Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2025-1320 ____________
DAVID JOSEPH PITTMAN, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
September 10, 2025
PER CURIAM.
David Joseph Pittman is a prisoner under a sentence of death
for whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for
September 17, 2025. He appeals the circuit court’s order
summarily denying his fourth successive motion for postconviction
relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and
denying his motion for a stay of execution filed under section
922.07(1), Florida Statutes (2025). 1 For the reasons that follow, we
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. affirm the circuit court’s order and deny Pittman’s motion for stay
of execution.
I
In 1990, Pittman was going through a contentious divorce
with his former wife, Marie. Pittman v. State (Pittman I), 646 So. 2d
167, 168 (Fla. 1994).2 Pittman had made several threats against
Marie and her family. Id. He had also recently learned that Marie’s
sister, Bonnie, was attempting to press criminal charges against
him for an alleged rape that happened years earlier. Id.
After cutting their phone lines from the outside, Pittman went
to the Knowles’ home on May 15, 1990. Id. at 168, 169 n.2.
Pittman was planning to speak with Bonnie about the problems he
was having with her family when Bonnie let him into the home. Id.
at 168. When she refused his sexual advances, Pittman killed her
by stabbing her multiple times and slitting her throat to silence her
cries for help. Id. Pittman then stabbed and killed Marie’s mother
outside of Bonnie’s bedroom and, as Marie’s father was attempting
to use the phone, stabbed and killed him also. Id. After killing
2. The full facts of this case are set forth in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal. See Pittman I, 646 So. 2d 167.
-2- Marie’s family, Pittman doused the home and yard with gasoline,
burned the home down, and stole Bonnie’s car. Id. at 168, 169 n.2.
Pittman was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder,
two counts of arson, and one count each of burglary and grand
theft. A jury ultimately found Pittman guilty of all but burglary.
Id. at 169. At the conclusion of the penalty phase proceedings, the
jury recommend the death penalty for all three murders by a vote of
nine to three. Id. The trial court sentenced Pittman to death,
finding two aggravating circumstances for each murder: (1) a
previous conviction of a violent felony, and (2) the heinous,
atrocious, or cruel nature of the murders. Id. In doing so, the trial
court rejected Pittman’s mitigating factors of extreme mental and
emotional disturbance, concluding that the aggravating factors
substantially outweighed the mitigating factors Pittman had proven.
Id. 3
3. The trial court acknowledged that Pittman put forward expert opinions that his “capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired” and that he suffered brain damage. See id. at 169 n.2. However, the court noted that these expert opinions were the only evidence in the record supporting these mitigating circumstances. Id. The court additionally found that Pittman was a “hyperactive personality,” “may have suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child,” and was
-3- Pittman has since unsuccessfully challenged his convictions
and death sentences in both state and federal court. In 1994, we
affirmed each of Pittman’s convictions and sentences on direct
appeal and denied rehearing. Id. at 173.4 The United States
Supreme Court denied Pittman’s certiorari petition. Pittman v.
Florida, 514 U.S. 1119 (1995). Pittman then sought postconviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which the
circuit court denied. We affirmed. 5 Pittman v. State (Pittman II),
an “impulsive person with memory problems and impaired social judgment.” Id. Ultimately, however, the court determined that these mitigating circumstances were both unrelated to the murders and substantially outweighed by the established aggravating circumstances. Id.
4. Pittman’s claims on direct appeal were: (1) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of collateral crimes and bad acts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting identification testimony; (3) the trial court erred in excluding hearsay statements of a third party’s alleged confession; (4) the trial court failed to hold a presentencing hearing; (5) the trial court rendered a legally insufficient sentencing order; (6) the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague; (7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance; (8) the trial court erred in failing to find the two statutory mental mitigating circumstances; (9) the trial court erred in failing to find nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; and (10) the death penalty is disproportionate in this case. Id. at 170 n.3.
5. Pittman raised the following claims on appeal: (1) the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady v. Maryland, 373
-4- 90 So. 3d 794, 799 (Fla. 2011). We also denied Pittman’s initial
habeas petition. See id.6
U.S. 83 (1963), claim with respect to inmate Carl Hughes; (2) the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to inmate David Pounds; (3) the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to the handwritten notes of other witness interviews; (4) the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to Dennis Waters’s identification of the wrecker; (5) the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to the letter concerning William Smith; (6) the postconviction court erred in denying relief based on the cumulative effect of all withheld and newly discovered evidence; (7) the postconviction court erred in denying his Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), claim; (8) the postconviction court erred in denying his guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (9) the postconviction court erred in denying his guilt phase newly discovered evidence claim; (10) the postconviction court erred in denying his penalty phase Brady claim; (11) the postconviction court erred in denying his penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (12) the postconviction court erred in denying his penalty phase newly discovered evidence claim. Pittman II, 90 So. 3d at 803 n.8.
6. The habeas petition raised the following claims: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the Florida Supreme Court erred in affirming the exclusion of certain evidence; (3) the Florida Supreme Court erred in affirming Pittman’s convictions and sentences where the State withheld pertinent facts; (4) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that Pittman’s death sentences were based on an improper aggravator; (5) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the prosecutor used improper argument in the penalty phase; and (6) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the penalty phase jury was misled by improper comments and instructions. Id. at 804 n.9.
-5- Pittman then sought relief in federal court, but the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied his
habeas petition and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Pittman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.
(Pittman III), No. 8:12-cv-1600-T-17EAJ, 2015 WL 736417, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2015); see also id. at *68 (declining to issue a
certificate of appealability); Pittman v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
(Pittman IV), 871 F.3d 1231, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017). Pittman also
unsuccessfully sought certiorari relief in the United States Supreme
Court. Pittman v. Jones, 586 U.S. 839 (2018).
Most recently, Pittman filed a third successive motion for
postconviction relief and a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Pittman v. State
(Pittman V), 337 So. 3d 776, 776 (Fla. 2022).7 The amended
postconviction motion raised an intellectual disability claim, and
the 3.800(a) motion asserted that Pittman’s death sentences were
illegal because he did not receive an evidentiary hearing on the
7. Pittman filed his first and second successive motions for postconviction relief but did not appeal their denial by the circuit court. See id. at 777 n.2.
-6- intellectual disability claim. Id. The postconviction court denied
both motions, and we affirmed. Id. at 777.
On August 15, 2025, Governor DeSantis issued a death
warrant for the execution of Pittman. As a result, Pittman filed a
fourth successive motion for postconviction relief and a motion for a
stay of execution. His fourth successive motion raised one claim:
that his death sentence is unconstitutional because he is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing to show that his execution is constitutionally
prohibited due to his intellectual disability. The postconviction
court entered an order summarily denying Pittman’s motions.
Pittman timely appeals and filed a motion for a stay of execution.
II
A
“Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is
appropriate ‘[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Bogle v.
State, 322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(h)(6).
In reviewing a circuit court’s summary denial, “this Court must
accept the defendant’s allegations as true to the extent that they are
-7- not conclusively refuted by the record.” Tompkins v. State, 994 So.
2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008) (citing Rolling v. State, 944 So. 2d 176,
179 (Fla. 2006)). Still, “[t]he defendant bears the burden to
establish a prima facie case based on a legally valid claim; mere
conclusory allegations are insufficient.” Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d
82, 96 (Fla. 2011) (citing Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061
(Fla. 2000)). A circuit court’s decision whether to grant an
evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion “is tantamount to a pure
question of law, subject to de novo review.” Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d
1123, 1127 (Fla. 2009) (citing State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137
(Fla. 2003)).
Also relevant here, postconviction claims in capital cases must
generally be filed within one year after the judgment and sentence
become final. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). With certain exceptions,
rule 3.851 prohibits both untimely and repetitive claims. Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2); see also Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122,
1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction
proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a
successive motion.” (citing Van Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347, 362
(Fla. 2013))).
-8- B
On appeal, Pittman challenges the postconviction court’s
denial of his intellectual disability claim. His claim relies in large
part on retroactive application of Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701
(2014), which this Court decided should be applied retroactively in
Walls v. State (Walls I), 213 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla. 2016). But in
Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020), we held that the
Walls I decision was clearly erroneous and that Hall should not be
retroactively applied. Id. at 1019-21. So, Pittman argues that
Phillips was wrongly decided.
Like we have before, we decline to revisit Phillips and conclude
the postconviction court correctly applied it to Pittman’s claim. See
Foster v. State, 395 So. 3d 127, 130 (Fla. 2024) (rejecting invitation
to recede from Phillips), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1939 (2025); Walls
v. State (Walls II), 361 So. 3d 231, 233 (Fla.) (noting we have already
rejected arguments to recede from Phillips and have instead
consistently applied its holding in the postconviction context), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 174 (2023).
Because Phillips governs, Pittman’s claim fails for several
reasons. First, his claim is untimely, as we already held in
-9- Pittman V. See 337 So. 3d at 777 (holding Pittman was required to
raise his intellectual disability claim no later than 60 days after
October 1, 2004).
Second, because Pittman has already raised his intellectual
disability claim, it is procedurally barred. See Hendrix, 136 So. 3d
at 1125 (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction
proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a
successive motion.” (citing Van Poyck, 116 So. 3d at 362)). We
equally reject Pittman’s argument that procedural bars should not
apply to intellectual disability claims. Indeed, we have regularly
applied procedural bars to exemption-from-execution claims. See
Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 100 (Fla. 2023) (holding that this
Court’s precedent “flatly refutes Dillbeck’s contention that no time
limits apply to categorical exemption claims”); Barwick v. State, 361
So. 3d 785, 795 (Fla. 2023) (same); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883,
886 (Fla. 2013) (same). And our approach is consistent with the
Eleventh Circuit’s. See In Re Bowles, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir.
2019). 8
8. Because the claim is both untimely and procedurally barred, Pittman is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Moreover,
- 10 - Finally, we reject Pittman’s argument that his execution is
constitutionally prohibited. To the extent that Pittman presents a
due process argument, it fails. “Due process requires that a
defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a
matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla.
2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993)). Here,
Pittman has received the process due to him and has failed to meet
the requisite standards for overcoming summary denial. See Bates
v. State, No. SC2025-1127, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S223, S224-25, 2025
WL 2319001, at *4-5 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2025) (rejecting a death row
defendant’s request for due process relief to further demonstrate his
mental state at the time of his offense because it was time-barred),
cert. denied, No. 25-5370, 2025 WL 2396797 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2025).
Likewise, this Court’s decision to adhere to Phillips does not
result in an arbitrary and capricious application of the death
penalty. We recently rejected a similar Eighth Amendment
challenge, noting that developments in the case law did not alter
our previously held position that Florida’s death penalty scheme is
this Court will not subvert its role as an appellate court and make a factual finding about Pittman’s intellectual capabilities.
- 11 - constitutionally sound. See Miller v. State, 379 So. 3d 1109, 1127
(Fla.) (rejecting argument that Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544
(Fla. 2020), and Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 2020), result in
arbitrary application of death penalty), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 241
(2024). Our decision in Phillips, which correctly applies our
established retroactivity test, also does not alter that analysis.
C
Because Pittman is not entitled to relief, we deny his motion
for a stay of execution. See Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 103 (“[A] stay of
execution on a successive motion for postconviction relief is
warranted only where there are substantial grounds upon which
relief might be granted.” (quoting Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867,
873-74 (Fla. 2014))).
III
We affirm the summary denial of Pittman’s fourth successive
motion for postconviction relief. We also deny his motion for stay of
execution. No oral argument is necessary, and no motion for
rehearing will be considered by this Court. The mandate shall issue
immediately.
It is so ordered.
- 12 - MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. CANADY, J., recused.
LABARGA, J., dissenting.
In Pittman v. State (Pittman V), 337 So. 3d 776, 777 (Fla.
2022), I dissented to the majority’s decision affirming the summary
denial of Pittman’s intellectual disability claim. The majority’s
affirmance was based on its conclusion in Phillips v. State, 299 So.
3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) (receding from Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340
(Fla. 2016), and holding that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014),
does not apply retroactively).
I dissented in Phillips in light of my concern that the decision
“potentially deprives certain individuals of consideration of their
intellectual disability claims, and it results in an inconsistent
handling of these cases among similarly situated individuals.” 299
So. 3d at 1026 (Labarga, J., dissenting).
In this death warrant case, Pittman yet maintains that he is
intellectually disabled, and he urges this Court to allow him “the
opportunity to present a full and complete picture of his intellectual
disability.” Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Phillips, I
- 13 - dissent to today’s decision affirming the summary denial of
Pittman’s fourth successive motion for postconviction relief.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Jon K. Abdoney, Judge – Case No. 531990CF002242A1XXXX
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Julissa R. Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Megan Montagno, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and John “Jack” LoBianco, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Timothy A. Freeland, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
- 14 -