David Khazai v. Anita Ahmadi

Court of Appeals of Kentucky·Decided February 2, 2023·No. 2022 CA 000264·Unknown

Opinion

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0264-ME

DAVID KHAZAI APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE ANGELA JOHNSON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-D-503524-001

ANITA AHMADI APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: David Khazai appeals from a domestic violence order (DVO) entered against him in favor of his former stepdaughter, Anita Ahmadi. In sum, he argues the operative statutes that guided the family court’s analysis are unconstitutional; the family court failed to make sufficient findings of fact; and

that insufficient evidence supported the family court’s decision. We find no error and affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On October 11, 2021, Anita Ahmadi moved the Jefferson Family Court for an emergency protective order (EPO) against her then-stepfather, David Khazai. In her motion, she alleged:

My mother has filed for divorce and he believes it is my fault. He currently is stalking us, calling me, leaving threatening messages, saying he is going to kill me.

ARMED + DANGEROUS → when my mother served the EPO he told the sheriffs he has no weapons but I was able to find 5. I believe there may be more.

There is a long history of abuse. A couple incidents are documented through CPS. I have received medical treatment before due to his abuse. He has been physically abusive to me for the past 17 years. He would use various objects to abuse me. Many MANY threats of violence and killing me.

The family court granted Anita’s motion that same day, and David was served with Anita’s EPO the day afterward. In relevant part, the EPO prohibited David from making any communication with Anita; directed him to remain at least 500 feet from her; and further restrained him from going within 500 feet of Anita’s workplace. On November 3, 2021, the family court amended the EPO consistently with an agreement of the parties, specifying it would remain in

force until February 9, 2022; and that if no violations of the EPO had occurred as of that date, then the EPO would expire.

However, when the family court revisited this matter during a hearing on February 9, 2022, Anita asserted David had committed several violations of the EPO since November 3, 2021. Accordingly, the family court kept the EPO in effect, and held a two-day evidentiary hearing to determine whether a domestic violence order (DVO) should issue. At the evidentiary hearing, the family court considered testimony from Anita and David, as well as Shahpar Shahab – Anita’s mother and David’s ex-wife. On February 16, 2022, when the hearing concluded, the family court granted Anita a DVO against David, effective for the next three years. The family court’s handwritten findings underlying its decision were as follows:

The ct. finds by the preponderance of the evidence that DV occurred and could occur again. Specifically, the ct.

finds the Respondent inflicted fear of imminent physical harm when he threatened her, attempted intimidation and called incessantly.

This appeal followed. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary in the context of our analysis.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.740(1) provides that “[f]ollowing a hearing ordered under KRS 403.730, if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again

occur, the court may issue a domestic violence order[.]”

KRS 403.720(1) defines “[d]omestic violence and abuse”

as “physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]”

Ashley v. Ashley, 520 S.W.3d 400, 403-04 (Ky. App. 2017).

The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007). . . . The standard of review for factual determinations is whether the family court’s finding of domestic violence was clearly erroneous. [Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)] 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Findings are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.

2003).

Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114-15 (Ky. App. 2010).

“[S]ubstantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion”

and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the light of all the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the fact that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding, “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses” because judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its]

reversal,” and appellate courts should not disturb trial court findings that are supported by substantial evidence.

Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354 (citations omitted).

“[I]n reviewing the decision of a trial court the test is not whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Cherry v.

Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation omitted). Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.

Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994)

(citations omitted).

Caudill, 318 S.W.3d at 115.

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, David dedicates one sentence of his brief to arguing either KRS 403.730 or KRS 403.740 are “void for vagueness.” It is unnecessary to address this point beyond stating it is improperly before us: David did not raise it below, nor has he ever notified the Attorney General of Kentucky about his contention. See Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989) (“The Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.”); see also Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Ky. 2008) (citations omitted) (explaining “strict compliance with the notification provisions of KRS 418.075 is mandatory[,] meaning that even in criminal cases, we have refused to address arguments that a statute is unconstitutional unless the notice provision of KRS 418.075 had been fully satisfied.”).

David also complains “[t]he Court’s Order does not make reference to when David inflicted fear of harm, or how the threatened harm was imminent.” However, David did not request additional findings. CR 52.04 states:

A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion pursuant to Rule 52.02.

In other words, we are unable to reverse and remand for the failure of the trial court to be more specific.

Lastly, David argues there was insufficient evidence supporting the family court’s findings that, pursuant to KRS 403.740(1), domestic violence and abuse occurred and may again occur.1 This issue is subject to review regardless of

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Related

Smith v. Smith
235 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 2006)
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald
888 S.W.2d 679 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1994)
Cherry v. Cherry
634 S.W.2d 423 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1982)
Baird v. Baird
234 S.W.3d 385 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 2007)
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett
770 S.W.2d 225 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1989)
Benet v. Commonwealth
253 S.W.3d 528 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2008)
Moore v. Asente
110 S.W.3d 336 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2003)
Caudill v. Caudill
318 S.W.3d 112 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 2010)
Reichle v. Reichle
719 S.W.2d 442 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1986)
Harris v. Commonwealth
384 S.W.3d 117 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2012)
Ashley v. Ashley
520 S.W.3d 400 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 2017)