Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10785 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00632-CG-N
DAVID GLENN MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOUTHERN INTERMODAL XPRESS, ASSURANT EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, UNION SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ________________________
(December 4, 2018)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 2 of 8
David Morris, proceeding pro se, filed this federal civil action to recover
benefits allegedly due him under a life-insurance policy governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Morris sued both Southern Intermodal
Xpress (“SIX”), which offered the policy to its employees, and Union Security
Insurance Company (“Union”), which issued the policy and then denied Morris
benefits under the trade name Assurant Employee Benefits. The district court
liberally construed his complaint as bringing a claim for wrongful denial of benefits
under an ERISA plan, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); dismissed the
complaint as to SIX for lack of a connection to the decision to deny benefits; and
then granted summary judgment in favor of Union on the merits of Morris’s claim.
Morris now appeals. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
Morris was insured under a group term-life-insurance policy offered by his
employer, SIX, and issued by Union. The policy insured Morris’s life and also
provided dependent life-insurance benefits. Dependent insurance extended to
“eligible dependents,” which the policy defined as a “lawful spouse” and certain
children. Dependent insurance ended if, among other things, a dependent was “no
longer eligible.” Morris was married at the time he became insured, but he divorced
on September 24, 2015. Nearly two months later, his ex-wife died.
2 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 3 of 8
After his ex-wife’s death, Morris filed a claim for dependent life-insurance
benefits under the policy. Union denied the claim because, in its view, dependent
coverage ended as of the date of divorce. At the time of her death, according to
Union, Morris’s ex-wife was not his lawful spouse and so was not an eligible
dependent under the policy. Union denied Morris’s appeal.
Morris then sued both SIX and Union “pursuant to . . . ERISA,” demanding
payment of the “death beneficiary proceeds” related to his ex-wife’s death. He
claimed that he was entitled to benefits as the “named beneficiary.” He attached to
his complaint a copy of the policy and a letter from Union denying his appeal.
SIX moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. SIX argued
that it could not be held responsible for wrongful denial of benefits because, as the
documents Morris submitted with his complaint demonstrated, it had no role in
denying benefits. Rather, SIX asserted, Morris’s claim was against Union alone.
Union filed an answer and then moved for summary judgment.
Morris’s complaint did not identify a specific ERISA provision as the basis
for his claim. But given his allegations that he was wrongfully denied benefits under
an “ERISA policy,” the district court liberally construed his complaint as raising a
claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which authorizes an ERISA-plan
“participant or beneficiary” to sue “to recover benefits due to him under the terms
3 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 4 of 8
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”
The district court then granted SIX’s motion to dismiss, but it did so without
prejudice to Morris’s ability to file an amended complaint demonstrating SIX’s
connection to the alleged wrongful denial of benefits. Morris did not file an amended
complaint. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Union,
determining that Union correctly denied the claim under the terms of the life-
insurance policy. The court reasoned that dependent life-insurance coverage for
Morris’s ex-wife had ended before her death because she was no longer his “lawful
spouse” as of the date of divorce. Morris now appeals.
II.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, Leib v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301,
1305 (11th Cir. 2009), as well as the grant of a motion for summary judgment,
Moorman v. UnumProvident Corp., 464 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006).
III.
Morris argues that the district court erred in forcing him to proceed under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), that he stated a plausible claim against SIX because SIX
offered the policy under which, in Morris’s view, benefits were owed, and that the
4 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 5 of 8
court erred by failing to compel SIX to pay dependent benefits following the death
of his ex-wife. We disagree with each of these arguments.
A.
First, the district court did not err by liberally construing Morris’s complaint
to raise a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). That provision of ERISA
authorizes a participant in or beneficiary of an ERISA plan to bring a civil action “to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Because Morris filed suit “pursuant to . . . ERISA” to recover “death beneficiary
proceeds” he claimed were owed under an “ERISA policy,” the district court
properly construed his claim as one “to recover benefits due to him under the terms
of his plan” under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Morris cites no alternative ERISA provision he
could have proceeded under, nor does he explain why he believes he was prejudiced
by the district court’s construction.
Furthermore, any state-law claim that Morris’s complaint may have raised
was preempted by § 1132(a). That provision exerts a strong preemptive power that
converts state-law claims into federal ERISA claims. Conn. State Dental Ass’n v.
Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009). Morris suggests
that he has a claim for breach of contract against SIX, but that claim is preempted
because he could have brought it under § 1132(a), and its resolution depends upon
the interpretation of provisions contained within his ERISA policy. See id. at 1344–
5 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 6 of 8
45.
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Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10785 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00632-CG-N
DAVID GLENN MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOUTHERN INTERMODAL XPRESS, ASSURANT EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, UNION SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ________________________
(December 4, 2018)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 2 of 8
David Morris, proceeding pro se, filed this federal civil action to recover
benefits allegedly due him under a life-insurance policy governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Morris sued both Southern Intermodal
Xpress (“SIX”), which offered the policy to its employees, and Union Security
Insurance Company (“Union”), which issued the policy and then denied Morris
benefits under the trade name Assurant Employee Benefits. The district court
liberally construed his complaint as bringing a claim for wrongful denial of benefits
under an ERISA plan, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); dismissed the
complaint as to SIX for lack of a connection to the decision to deny benefits; and
then granted summary judgment in favor of Union on the merits of Morris’s claim.
Morris now appeals. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
Morris was insured under a group term-life-insurance policy offered by his
employer, SIX, and issued by Union. The policy insured Morris’s life and also
provided dependent life-insurance benefits. Dependent insurance extended to
“eligible dependents,” which the policy defined as a “lawful spouse” and certain
children. Dependent insurance ended if, among other things, a dependent was “no
longer eligible.” Morris was married at the time he became insured, but he divorced
on September 24, 2015. Nearly two months later, his ex-wife died.
2 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 3 of 8
After his ex-wife’s death, Morris filed a claim for dependent life-insurance
benefits under the policy. Union denied the claim because, in its view, dependent
coverage ended as of the date of divorce. At the time of her death, according to
Union, Morris’s ex-wife was not his lawful spouse and so was not an eligible
dependent under the policy. Union denied Morris’s appeal.
Morris then sued both SIX and Union “pursuant to . . . ERISA,” demanding
payment of the “death beneficiary proceeds” related to his ex-wife’s death. He
claimed that he was entitled to benefits as the “named beneficiary.” He attached to
his complaint a copy of the policy and a letter from Union denying his appeal.
SIX moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. SIX argued
that it could not be held responsible for wrongful denial of benefits because, as the
documents Morris submitted with his complaint demonstrated, it had no role in
denying benefits. Rather, SIX asserted, Morris’s claim was against Union alone.
Union filed an answer and then moved for summary judgment.
Morris’s complaint did not identify a specific ERISA provision as the basis
for his claim. But given his allegations that he was wrongfully denied benefits under
an “ERISA policy,” the district court liberally construed his complaint as raising a
claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which authorizes an ERISA-plan
“participant or beneficiary” to sue “to recover benefits due to him under the terms
3 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 4 of 8
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”
The district court then granted SIX’s motion to dismiss, but it did so without
prejudice to Morris’s ability to file an amended complaint demonstrating SIX’s
connection to the alleged wrongful denial of benefits. Morris did not file an amended
complaint. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Union,
determining that Union correctly denied the claim under the terms of the life-
insurance policy. The court reasoned that dependent life-insurance coverage for
Morris’s ex-wife had ended before her death because she was no longer his “lawful
spouse” as of the date of divorce. Morris now appeals.
II.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, Leib v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301,
1305 (11th Cir. 2009), as well as the grant of a motion for summary judgment,
Moorman v. UnumProvident Corp., 464 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006).
III.
Morris argues that the district court erred in forcing him to proceed under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), that he stated a plausible claim against SIX because SIX
offered the policy under which, in Morris’s view, benefits were owed, and that the
4 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 5 of 8
court erred by failing to compel SIX to pay dependent benefits following the death
of his ex-wife. We disagree with each of these arguments.
A.
First, the district court did not err by liberally construing Morris’s complaint
to raise a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). That provision of ERISA
authorizes a participant in or beneficiary of an ERISA plan to bring a civil action “to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Because Morris filed suit “pursuant to . . . ERISA” to recover “death beneficiary
proceeds” he claimed were owed under an “ERISA policy,” the district court
properly construed his claim as one “to recover benefits due to him under the terms
of his plan” under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Morris cites no alternative ERISA provision he
could have proceeded under, nor does he explain why he believes he was prejudiced
by the district court’s construction.
Furthermore, any state-law claim that Morris’s complaint may have raised
was preempted by § 1132(a). That provision exerts a strong preemptive power that
converts state-law claims into federal ERISA claims. Conn. State Dental Ass’n v.
Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009). Morris suggests
that he has a claim for breach of contract against SIX, but that claim is preempted
because he could have brought it under § 1132(a), and its resolution depends upon
the interpretation of provisions contained within his ERISA policy. See id. at 1344–
5 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 6 of 8
45. Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Morris’s sole claim was one
under § 1132(a)(1)(B).
B.
Second, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a claim against SIX, Morris’s employer. The court concluded that SIX was not
liable under § 1132(a) because nothing in the complaint indicated that the denial of
benefits was caused by any impropriety on SIX’s part. The court noted that the
policy itself gave Union “sole discretionary authority” over the benefits decision,
that Union alone issued the decision denying Morris’s claim for benefits and his
appeal based on its interpretation of the policy, and that Morris had not alleged any
impropriety in SIX’s handling of the claim paperwork before Union made its
decision. The court therefore concluded that any improper denial of benefits was
attributable to Union, not to SIX. Morris does not identify any specific problem with
the court’s reasoning, and we find that it is consistent with our precedent. See
Hamilton v. Allen-Bradley Co., Inc., 244 F.3d 819, 824–25 (11th Cir. 2001); Rosen
v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191, 193–94 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Hunt v. Hawthorne
Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 888, 907–08 (11th Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, Morris is incorrect that the district court did not give him a
chance to amend his complaint before dismissal. While the court dismissed his
complaint against SIX, it did so without prejudice and with leave to file an amended
6 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 7 of 8
complaint. Morris did not so do. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
granting SIX’s motion to dismiss.
C.
In any event, even if we assume that the district court erred by dismissing SIX
from the lawsuit, the error was harmless. In granting summary judgment to Union
on the merits of Morris’s claim for unpaid benefits, the district court determined that
Union correctly denied benefits under the terms of the life insurance policy.
Morris’s claim against SIX is based solely on those same policy terms, not on any
specific or additional wrongdoing by SIX. For that reason, if the court is correct that
Morris’s claim failed against Union, that means that his claim also fails against SIX.
When reviewing the denial of benefits under an ERISA plan, we first consider
whether, applying de novo review, the decision to deny benefits was the correct one.
Capone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 592 F.3d 1189, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010). If we agree
that the decision was correct, we “end the inquiry and affirm the decision.” Id. If
we find that the decision was incorrect, we may apply more deferential standards
depending on whether the decision was discretionary and whether the decision
maker operated under a conflict of interest. See id.
Here, we agree with the district court that Union’s decision to deny benefits
was the correct one under the terms of Morris’s life-insurance policy. Morris’s
policy provided coverage to “eligible dependent[s],” which included a “lawful
7 Case: 18-10785 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 8 of 8
spouse.” Coverage ended if a dependent was no longer “eligible.” It follows that,
because Morris’s ex-wife was not his “lawful spouse” as of the date of their divorce,
she ceased to be an “eligible” dependent as of that same date. See Killough v.
Flowers, 843 So. 2d 770, 773 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (stating that “a trial court’s
divorce judgment completely and finally dissolves the marital relationship between
husband and wife on the date of its entry” (quotation marks omitted)). So, by the
time of Morris’s ex-wife’s death nearly two months later, any dependent coverage
had ended. Morris’s assertion that he is a “named beneficiary”—in the sense that he
may have been entitled to benefits notwithstanding the divorce—finds no support in
the language of the policy.
Because Union’s decision to deny benefits was de novo correct, we “end the
inquiry and affirm the decision.” Capone, 592 F.3d at 1195.
IV.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment against Morris on
his claim for unpaid benefits under an ERISA plan.
AFFIRMED.