NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2377-23
DAVID LANDE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent. __________________________
Submitted April 8, 2025 – Decided May 29, 2025
Before Judges Gilson and Firko.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PERS No. xx1371.
David Lande, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Yi Zhu, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM David Lande (Lande) appeals from a final administrative determination
by the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System (the
Board). Lande had applied to purchase thirty-six months of service credits based
on his prior military service. The Board denied Lande's application holding that
the statute governing the Workers' Compensation Judges Part of the Public
Employees' Retirement System (PERS-WCJ), N.J.S.A 43:15A-142 to -154, does
not allow for the purchase of service credits for military service. Because the
Board's interpretation of the governing statute is correct, we affirm.
I.
On June 5, 2021, following his appointment as a workers' compensation
judge, Lande enrolled in PERS-WCJ. On April 29, 2022, Lande applied to
purchase thirty-six months of service credits based on his military service from
July 7, 1991 through July 6, 1994. Lande sought to have those three years of
service credited to his PERS-WCJ pension account.
On May 26, 2022, the Department of Treasury, Division of Pensions and
Benefits (the Division) denied Lande's request, reasoning that N.J.S.A. 43:15A-
152(a) does not authorize the purchase of service credits based on military
service. Lande administratively appealed the Division's denial to the Board.
A-2377-23 2 On October 18, 2023, the Board affirmed the Division's denial. Lande
further appealed on December 6, 2023. Thereafter, on February 22, 2024, the
Board issued its final administrative determination, which denied Lande's
request to purchase service credits based on his military service.
The Board found that there were no disputed issues of fact, and the
question presented was purely an issue of statutory interpretation. The Board
pointed out that the purchase of service credits for a workers' compensation
judge is governed by N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a). The Board then held that N.J.S.A.
43:15A-152(a) allows for workers' compensation judges to purchase credits for
two types of prior service: (1) previous service as a workers' compensation
judge; and (2) previous service "in an office, position, or employment of this
State or of a county, municipality, board of education, or public agency of this
State." The Board therefore concluded that because prior military service was
not listed in the governing statute, Lande was not entitled to receive service
credits for his military service.
Lande now appeals from the Board's final administrative determination.
II.
On appeal, Lande makes two arguments. He contends that the Board's
determination (1) was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the Board
A-2377-23 3 misinterpreted the law and based its decision on the wrong statute; and (2) was
incorrect because pension laws are remedial legislation and should be construed
in favor of the intended beneficiaries.
An appellate court's review of an administrative agency's final decision is
limited. Seago v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.' Pension & Annuity Fund, 257 N.J. 381,
391 (2024) (citing Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234
N.J. 150, 157 (2018)). An agency's decision will not be reversed unless "(1) it
was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied
legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the
findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible
evidence in the record." Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J.
Dep't of Env't Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007) (citing In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644,
656 (1999)).
Moreover, courts generally "afford substantial deference to an agency's
interpretation of a statute that it is charged with enforcing." Ibid. (citing R & R
Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)). An appellate
court, however, is not "bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its
determination of a strictly legal issue." Id. at 48-49 (quoting Taylor, 158 N.J. at
658) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, "no deference is required when 'an
A-2377-23 4 agency's statutory interpretation is contrary to the statutory language, or if the
agency's interpretation undermines the Legislature's intent.'" In re Proposed
Constr. of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556, 565-66 (App. Div. 2023)
(quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council
73, 150 N.J. 331, 351 (1997)).
A. The Governing Statute.
The issue on this appeal is one of statutory interpretation. The Board
correctly held that the Legislature has created a separate part of the Public
Employees' Retirement System (PERS), that is, PERS-WCJ, to govern pensions
for workers' compensation judges, and PERS-WCJ is governed by L. 2001, c.
259 (Chapter 259) (codified at N.J.S.A 43:15A-142 to -154). The Board also
correctly held that the purchase of service credits in PERS-WCJ is governed by
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a). That statute states, in relevant part:
Any workers compensation judge who wishes to receive credit for previous service as a judge of compensation or in an office, position, or employment of this State or of a county, municipality, board of education, or public agency of this State, shall file an application therefor with the board of trustees and pay into the annuity savings fund the amount required by applying the factor, supplied by the actuary, as being applicable to the judge's age at the time of purchase and the type of service to be purchased, to the member's salary at that time. Such purchase may be made in regular installments, equal to at least one-half the full
A-2377-23 5 normal contribution to the retirement system over a maximum period to be determined by the board of trustees.
[N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a).]
In interpreting a statute, the "aim is 'to effectuate the Legislature's intent.'"
Sanjuan v. Sch. Dist. of W. N.Y., 256 N.J. 369, 378 (2024) (quoting W.S. v.
Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518-19 (2023)). "The best evidence of such intent 'is the
statutory language,' read in accordance with its 'ordinary meaning and
significance . . . .'" Ibid. (first quoting State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (2022);
and then quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).
The plain meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a) is clear: workers'
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2377-23
DAVID LANDE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent. __________________________
Submitted April 8, 2025 – Decided May 29, 2025
Before Judges Gilson and Firko.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PERS No. xx1371.
David Lande, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Yi Zhu, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM David Lande (Lande) appeals from a final administrative determination
by the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System (the
Board). Lande had applied to purchase thirty-six months of service credits based
on his prior military service. The Board denied Lande's application holding that
the statute governing the Workers' Compensation Judges Part of the Public
Employees' Retirement System (PERS-WCJ), N.J.S.A 43:15A-142 to -154, does
not allow for the purchase of service credits for military service. Because the
Board's interpretation of the governing statute is correct, we affirm.
I.
On June 5, 2021, following his appointment as a workers' compensation
judge, Lande enrolled in PERS-WCJ. On April 29, 2022, Lande applied to
purchase thirty-six months of service credits based on his military service from
July 7, 1991 through July 6, 1994. Lande sought to have those three years of
service credited to his PERS-WCJ pension account.
On May 26, 2022, the Department of Treasury, Division of Pensions and
Benefits (the Division) denied Lande's request, reasoning that N.J.S.A. 43:15A-
152(a) does not authorize the purchase of service credits based on military
service. Lande administratively appealed the Division's denial to the Board.
A-2377-23 2 On October 18, 2023, the Board affirmed the Division's denial. Lande
further appealed on December 6, 2023. Thereafter, on February 22, 2024, the
Board issued its final administrative determination, which denied Lande's
request to purchase service credits based on his military service.
The Board found that there were no disputed issues of fact, and the
question presented was purely an issue of statutory interpretation. The Board
pointed out that the purchase of service credits for a workers' compensation
judge is governed by N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a). The Board then held that N.J.S.A.
43:15A-152(a) allows for workers' compensation judges to purchase credits for
two types of prior service: (1) previous service as a workers' compensation
judge; and (2) previous service "in an office, position, or employment of this
State or of a county, municipality, board of education, or public agency of this
State." The Board therefore concluded that because prior military service was
not listed in the governing statute, Lande was not entitled to receive service
credits for his military service.
Lande now appeals from the Board's final administrative determination.
II.
On appeal, Lande makes two arguments. He contends that the Board's
determination (1) was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the Board
A-2377-23 3 misinterpreted the law and based its decision on the wrong statute; and (2) was
incorrect because pension laws are remedial legislation and should be construed
in favor of the intended beneficiaries.
An appellate court's review of an administrative agency's final decision is
limited. Seago v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.' Pension & Annuity Fund, 257 N.J. 381,
391 (2024) (citing Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234
N.J. 150, 157 (2018)). An agency's decision will not be reversed unless "(1) it
was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied
legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the
findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible
evidence in the record." Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J.
Dep't of Env't Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007) (citing In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644,
656 (1999)).
Moreover, courts generally "afford substantial deference to an agency's
interpretation of a statute that it is charged with enforcing." Ibid. (citing R & R
Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)). An appellate
court, however, is not "bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its
determination of a strictly legal issue." Id. at 48-49 (quoting Taylor, 158 N.J. at
658) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, "no deference is required when 'an
A-2377-23 4 agency's statutory interpretation is contrary to the statutory language, or if the
agency's interpretation undermines the Legislature's intent.'" In re Proposed
Constr. of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556, 565-66 (App. Div. 2023)
(quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council
73, 150 N.J. 331, 351 (1997)).
A. The Governing Statute.
The issue on this appeal is one of statutory interpretation. The Board
correctly held that the Legislature has created a separate part of the Public
Employees' Retirement System (PERS), that is, PERS-WCJ, to govern pensions
for workers' compensation judges, and PERS-WCJ is governed by L. 2001, c.
259 (Chapter 259) (codified at N.J.S.A 43:15A-142 to -154). The Board also
correctly held that the purchase of service credits in PERS-WCJ is governed by
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a). That statute states, in relevant part:
Any workers compensation judge who wishes to receive credit for previous service as a judge of compensation or in an office, position, or employment of this State or of a county, municipality, board of education, or public agency of this State, shall file an application therefor with the board of trustees and pay into the annuity savings fund the amount required by applying the factor, supplied by the actuary, as being applicable to the judge's age at the time of purchase and the type of service to be purchased, to the member's salary at that time. Such purchase may be made in regular installments, equal to at least one-half the full
A-2377-23 5 normal contribution to the retirement system over a maximum period to be determined by the board of trustees.
[N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a).]
In interpreting a statute, the "aim is 'to effectuate the Legislature's intent.'"
Sanjuan v. Sch. Dist. of W. N.Y., 256 N.J. 369, 378 (2024) (quoting W.S. v.
Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518-19 (2023)). "The best evidence of such intent 'is the
statutory language,' read in accordance with its 'ordinary meaning and
significance . . . .'" Ibid. (first quoting State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (2022);
and then quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).
The plain meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a) is clear: workers'
compensation judges can get service credit for two types of prior service (1) as
a compensation judge; and (2) for work "in an office, position, or employment
of this State or of a county, municipality, board of education, or public agency
of this State." N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a). The statute does not authorize credit
for prior military service. Ibid.
Lande relies on N.J.S.A. 43:15A-73.1. That provision allows members of
PERS to purchase service credits, including credits based on "military service
in the Armed Forces of the United States." N.J.S.A. 43:15A-73.1. As the Board
correctly reasoned, however, workers' compensation judges have their own
A-2377-23 6 separate part of PERS. See Chapter 259. As was just discussed, Chapter 259
has an express provision stating what types of prior service will be credit ed to a
member of PERS-WCJ. See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a).
Like the Board, we reject Lande's argument that a denial of his request to
purchase military service credits deprives him of benefits available to regular
PERS members. In enacting Chapter 259, the Legislature stated that workers'
compensation judges would enjoy the same benefits as other PERS members
"except as provided by [Chapter 259]." N.J.S.A. 43:15A-143(a). It is a well-
established principle of statutory interpretation that a specific provision of a
statute controls over a general provision. State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 28 (2023)
(explaining that "a more specific statutory provision usually controls over a
more general one" (citing N.J. Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville, 139 N.J.
582, 591 (1995))); Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 424-25 (2009)
(stating that "specific language in a statute takes precedence over more general
language" (citing Wilson v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 109 N.J.
271, 278 (1988))). Therefore, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-152(a) controls and N.J.S.A.
43:15A-73.1 is not applicable to Lande.
A-2377-23 7 In summary, the Board applied the correct statutory provision in denying
Lande's request. Moreover, having reviewed the plain language of N.J.S.A.
43:15A-152(a), we agree with the Board's interpretation.
B. The Remedial Nature of Pension Laws.
Lande also contends that he should benefit from the liberal administration
of pension laws, which are generally interpreted to favor providing benefits to
members. See Geller v. Dep't of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969) (holding
that "statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered
in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby").
We reject Lande's argument because he is attempting to misapply that
principle. While it is generally recognized that pension laws should be
construed liberally, it is also recognized that pension laws "must be carefully
interpreted so as not to 'obscure or override considerations of . . . a potential
adverse impact on the financial integrity of the [f]und.'" Smith v. State, Dep't
of Treasury, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Chaleff v. Tchrs.' Pension & Annuity Fund Trs., 188 N.J. Super. 194,
197 (App. Div. 1983), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 573 (1983)). "An inappropriate
allowance of benefits tends 'to place a greater strain on the financial integrity of
the fund in question and its future availability for those persons who are truly
A-2377-23 8 eligible for such benefits.'" Cardinale v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret.
Sys., 458 N.J. Super. 260, 272 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Francois v. Bd. of Trs.,
Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335, 350 (App. Div. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In denying Lande's request for military service credits, the Board did not
act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. Instead, it correctly applied the
governing statutory provision. Moreover, in doing so it acted well within its
authority as a fiduciary to protect the financial integrity of PERS-WCJ.
Affirmed.
A-2377-23 9