David Hamilton v. People of The State of California

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: April 26, 2021
• Docket: 2:21-cv-03446
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 JS-6 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA-WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 13 DAVID HAMILTON, ) Case No. CV 21-03446-DSF (AS) ) 14 Petitioner, ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL ) 15 ) v. ) 16 ) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) 17 CALIFORNIA, et al., ) ) 18 Respondents. ) ) 19 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 22 On April 20, 2021, David Hamilton (“Petitioner”), a 23 California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a “Petition for 24 Writ Error Coram Vobis to Escape the Limitations Laid Down in Rule 25 60(b)” (Dkt. No. 1), which the Court construes as a Petition for 26 Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 27 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). Petitioner challenges his 2010 28 convictions for mayhem and assault by means likely to produce 1 great bodily injury in Los Angeles County Superior Court (Case No. 2 BA339752), as well as his sentence of 46-years-to-life.1 The 3 Petition alleges the following grounds for federal habeas relief: 4 (1) Petitioner is actually innocent; (2) Prior to his arraignment, 5 Petitioner was not administered warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 6 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (3) The prosecutor failed to disclose 7 exculpatory evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due 8 process; and (4) The withdrawal of Petitioner’s plea of not guilty 9 by reason of insanity was “not done so willingly”; and the trial 10 court’s refusal to allow Petitioner to communicate with standby 11 counsel during trial proceedings was an abuse of discretion. 12 (Petition at 3-8).2 13 14 On November 4, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of 15 Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 16 § 2254, in which he challenged the same 2010 convictions and 17 18 1 The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings in David Hamilton v. William Knipp, Warden, Case No. CV 14-08537-DSF 19 (RZ) and David Hamilton v. People of the State of California, et al., Case No. CV 17-08154-DSF (AS). On May 12, 2015, Case No. CV 20 14-08537-DSF (RZ) was transferred to the calendar of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See David Hamilton v. William 21 Knipp, Warden, Case No. CV 14-08537-DSF (RZ) (Dkt. No. 22). 22 2 To the extent that Petitioner is attempting to seek relief from Judgment in Case No. CV 14-08537-DSF (RZ) and/or Case 23 No. CV 17-08154-DSF (AS) under Fed.R.Civ.P 60(b)(6), Petitioner has failed to show extraordinary circumstances justifying the 24 reopening of a final judgment. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005); LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser 25 Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 26 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998)(“To receive Rule 60(b)(6) relief, a moving party must show both injury and that circumstances beyond 27 [his or her] control prevented timely action to protect [his or her] interests.”). 28 2 1 sentence (“prior habeas action”). See David Hamilton v. William 2 Knipp, Case No. CV 14-08537-DSF (RZ)(Dkt. No. 1). On June 15, 3 2015, the Court issued an Order and Judgment denying that habeas 4 petition and dismissing the action with prejudice (based on its 5 untimeliness), in accordance with the findings, conclusions and 6 recommendations of the assigned Magistrate Judge. (Id.; Dkt. Nos. 7 28-29). On the same date, the Court denied Petitioner a 8 certificate of appealability. (Id.; Dkt. No. 30). On February 16, 9 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s 10 request for a certificate of appealability. (Id.; Dkt. No. 37). 11 12 On November 8, 2017, Petitioner filed what was construed as 13 a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody 14 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the same 2010 15 convictions and sentence. See David Hamilton v. People of the 16 State of California, et al., Case No. CV 17-08154-DSF (AS) (Dkt. 17 Nos. 1, 5 at 1). On November 27, 2017, the Court issued an Order 18 and Judgment dismissing that habeas petition without prejudice, 19 as an unauthorized, successive petition, and denied Petitioner a 20 Certificate of Appealability. (Id.; Dkt. Nos. 5-7). 21 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 24 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 25 (“AEDPA”), enacted on April 24, 1996, provides in pertinent part 26 that: 27 28 (a) No circuit or district judge shall be 3 1 required to entertain an application for a writ of 2 habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a 3 person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the 4 United States if it appears that the legality of such 5 detention has been determined by a judge or court of 6 the United States on a prior application for a writ 7 of habeas corpus, except as provided in §2255. 8 (b)(1) A claim presented in a second or 9 successive habeas corpus application under section 10 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall 11 be dismissed. 12 (2) A claim presented in a second or successive 13 habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 14 not presented in a prior application shall be 15 dismissed unless-- 16 (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on 17 a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 18 cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 19 was previously unavailable; or 20 (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could 21 not have been discovered previously through the 22 exercise of due diligence; and 23 (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven 24 and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would 25 be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 26 evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 27 reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant 28 guilty of the underlying offense. 4 1 (3)(A) Before a second or successive application 2 permitted by this section is filed in the district 3 court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate 4 court of appeals for an order authorizing the 5 district court to consider the application. 6 (B) A motion in the court of appeals for an 7 order authorizing the district court to consider a 8 second or successive application shall be determined 9 by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. 10 (C) The court of appeals may authorize the 11 filing of a second or successive application only if 12 it determines that the application makes a prima 13 facie showing that the application satisfies the 14 requirements of this subsection. 15 (D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the 16 authorization to file a second or successive 17 application not later than 30 days after the filing 18 of the motion. 19 (E) The grant or denial of an authorization by 20 a court of appeals to file a second or successive 21 application shall not be appealable and shall not be 22 the subject of a Petition for Rehearing or for a Writ 23 of Certiorari. 24 (4) A district court shall dismiss any claim 25 presented in a second or successive application that 26 the court of appeals has authorized to be filed 27 unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies 28 the requirements of this section. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 5 1 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) “creates a ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for 2 the consideration of second or successive applications in district 3 court. The prospective applicant must file in the court of 4 appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas 5 application in the district court. § 2244(b)(3)(A).” Felker v. 6 Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657(1996). 7 8 The instant Petition and the prior habeas action challenge 9 Petitioner’s custody pursuant to the same 2010 judgment entered 10 by the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Accordingly, the 11 instant Petition, filed on April 20, 2021, well after the 12 effective date of the AEDPA, is a second or successive habeas 13 petition for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Therefore, Petitioner 14 was required to obtain authorization from the Court of Appeals 15 before filing the present Petition. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A). 16 No such authorization has been obtained in this case. 17 18 Moreover, the claims asserted in the instant Petition do not 19 appear to fall within the exceptions to the bar on second or 20 successive petitions because the asserted claims are not based on 21 newly discovered facts or a “a new rule of constitutional law, 22 made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 23 Court, that was previously unavailable.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 24 656, 662 (2001); see also Johnson v. California, 2019 WL 4276636, 25 at n.3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019)(“[A] new state right afforded 26 by an amended state statute does not create a new federal 27 constitutional right and certainly is not the equivalent of a 28 federal constitutional right newly recognized by the United States 6 1 Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 2 collateral review.”; quoting Trejo v. Sherman, 2016 WL 9075049, 3 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016), report and recommendation 4 accepted, 2016 WL 8738143 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016)). However, 5 this determination must be made by the United States Court of 6 Appeals upon a petitioner’s motion for an order authorizing the 7 district court to consider his second or successive petition. 28 8 U.S.C. § 2244(b); see Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007) 9 (where the petitioner did not receive authorization from the Court 10 of Appeals before filing second or successive petition, “the 11 District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain [the 12 petition]”); Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) 13 (“[T]he prior-appellate-review mechanism set forth in § 2244(b) 14 requires the permission of the court of appeals before ‘a second 15 or successive habeas application under § 2254’ may be 16 commenced.”). Because Petitioner has not obtained authorization 17 from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot 18 entertain the present Petition. See Burton v. Stewart, supra. 19 20 Moreover, even if Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence may 21 fall within the exception to the bar on second or successive 22 petitions because it is based on newly discovered evidence (see 23 Petition at 4-5), this determination must be made by the United 24 States Court of Appeals upon a petitioner’s motion for an order 25 authorizing the district court to consider his second or 26 successive petition. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 27 (2013)(“We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a 28 gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment 7 1 is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this 2 case, expiration of the statute of limitations.”; Under the actual 3 innocence exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner 4 must show that “‘in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 5 reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a 6 reasonable doubt.’”; citation omitted); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 7 518, 538 (2006)(“A petitioner’s burden at the gateway stage is to 8 demonstrate that more likely than not, in light of the new 9 evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a 10 reasonable doubt–or, to remove the double negative, that more 11 likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable 12 doubt.”). 13 14 In any event, Petitioner has not even purported to make a 15 showing of actual innocence, supported by new reliable evidence. 16 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)(“To be credible, [a 17 claim of actual innocence] requires petitioner to support his 18 allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-- 19 whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 20 eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was not 21 presented at trial.”). Petitioner simply has not presented an 22 “exceptional case[] involving a compelling claim of actual 23 innocence.” House, 547 U.S. at 521; see Schlup, supra 24 (“[E]xperience has taught us that a substantial claim that 25 constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent 26 person is extremely rare.”); McQuiggin, 569 U.S> at 386 (“We 27 caution, however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are 28 rare”). 8 1 While it does not appear that the actual innocence exception filing a successive petition would apply here, this is a determination that must be made by the Ninth Circuit Court of 4] Appeals. 5 6 III. ORDER 7 8 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice. 10 11 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 12 13 || DATED: April 26, 2021 14 He f, 15 A. _}Ca DALE S. FISCHER 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28