David Joseph Gonzalez v. State
This text of David Joseph Gonzalez v. State (David Joseph Gonzalez v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-16-00012-CR
DAVID JOSEPH GONZALEZ, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 426th District Court Bell County, Texas Trial Court No. 73960, Honorable Fancy H. Jezek, Presiding
April 19, 2016
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
David Joseph Gonzalez, appellant, appeals his conviction for aggravated assault.
Through two issues, he contends that 1) the evidence is insufficient to support his ability
to pay court appointed attorney’s fees and 2) the judgment incorrectly shows appellant
pled “guilty” when he actually pled “not guilty.”1 We affirm as modified.
1 Because the appeal was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals, we are obligated to apply its precedent where available. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. Background
Appellant was indicted on February 18, 2015 for the offense of aggravated
assault by causing serious bodily injury. The trial court assigned him appointed counsel
due to his status as an indigent. On day of trial, appellant waived his right to a jury and
entered a plea of “not guilty.” Upon completion of trial, the trial court found him guilty
and assessed punishment at ten years in prison. The imposition of that sentence was
suspended, and appellant was placed on community supervision for six years. As a
condition of his community supervision, he was ordered to pay $2,502.50 in attorney’s
fees. Furthermore, that obligation was incorporated into the judgment, which decree
also reflected that appellant pled “guilty.”
Issues
In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to
pay attorney’s fees. In his second, he contends that the judgment incorrectly reflects
that he pled guilty. The State conceded the accuracy of both issues. Consequently, we
sustain the issues, modify the judgment to remove the obligation to pay attorney’s fees
as a condition of community supervision, and modify the judgment to indicate that
appellant pled “not guilty” to the charge for which he was indicted and tried. See Mayer
v. State, 274 S.W.3d 898, 902 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008), affirmed, 309 S.W.3d 552
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (modified the judgment to delete the requirement imposed on an
indigent defendant to pay attorney’s fees); Rago v. State, No. 03-13-00798-CR, 2015
Tex. App. LEXIS 13026, at *17 (Tex. App.—Austin December 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (noting that a court of appeals has the authority to
modify incorrect judgments when the necessary information is available to do so).
2 Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.
Brian Quinn Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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