David Khalaj v. City of Phoenix

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 27, 2023
• Docket: 22-16820
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 27 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID KHALAJ; JULIET DAVID No. 22-16820 YOUMARAN, a married couple, D.C. No. Plaintiffs-Appellants, 2:17-cv-01199-GMS-JZB

v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipal corporation; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 20, 2023 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: IKUTA, BADE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiffs David Khalaj and Juliet Youmaran appeal the district court’s order

granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Phoenix and several Phoenix

police officers in plaintiffs’ civil rights lawsuit arising from their 2016 arrest at the

Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Silverado Hospice,

Inc. v. Becerra, 42 F.4th 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2022). We affirm.

The officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs, which defeats

plaintiffs’ federal and state law false arrest claims. See Cabrera v. City of

Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Hockett v. City of

Tucson, 678 P.2d 502, 505 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). Under both Arizona and federal

law, a police officer has probable cause “when reasonably trustworthy information

and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect

has committed an offense.” State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1007–08 (Ariz. 2000);

accord Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir.

2001) (“Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances known

to the arresting officers . . . a prudent person would believe the suspect had

committed a crime.”). Probable cause “is not a high bar,” Kaley v. United States,

571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014), and “requires only a probability or substantial chance of

criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–244,

n.13 (1983)). In addition, an officer’s “reason for making the arrest need not be the

criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004).

In this case, the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for

2 disorderly conduct. Under Arizona law, “[a] person commits disorderly conduct if,

with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with

knowledge of doing so, such person: 1. Engages in fighting, violent or seriously

disruptive behavior; or 2. Makes unreasonable noise . . . .” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

2904(A)(1)–(2). Video recordings of the incident that the officers reviewed before

making the arrests clearly show the plaintiffs screaming at and physically resisting

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, which disturbed other passengers

nearby. The defendant officers therefore had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs

had engaged in seriously disruptive behavior or made unreasonable noise, and that

this disturbed other persons in the area.

Officers also had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs acted with the

required mens rea. “[W]hen a defendant is charged with disorderly conduct for

disturbing the peace of a particular person, the state is required to prove that the

defendant knowingly disturbed the victim’s peace . . . .” State v. Burdick, 125 P.3d

1039, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). The evidence allowed a reasonable officer to

conclude that this standard was met given the heated nature of the altercation

between plaintiffs and the CBP officers in the presence of other passengers.

Plaintiffs argue that they acted in self-defense and that their actions were

protected under the First Amendment. But “[i]t is not the rule that police must

investigate a defendant’s legal defenses prior to making an arrest.” O’Doan v.

3 Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d

484, 500 (6th Cir. 2009)) (alteration in original); see also Yousefian v. City of

Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The mere existence of some

evidence that could suggest self-defense does not negate probable cause.”). Because

we conclude that officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs, the district court

properly granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ other claims as well.

AFFIRMED.