David Kauffman v.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: May 23, 2025
• Docket: 25-1619
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

CLD-133 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-1619 ___________

IN RE: DAVID R. KAUFFMAN, Petitioner ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Related to 3:23-cv-00239) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. April 24, 2025 Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 23, 2025) __________

OPINION * __________ PER CURIAM

David R. Kauffman has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting, among

other things, that we direct the District Court to refer his civil case to a new Magistrate

Judge. For the following reasons, we will deny the petition.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Kauffman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania, alleging that numerous Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

officers and employees violated his civil rights. The matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Keith Pesto, who, Kauffman complains, is “shutting the courthouse doors to” him.

Mandamus Pet., 9. According to Kauffman, Judge Pesto has an “established bias

against” him, as evidenced by adverse rulings and by “refus[al] to issue a Rule 16

Scheduling Order.” Id. at 2. The case remains pending in the District Court.

Our mandamus authority includes the power to order a District Court to recuse in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 455. See In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1995); see

also Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993). Under

§ 455(a), “any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

Because the purpose of this provision is “to promote public confidence in the integrity of

the judicial process,” it is not necessary for Kauffman to show that Judge Pesto was

actually biased. See Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 325 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988)). The test for

recusal under § 455(a) is whether a reasonable person who is aware of all of the facts

might reasonably question a judge’s impartiality. In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d

289, 302 (3d Cir. 2004). Kauffman’s allegations of bias pertain solely to “displeasure

with legal rulings.” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278

(3d Cir. 2000). Thus, those allegations fail to set forth a reasonable basis for questioning

2 Judge Pesto’s impartiality. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)

(adverse rulings alone generally do not constitute a sufficient basis for holding that a

judge’s impartiality is in doubt); see also United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 62, 68 (3d

Cir. 1989) (explaining that recusal is not required when based on mere “possibilities” and

“unsubstantiated allegations”).

Furthermore, mandamus relief is not warranted based on Judge Pesto’s alleged

“refus[al]” to issue a scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Mandamus Pet. 2. Issuance of a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy

in extraordinary circumstances only. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1985).

Although we may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that undue delay is tantamount

to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), the

manner in which a court controls its docket is discretionary. See In re Fine Paper

Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). Given the discretionary nature of

docket management, there can be no clear and indisputable right to have the District

Court handle a case on its docket in a certain manner. See Allied Chem. Corp. v.

Daiflon, 49 U.S. 33, 36 (1980). Because the proceedings in the District Court are moving

forward apace, we conclude that the absence of a scheduling order under Rule 16 is not

tantamount to failure to exercise jurisdiction.

Kauffman also asks us to direct the District Court to “make [his] proposed First-

Amended Complaint the operative complaint.” Mandamus Pet., 2. We decline to do so.

Several months after the defendants submitted their motions to dismiss the original

3 complaint, Kauffman moved for leave to file an amended complaint. The District Court

denied that motion, noting that amendment would not promote justice as described in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 or the speedy and inexpensive determination of

actions described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1. Mandamus is not a substitute for

an appeal, see In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 2006), and Kauffman can

challenge the denial of his motion for leave to amend on appeal following the District

Court’s entry of a final order. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108

(3d Cir. 2002) (stating that this Court reviews the denial of leave to amend for abuse of

discretion).

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Kauffman’s petition for a writ of

mandamus.