David Lloyd Cecil v. State
This text of David Lloyd Cecil v. State (David Lloyd Cecil v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NO. 07-03-0113-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
JULY 11, 2003 ______________________________
DAVID LLOYD CECIL,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee _________________________________
FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 45514-E; HON. ABE LOPEZ, PRESIDING _______________________________
Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.
Appellant David Lloyd Cecil appeals his conviction of aggravated sexual assault.
His court-appointed counsel has moved to withdraw after filing a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and representing she
has searched the record and found no arguable grounds for reversal. The motion and brief
indicate that appellant was informed of his rights to review the appellate record and file his
own brief. So too did we inform appellant that any pro se response or brief he cared to file
had to be filed by June 30, 2003. To date, appellant has filed no pro se response or brief. In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel discussed
one potential area for appeal which concerned the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress
his statement because it was involuntary. The statement was taken at a mental health
facility (the Pavilion) after appellant had told his wife and his daughter that he had been
having inappropriate sexual contact with his granddaughter and had also acted in a
manner which caused his wife to fear he was suicidal. However, counsel explained that
there is nothing in the record to indicate that he was threatened or promised anything by
law enforcement officers in return for his confession or that his statement was anything
other than voluntary. There was also a determination that he was competent to stand trial.
So too have we conducted an independent review of the record to determine
whether there existed reversible error and found none. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d
503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (requiring us to conduct an independent review). A
hearing was held outside the presence of the jury to determine that the child victim could
testify via closed circuit television, and there was evidence that the procedure was
necessary to protect the welfare of the child, the child would be traumatized by facing her
grandfather in the courtroom as opposed to the courtroom generally, and the emotional
distress suffered by the child would be more than mere nervousness. See Dufrene v.
State, 853 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). There were
also no objections to the jury charge, and we have found no egregious harm. Further, the
punishment assessed was within that prescribed by law, and the law permits the
cumulation of appellant’s sentence in this cause with that for another offense arising out
of the same criminal episode. TEX . PEN . CODE ANN . §3.03(b)(2)(A) (Vernon 2003).
2 Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Brian Quinn Justice
Do not publish.
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