David Leoni v. Experian Information Solutions
This text of David Leoni v. Experian Information Solutions (David Leoni v. Experian Information Solutions) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 14 2021 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID LEONI, No. 19-17175
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01408-RFB-VCF v.
EXPERIAN INFORMATION MEMORANDUM* SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Richard F. Boulware II, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 5, 2020 Portland, Oregon
Before: PAEZ and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,** District Judge. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge PREGERSON
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. Appellant David Leoni (Leoni) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (Experian).
Reviewing de novo, we affirm. See Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d
1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2021). Leoni failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding
Experian’s violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g(a)(1) or e(b) of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA). See Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992
(9th Cir. 2018) (“To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce
evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.”)
(citations omitted). Moreover, assuming Experian negligently violated both
statutory provisions, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Leoni failed to
establish actual damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1).
On August 1, 2016, a bankruptcy court discharged a debt Leoni owed to
Military Star. Later that month, Leoni reviewed a copy of his Experian consumer
disclosure. The tradeline for Military Star incorrectly showed that Leoni still owed
the debt. At Leoni’s request, Experian investigated the matter and mailed Leoni a
reinvestigation report. Although Experian correctly reported that the Military Star
debt had been discharged, it incorrectly noted in the account history that the debt
had been “included in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy on November 08, 2016,” a date
2 following the discharge. Leoni premises his claims on the erroneous “included in”
bankruptcy date.
1. To establish a willful violation of the FCRA, Leoni was required to
demonstrate that Experian “knowingly violate[d] the statute or recklessly
disregard[ed] its requirements.” Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008, 1031
(9th Cir. 2020). The record does not raise a material issue of fact that Experian
knowingly or recklessly changed the “included in bankruptcy” date. Experian’s
error was, at most, the result of negligence.
2. To prevail on a claim for negligent violation of the FCRA, Leoni
would have to establish that he suffered “actual damages.” See 15 U.S.C. §
1681o(a)(1); see also Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008),
as amended. Leoni’s asserted damages included: (1) he “avoided applying for
credit for fear of being denied”; (2) “the inaccurate information could serve as a
factor in Experian credit scores”; (3) he “suffered sleepless nights,” i.e., emotional
distress; (4) he incurred “transportation costs”; and (5) “lost time considering
issues related to the inaccurate credit reporting.” Leoni, however, failed to offer
proof of some of the asserted damages, and some of the categories are not
compensable.
3 First, Leoni admitted that he feared credit denials not because of the
“included in” bankruptcy date, but because of the bankruptcy on his record.
Second, Leoni points to no evidence in the record that the “included in
bankruptcy” date lowered his credit score, as opposed to the bankruptcy itself.
Third, Leoni also admitted that his sleeplessness was related “to the fact that
there’s a bankruptcy on [his] credit report” and the fact that his wife was “not
sleeping well, [so] I don’t sleep because I’m worried about her,” instead of
“anything specific[] to Military Star.” After Leoni’s attorney objected to that
question, Leoni added: “Which is connected -- the bankruptcy -- which is --
Military Star is included. It’s all that.” But this vague attempt to lump in the
Military Star tradeline with his bankruptcy as an added source of emotional
distress does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Filipino Yellow Pages,
Inc. v. Asian J. Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that vague testimony did not create a genuine issue of fact).
Fourth, Leoni cites no authority in support of his claim of damages for the
cost of traveling to his attorneys’ office or the time he spent reviewing the credit
reports. To the contrary, several district courts in this Circuit have declined to
recognize such expenses as damages when they were incurred for the sole purpose
4 of correcting inaccurate reporting. See, e.g., Moran v. Screening Pros, LLC, No.
2:12-cv-05808-SVW-AGR, 2020 WL 4724307, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020).1
Based on these rulings, we need not reach the class certification issue. See
Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
1 We disagree with Leoni’s reliance on Ramirez to support his contention that “a plaintiff’s lost time for having to hire a lawyer is a cognizable actual damage.” In the context of a class certification motion, we rejected the argument that the proposed class representative “was not typical of the class because his injuries were more severe than the injuries suffered by the rest of the class.” Ramirez, 951 F.3d at 1033. One of the alleged “injuries” was the significant time he spent trying to correct the reporting issue and hiring a lawyer. Id. We did not hold that such an “injury” was compensable as actual damages. Rather, we only held that those facts did not defeat typicality. See id. 5 FILED JUN 14 2021 Leoni v. Experian Information Solutions, No. 19-17175 Pregerson, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Although I concur with much of the majority’s disposition, I cannot agree
that there is no genuine issue as to Leoni’s emotional distress damages. Leoni’s
testimony that his worries were not related to “anything specific[] to Military Star”
is not dispositive. Because Experian’s reinvestigation report correctly indicated
that Leoni no longer owed a debt to Military Star, it stands to reason that he was
not concerned about “anything specific to Military Star.” As the majority
acknowledges, however, Leoni also testified that the Military Star tradeline and the
underlying bankruptcy were connected. Even assuming that it was the underlying
bankruptcy that so troubled Leoni, his worries could have been exacerbated by the
Military Star tradeline, which erroneously indicated a bankruptcy that would
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