3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 DAVID LEVOYD REED, Case No. 2:19-cv-00172-ART-NJK 6 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION AND ORDER TO 7 v. SHOW CAUSE (ECF Nos. 164, 168), MOTION TO SEAL (ECF No. 170), 8 JAMES DZURENDA, et al., AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (ECF No. 163) 9 Defendants.
10 Pro se and incarcerated Plaintiff David Levoyd Reed brings this action 11 against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Eighth 12 Amendment for excessive force. (ECF No. 8.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 13 Motion and Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary 14 Restraining Order (ECF No. 164), Motion and Order to Show Cause for a 15 Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Conjunction with 16 ECF No. 164 (ECF No 168), and Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11(b) (ECF No. 17 163). 18 I. Background 19 Mr. Reed’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was screened on November 20 18, 2019, allowing him to proceed on claims for First Amendment retaliation 21 against Officer Nielson and Eighth Amendment excessive force against Officer 22 Nielson and a Doe officer. (ECF No. 8 at 11-12.) On February 9, 2022, Officer 23 Nielson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on both claims. (ECF No. 75.) The 24 Court granted summary judgment on Mr. Reed’s First Amendment claim and 25 denied summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim. 26 In his Eighth Amendment claim, Mr. Reed alleges that on December 6, 27 2017, Defendant Nelson and a Doe officer attacked Mr. Reed without cause or 28 1 justification during a peaceful conversation with Officer Zuniga in the Clark 2 County Detention Center’s court holding rotunda. (ECF No. 8 at 5.) Mr. Reed 3 requests ten million dollars in punitive damages. 4 In his Motion and Order to Show Cause, Mr. Reed seeks a preliminary 5 injunction against Senior Corrections Officers Griffin, Jackson, and Illoyas; 6 Corrections Officers Bledsoe, Lares, Lozono, and John Doe; Caseworkers Lewis 7 and Silber; Lieutenant Barth, CCSIII Moore, and Sergeant Bunting enjoining 8 them from “all forms of harassment, retaliation, deliberate indifference to [his] 9 medical needs, not serving [him] food, not serving [him] food off the regular line.” 10 (ECF No. 164 at 2.) He also requests a number of other interventions, including 11 a blood test, health exam, new diet, removal of spyware on his tablet, rehousing 12 in a different unit, and relocation out of High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), among 13 other requests. (Id. at 3.) 14 In his second Motion and Order to Show Cause, Mr. Reed seeks a 15 preliminary injunction against Caseworker Specialist II Brandon Silber, 16 Caseworkers Moore and Turn, and Lieutenants Barth and Estill enjoining them 17 from “the continued retaliation and harassment that bears a direct nexus to the 18 above-entitled action.” (ECF No. 168 at 1.) He alleges that the named parties 19 overheard the settlement conference and are attempting to force him to leave 20 administrative segregation against his will by accusing him of false charges and 21 sanctions. (Id. at 6.) He requests that HDSP not cut off his electricity or find him 22 guilty of the above-mentioned infraction for refusing to cell as assigned. (Id.) 23 Defendants responded to the first Motion and Order to Show Cause (ECF 24 No. 169) and filed a Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s Records Under Seal (ECF 25 No. 170). They did not respond to Mr. Reed’s second Motion and Order to Show 26 Cause. 27 II. Legal Standard 28 Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, never awarded as 1 of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff 2 seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 3 the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 4 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 5 injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los 6 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 7 “Where a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond 8 maintaining the status quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious 9 about issuing a preliminary injunction.” Martin v. International Olympic 10 Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984);18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Thus, an 11 award of mandatory preliminary relief is not to be granted unless both the facts 12 and the law clearly favor the moving party and extreme or serious damage will 13 result. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 14 Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979)). Furthermore, 15 under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), preliminary injunctive relief 16 must be “narrowly drawn,” must “extend no further than necessary to correct the 17 harm,” and must be “the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 As a threshold matter, “there must be a relationship between the injury 19 claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the 20 underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 21 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). This requires a sufficient nexus between the claims 22 raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying 23 complaint itself. The relationship between the preliminary injunction and the 24 underlying complaint is sufficient where the preliminary injunction would grant 25 “relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally. Absent that 26 relationship or nexus, the district court lacks authority to grant the relief 27 requested.” Id. at 636. 28 1 III. Analysis 2 a. Motions for Injunctive Relief 3 The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to show that he is 4 entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time, because he addresses issues and 5 parties that are not a part of his surviving claims from his FAC and requests relief 6 beyond the scope of what may be granted finally. Further, Mr. Reed cannot meet 7 the demanding standard for a mandatory injunction. 8 i. First Motion and Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 164) 9 Mr. Reed’s first motion seeks a remedy for conduct outside the scope of the 10 FAC. In his motion, Mr. Reed alleges that on January 21, 2026, approximately 11 nine years after the events described in his FAC, a fellow inmate threw human 12 waste in his cell at the direction of HDSP staff in retaliation for his filing 13 grievances. (ECF No. 164 at 4-5.) He also alleges that HDSP staff improperly 14 adjusted his food, installed spyware on his tablet, and censored his mail. (ECF 15 No. 164 at 9-10.) 16 The individuals and institutions Mr. Reed seeks to enjoin are not parties to 17 this lawsuit, and the allegations of retaliation he poses against them unrelated to 18 the claim for excessive force on which he is proceeding. The relief he seeks for 19 Defendants Nielson and Doe’s violation of his Eighth Amendment rights would 20 also not include changing his diet, housing, nor tablet settings, nor justify his 21 other requests for relief. Therefore, his first Motion and Order to Show Cause is 22 denied. 23 ii.
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 DAVID LEVOYD REED, Case No. 2:19-cv-00172-ART-NJK 6 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION AND ORDER TO 7 v. SHOW CAUSE (ECF Nos. 164, 168), MOTION TO SEAL (ECF No. 170), 8 JAMES DZURENDA, et al., AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (ECF No. 163) 9 Defendants.
10 Pro se and incarcerated Plaintiff David Levoyd Reed brings this action 11 against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Eighth 12 Amendment for excessive force. (ECF No. 8.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 13 Motion and Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary 14 Restraining Order (ECF No. 164), Motion and Order to Show Cause for a 15 Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Conjunction with 16 ECF No. 164 (ECF No 168), and Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11(b) (ECF No. 17 163). 18 I. Background 19 Mr. Reed’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was screened on November 20 18, 2019, allowing him to proceed on claims for First Amendment retaliation 21 against Officer Nielson and Eighth Amendment excessive force against Officer 22 Nielson and a Doe officer. (ECF No. 8 at 11-12.) On February 9, 2022, Officer 23 Nielson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on both claims. (ECF No. 75.) The 24 Court granted summary judgment on Mr. Reed’s First Amendment claim and 25 denied summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim. 26 In his Eighth Amendment claim, Mr. Reed alleges that on December 6, 27 2017, Defendant Nelson and a Doe officer attacked Mr. Reed without cause or 28 1 justification during a peaceful conversation with Officer Zuniga in the Clark 2 County Detention Center’s court holding rotunda. (ECF No. 8 at 5.) Mr. Reed 3 requests ten million dollars in punitive damages. 4 In his Motion and Order to Show Cause, Mr. Reed seeks a preliminary 5 injunction against Senior Corrections Officers Griffin, Jackson, and Illoyas; 6 Corrections Officers Bledsoe, Lares, Lozono, and John Doe; Caseworkers Lewis 7 and Silber; Lieutenant Barth, CCSIII Moore, and Sergeant Bunting enjoining 8 them from “all forms of harassment, retaliation, deliberate indifference to [his] 9 medical needs, not serving [him] food, not serving [him] food off the regular line.” 10 (ECF No. 164 at 2.) He also requests a number of other interventions, including 11 a blood test, health exam, new diet, removal of spyware on his tablet, rehousing 12 in a different unit, and relocation out of High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), among 13 other requests. (Id. at 3.) 14 In his second Motion and Order to Show Cause, Mr. Reed seeks a 15 preliminary injunction against Caseworker Specialist II Brandon Silber, 16 Caseworkers Moore and Turn, and Lieutenants Barth and Estill enjoining them 17 from “the continued retaliation and harassment that bears a direct nexus to the 18 above-entitled action.” (ECF No. 168 at 1.) He alleges that the named parties 19 overheard the settlement conference and are attempting to force him to leave 20 administrative segregation against his will by accusing him of false charges and 21 sanctions. (Id. at 6.) He requests that HDSP not cut off his electricity or find him 22 guilty of the above-mentioned infraction for refusing to cell as assigned. (Id.) 23 Defendants responded to the first Motion and Order to Show Cause (ECF 24 No. 169) and filed a Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s Records Under Seal (ECF 25 No. 170). They did not respond to Mr. Reed’s second Motion and Order to Show 26 Cause. 27 II. Legal Standard 28 Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, never awarded as 1 of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff 2 seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 3 the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 4 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 5 injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los 6 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 7 “Where a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond 8 maintaining the status quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious 9 about issuing a preliminary injunction.” Martin v. International Olympic 10 Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984);18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Thus, an 11 award of mandatory preliminary relief is not to be granted unless both the facts 12 and the law clearly favor the moving party and extreme or serious damage will 13 result. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 14 Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979)). Furthermore, 15 under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), preliminary injunctive relief 16 must be “narrowly drawn,” must “extend no further than necessary to correct the 17 harm,” and must be “the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 As a threshold matter, “there must be a relationship between the injury 19 claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the 20 underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 21 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). This requires a sufficient nexus between the claims 22 raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying 23 complaint itself. The relationship between the preliminary injunction and the 24 underlying complaint is sufficient where the preliminary injunction would grant 25 “relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally. Absent that 26 relationship or nexus, the district court lacks authority to grant the relief 27 requested.” Id. at 636. 28 1 III. Analysis 2 a. Motions for Injunctive Relief 3 The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to show that he is 4 entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time, because he addresses issues and 5 parties that are not a part of his surviving claims from his FAC and requests relief 6 beyond the scope of what may be granted finally. Further, Mr. Reed cannot meet 7 the demanding standard for a mandatory injunction. 8 i. First Motion and Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 164) 9 Mr. Reed’s first motion seeks a remedy for conduct outside the scope of the 10 FAC. In his motion, Mr. Reed alleges that on January 21, 2026, approximately 11 nine years after the events described in his FAC, a fellow inmate threw human 12 waste in his cell at the direction of HDSP staff in retaliation for his filing 13 grievances. (ECF No. 164 at 4-5.) He also alleges that HDSP staff improperly 14 adjusted his food, installed spyware on his tablet, and censored his mail. (ECF 15 No. 164 at 9-10.) 16 The individuals and institutions Mr. Reed seeks to enjoin are not parties to 17 this lawsuit, and the allegations of retaliation he poses against them unrelated to 18 the claim for excessive force on which he is proceeding. The relief he seeks for 19 Defendants Nielson and Doe’s violation of his Eighth Amendment rights would 20 also not include changing his diet, housing, nor tablet settings, nor justify his 21 other requests for relief. Therefore, his first Motion and Order to Show Cause is 22 denied. 23 ii. Second Motion and Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 168) 24 Mr. Reed’s second Motion and Order to Show Cause also seeks a remedy 25 for conduct outside the scope of the FAC. Mr. Reed alleges that he was denied his 26 preferred housing placement in retaliation for grieving the 2025 and 2026 events 27 described in his first Motion and Order to Show Cause. (ECF No. 168 at 5.) As 28 stated above, these events are unrelated to those acts that are alleged in the FAC, 1 and there is an insufficient nexus upon which to grant injunctive relief. Therefore, 2 Mr. Reed’s section Motion and Order to Show Cause is denied. 3 b. Defendants’ Motion to File Plaintiff’s Records Under Seal 4 Defendants seek leave to file Mr. Reed’s case notes as Exhibit A to their 5 Opposition to a Temporary Restraining Order under seal. (ECF No. 170.) 6 There is a strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial filings 7 and documents. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); 8 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he 9 strong presumption of access to judicial records applies fully to dispositive 10 pleadings, including motions for summary judgment and related attachments.” 11 Kamakana, 447 at 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). For records attached to motion not more 12 than tangentially related to the merits of the case, the “good cause” standard 13 applies. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2016). 14 “A motion for preliminary injunction frequently requires the court to 15 address the merits of a case, which often includes the presentation of substantial 16 evidence,” and the right of access does not turn on any particular result. Ctr. for 17 Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099, 1102. Because Mr. Reed asks the Court to 18 consider the merits of his case and seeks relief that he believes is contained 19 within the underlying complaint, Defendants must meet the compelling reasons 20 standard to seal Mr. Reed’s case notes. 21 The Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden to have Mr. 22 Reed’s records sealed. They argue that the records are “sensitive” and that Mr. 23 Reed has no access to a copy of them in prison yet also claims that he will not be 24 prejudiced because copies can be made available to him through the Warden. 25 (ECF No. 170.) Defendants have not provided any specific argument about what 26 is sensitive or confidential in the case notes or why they should not be accessible 27 to the public. Defendant’s Motion to Seal is therefore denied. 28 1 c. Motion for Sanctions 2 Mr. Reed moves for sanctions under Rule 11 against his former counsel 3 and Defendant’s counsel for allegedly conspiring to delay litigation and allow Mr. 4 Reed to be assassinated before the culmination of this case. (ECF No. 163.) He 5 also alleges that both attorneys “acted with incompetence,” citing the Nevada 6 Rules of Professional Conduct. (Id. at 5.) 7 An attorney is subject to Rule 11 sanctions when he or she presents to the 8 court a pleading, written motion, or other paper “for any improper purpose, such 9 as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 10 litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). Any attorney who certifies to the court that a 11 pleading, written motion, or other paper complies with Rule 11 is subject to the 12 rule, even if the attorney later withdraws from the case. Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 13 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2005). 14 Rule 11 is “an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme 15 caution.” Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.3d 1336, 1345 (9th 16 Cir. 1988). The party seeking sanctions must comply with stringent notice and 17 filing requirements, including serving the motion to the allegedly offending party 18 and giving them 21 days to withdraw or correct the challenged filing. Fed. R. Civ. 19 P. 11(c)(2). Mr. Reed has not provided any evidence that he properly provided 20 notice to either counsel and therefore, the Court finds that the Motion for 21 Sanctions fails on procedural grounds. 22 The Court also denies the motion on the merits. The record does not show 23 that attorneys for Mr. Reed and Defendant intentionally listed Mr. Reed’s other 24 case in federal court in an attempt to delay the litigation or for another improper 25 purpose. The Court also finds that at this time, there is insufficient evidence to 26 demonstrate that Mr. Reed’s former counsel violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, or 1.4 of the 27 Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct for stipulating to reschedule the settlement 28 conference set for December 4, 2026, in an effort to globally settle two of Mr. 1 || Reed’s cases and accommodate Defendant Nielson’s medical appointment. (See 2 || ECF No. 141.) 3 IV. Conclusion 4 It is therefore ordered that Mr. Reed’s Motion and Order to Show Cause for 5 || a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 164) and 6 || Motion and Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary 7 || Restraining Order in Conjunction with ECF No. 164 (ECF No. 168) are DENIED. 8 || Mr. Reed may file a separate complaint regarding these claims of retaliation after 9 || exhausting his administrative remedies. 10 It is further ordered that Mr. Reed’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 163) is 11 || DENIED. 12 It is further ordered that Defendants’ Motion to Seal (ECF No. 170) is 13 || DENIED. The Clerk is kindly ordered to UNSEAL ECF No. 171. 14 15 Dated this 28th day of May, 2026. 16 17 Ans padi 18 ANNE R. TRAUM 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28