recuse is denied.

The Court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman,

Landau, Hightower, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

ORDER DENYING MOTION AS TO JUSTICE FARRIS

To the extent that appellant’s motion requests recusal of Justice Farris, it is

The Court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman,

Landau, Hightower, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, and Guerra.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cannon v. City of Hurst
180 S.W.3d 600 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Cameron v. Greenhill
582 S.W.2d 775 (Texas Supreme Court, 1979)
McCullough v. Kitzman
50 S.W.3d 87 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Manges v. Guerra
673 S.W.2d 180 (Texas Supreme Court, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
David Lorenza Joyner v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-lorenza-joyner-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2021.