David French v. Kate Hillman

Fourth Circuit

David French v. Kate Hillman

331 F.2d 305, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 5695

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedApril 15, 1964

Docket9060

StatusPublished

This text of 331 F.2d 305 (David French v. Kate Hillman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

David French v. Kate Hillman, 331 F.2d 305, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 5695 (4th Cir. 1964).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this action of ejectment, the plaintiff’s contention that he is the lawful owner of the real estate in controversy is bottomed upon a claim of constructive possession under color of title. The plaintiff claims under a deed which, unquestionably, conveyed to his predecessor in title a tract adjoining the land in dispute. He points to some words in the deed which might include the tract in dispute as well as the tract clearly intended to be conveyed. The District Judge, however, did not so construe the deed. He held that if the language upon which the plaintiff relies is inconsistent with the deed’s reference to the remote grantor’s source of title, the later reference discloses the specific intention of the parties and is controlling notwithstanding the earlier language susceptible of a broader construction. The District Judge concluded that the deed to the plaintiff’s immediate predecessor in title did not give his predecessor color of title to the land in dispute.

After full consideration of the briefs and the argument of counsel, we conclude that the District Judge properly decided the threshold question. We, therefore, affirm for the reasons stated by him in support of his conclusion that the plaintiff’s predecessor had no color of title to the disputed land. 1

Affirmed.

1

. See French v. Hillman, et al., W.D.Va., 216 F.Supp. 117.

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PER CURIAM.

In this action of ejectment, the plaintiff’s contention that he is the lawful owner of the real estate in controversy is bottomed upon a claim of constructive possession under color of title. The plaintiff claims under a deed which, unquestionably, conveyed to his predecessor in title a tract adjoining the land in dispute. He points to some words in the deed which might include the tract in dispute as well as the tract clearly intended to be conveyed. The District Judge, however, did not so construe the deed. He held that if the language upon which the plaintiff relies is inconsistent with the deed’s reference to the remote grantor’s source of title, the later reference discloses the specific intention of the parties and is controlling notwithstanding the earlier language susceptible of a broader construction. The District Judge concluded that the deed to the plaintiff’s immediate predecessor in title did not give his predecessor color of title to the land in dispute.

After full consideration of the briefs and the argument of counsel, we conclude that the District Judge properly decided the threshold question. We, therefore, affirm for the reasons stated by him in support of his conclusion that the plaintiff’s predecessor had no color of title to the disputed land. 1

Affirmed.

1

. See French v. Hillman, et al., W.D.Va., 216 F.Supp. 117.

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331 F.2d 305, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 5695, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-french-v-kate-hillman-ca4-1964.

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