David Hadden v. Assistant State’s Attorney Brandon

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 6, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-03308
StatusUnknown

This text of David Hadden v. Assistant State’s Attorney Brandon (David Hadden v. Assistant State’s Attorney Brandon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Hadden v. Assistant State’s Attorney Brandon, (C.D. Ill. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DAVID HADDEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No.: 25-3308-SEM-DJQ ) ) ASSISTANT STATE’S ) ATTORNEY BRANDON, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Plaintiff David Hadden, proceeding pro se, is an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who is incarcerated at the IDOCs Graham Correctional Center (“Graham”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the case is now before the Court for a merit review of his claims. Because Plaintiff is a prisoner for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and, through such process, to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action, if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor.

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that, on or about February 20, 2025, he

appeared in Sangamon County court on traffic charges, including a charge of failure to obtain proper insurance. Previously, Plaintiff had been found guilty in January 2025 of failure to obtain proper

insurance on his vehicle. Plaintiff was found guilty on this January 2025 charge because he had failed to appear in court because he was suffering from COVID-19. After discussing the matter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Sangamon County Assistant State’s Attorney Brandon L/N/U agreed to dismiss the past lack of insurance violation and the current lack of insurance violation if Plaintiff agreed to plead guilty to the charge of improper use of a vehicle based upon an improper

registration and license plate on that vehicle. After reaching this agreement, Plaintiff pled guilty to the agreed charge and the judge imposed a sentence.

However, ASA Brandon never moved to dismiss the two charges regarding Plaintiff’s lack of proof of insurance. Plaintiff contends that ASA Brandon’s failure to do so led to a cascade of

events that caused Plaintiff to lose a significant amount of money and that led to the closure of his business. In March 2025, Plaintiff contacted ASA Brandon, who again

represented to Plaintiff that he would obtain a dismissal of the two charges for lack of insurance. But according to Plaintiff, Brandon never did so. Accordingly, Plaintiff has filed this case under § 1983

against ASA Brandon because ASA Brandon’s failure to obtain the promised dismissals is the proximate cause of his monetary damages. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Prosecutors are immune from liability for money damages under § 1983 for actions “within the scope of his prosecutorial duties” that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 420, 430 (1976). In fact, absolute immunity shields prosecutors even if they act maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.

Smith v. Power, 346 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2003) In the instant case, every act of failure to act by ASA Brandon of which Plaintiff complains was done in his role and duties as a

prosecutor. Although the transactions that transpired against Plaintiff after ASA Brandon failed to obtain the promised dismissals were unfortunate, ASA Brandon is absolutely immune from

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against him. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, and allowing Plaintiff to attempt to amend his complaint based upon the facts as alleged by him would be futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 2. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE based upon Plaintiff’s failure to file a complaint upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in Defendant’s favor and against Plaintiff. All other pending motions are

denied as moot, and this case is closed. All deadlines and settings on the Court’s calendar are vacated. 3. The Clerk of the Court is also directed to add this

dismissal to the Court’s “three-strikes” list under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 4. Plaintiff is advised that this dismissal may count as a

“strike” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). 5. If he wishes to appeal this judgment, Plaintiff must file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty (30) days of

the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). 6. If he wishes to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must

identify the issues that he will present on appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (an appellant should be given an

opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a responsible assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing that a good faith appeal is an

appeal that “a reasonable person could suppose . . . has some merit” from a legal perspective). 7. If he chooses to appeal, Plaintiff will be liable for the

$605.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

Entered this 6th day of November, 2025

s/ Sue E. Myerscough SUE E. MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Related

Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Curtis J. Celske v. Thomas Edwards
164 F.3d 396 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Paul Smith and Gloria Smith v. L. Patrick Power
346 F.3d 740 (Seventh Circuit, 2003)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Michael Alexander v. United States
721 F.3d 418 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)

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