David Lind v. Hank Spacone
This text of David Lind v. Hank Spacone (David Lind v. Hank Spacone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 23 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: DAVID KENNETH LIND, No. 19-60038
Debtor. BAP No. 18-1271
------------------------------ MEMORANDUM* DAVID KENNETH LIND,
Appellant,
v.
HANK SPACONE, Trustee,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Taylor, Brand, and Spraker, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2021**
Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Chapter 7 debtor David Kenneth Lind appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order
authorizing the sale of real property, and dismissing in part, Lind’s appeal. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions
and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy
court’s ruling. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090
(9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not clearly err by finding that the purchaser of the
real property was a bona fide good faith purchaser. See Onouli-Kona Land Co. v.
Estate of Richards (In re Onouli-Kona Land Co.), 846 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (9th
Cir. 1988) (discussing good faith requirement for operation of mootness rule in
bankruptcy; explaining that good faith does not depend on value); see also Decker
v. Tramiel (In re JTS Corp.), 617 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of
review for bankruptcy court’s findings of fact).
The BAP properly dismissed as moot the remainder of Lind’s appeal
because Lind did not obtain a stay of the sale pending appeal. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(m); Adeli v. Barclay (In re Berkeley Delaware Court, LLC), 834 F.3d 1036,
1039 (9th Cir. 2016) (under § 363(m), the validity of a sale of property executed
under §363 cannot be challenged on appeal unless the bankruptcy court’s
authorization and such sale were stayed pending appeal); Suter v. Goedert, 504
F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for question of mootness).
2 19-60038 We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Lind’s motion to submit a supplemental reply brief (Docket Entry No. 21) is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 19-60038
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