David Hawkins v. Commonwealth
This text of David Hawkins v. Commonwealth (David Hawkins v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
DAVID HAWKINS MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1876-94-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER DECEMBER 12, 1995 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS Robert W. Curran, Judge
Willard M. Robinson, Jr., for appellant.
Richard W. Rizk, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
David Hawkins (appellant) appeals his convictions for
abduction in violation of Code § 18.2-48 and rape in violation of
Code § 18.2-61. Appellant contends the trial court erred (1) in
allowing testimony from a police detective concerning the
victim's identification of appellant in a photo spread, and
(2) in failing to admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's
statement during the sentencing phase that appellant was
previously convicted of rape, after the trial court ruled the
rape conviction could not be introduced. Because the trial court
committed no error, we affirm appellant's convictions.
* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. I.
FACTS
On October 2, 1993, the victim saw appellant exit a trailer
at the trailer park where the victim lived. Appellant approached
the victim and asked her to accompany him to a nearby convenience
store. When the victim refused, appellant grabbed her hand and
pulled her out of the trailer park. Appellant dragged the victim
to a wooded area behind the convenience store where he removed
her clothes and his own clothes. The victim testified that,
while on top of her, appellant placed his penis inside her vagina
four times, despite her protestations. Afterward, the victim
dressed herself and returned to the trailer park. Subsequently,
the victim picked appellant's picture from a six-man photo spread
shown to her by Detective William Hayes of the Newport News
Police Department. At trial, the victim took the stand and identified appellant
as her rapist. During lengthy cross-examination, appellant's
counsel explored inconsistencies in the victim's identification
of appellant.
The prosecutor asked Detective Hayes what he and the victim
said at the time of the photo-spread identification. Appellant
objected that such testimony was improper impeachment evidence,
but the trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then
elicited the following testimony:
Q: Could you tell what you said to [the victim] and what happened basically without telling us her responses if
-2- you could?
A: Yes, ma'am, I showed her the photo-spread and I told her to look at it carefully and see if she could see anyone there that she recognized.
Q: Okay.
A: And she looked at it.
Q: Could you tell us whether you saw her look at all of the photos?
A: Well, I was setting [sic] next to her while she was looking at the photo-spread, I asked her to look at all of them. Q: And when you say that she picked out number six, what did you say?
A: I told her after she picked it out, I told her, that's not him, and then she said, yes it is.
Appellant's Counsel: Your honor, that's what I objected to.
The Court: The portion of that that [sic] is what the young lady said is stricken. The portion he said is appropriate for him to say that he did say something to her.
Prosecutor: Okay.
Q: After you said, that's not him did you say anything else, Detective Hayes, that you recall?
A: Right off I don't remember saying anything else.
Q: Could you tell the jury why you said that's not him?
Appellant's Counsel: I object to that.
The Court: I'll sustain that objection.
After the jury found appellant guilty of abduction and rape,
the trial court held a separate sentencing hearing with the jury
-3- present. The prosecutor commenced the proceedings by stating,
"Your Honor, the only evidence we would have for sentencing are
copies, certified copies of [appellant's] prior conviction for
rape." Appellant's counsel immediately asked the trial court if
he could "clarify a couple of things out of the presence of [the]
jury," and the jury retired. The trial court ruled the
Commonwealth could not introduce copies of appellant's prior rape
conviction because they had not been filed on time. Appellant's
counsel concedes on brief he did not hear the prosecutor's
reference to appellant's "conviction for rape," and therefore did
not object to it or ask for a jury admonishment. Because no
other sentencing evidence existed, both the Commonwealth and
appellant agreed neither would argue punishment. The jury
returned verdicts sentencing appellant on both charges. II.
HEARSAY STATEMENTS
We hold the trial court did not err in allowing Detective
Hayes to testify as to statements the victim made when she
identified appellant from a photo spread. The law regarding
testimony about out-of-court identifications is well settled in
Virginia: a party may introduce evidence of extrajudicial
identifications. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 447, 450,
345 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1986). Specifically addressing this issue,
the Supreme Court stated:
Where the witness who identified the accused out- of-court is available as a witness, so as to afford the
-4- accused the rights of confrontation and cross- examination, the dangers sought to be avoided by the hearsay rule are absent and the testimony of a third person as to the extrajudicial identification has been held to be admissible. . . .
An identification made by a victim or an eyewitness soon after a crime has been committed may be more objective and accurate and have greater probative value than one made later in court when unduly suggestive circumstances, if present, or the changed appearance of the defendant, might adversely affect the identifier's testimony. Moreover, the memory of a witness may fade . . . . It is also not beyond the realm of possibility that an identifying witness may be inhibited by threat or intimidation from making a positive in-court identification. Accordingly, we agree with the reasoning of those courts which have approved the broad admissibility of identification evidence.
Niblett v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 76, 82, 225 S.E.2d 391, 394
(1976)(emphases added); see Martin v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 686,
173 S.E.2d 794 (1970); Ellis v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 340,
444 S.E.2d 12 (1994); Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in
Virginia § 18-30(b), at 195 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1994)(stating
hearsay evidence of pretrial identification is admissible as
independent substantive evidence of identity). In this case, the
victim was present in court and available for cross-examination.
Hayes' testimony was therefore "properly admitted as evidence
against [appellant], to be considered and weighed by the jury
with the other evidence in the case." Niblett, 217 Va. at 83,
225 S.E.2d at 395.
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