David & Francis Mears v. Marvin Smith III

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 29, 2024
• Docket: 01-23-00345-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued October 29, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00345-CV ——————————— DAVID AND FRANCIS MEARS, Appellants V. MARVIN SMITH III, Appellee

On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-51626

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David and Frances Mears sued their neighbor Marvin Smith, III, alleging that

he threatened Frances and trespassed on their property. The Mearses asserted claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, nuisance, trespass, and

assault. Smith moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on all claims. The Mearses did not respond, and the trial court granted the motion. In their sole issue

on appeal, the Mearses contend that Smith’s no-evidence motion was legally

insufficient because it did not specifically challenge the essential elements of their

claims. Finding no error, we affirm.

After adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary judgment

under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) on the ground that there is no evidence

of one or more essential elements of a claim on which the opposing party would

have the burden of proof at trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Roventini v. Ocular

Scis., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 719, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

Rule 166a(i) requires that no-evidence motions “be specific in challenging the

evidentiary support for an element of a claim or defense.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a,

comment – 1997. That is, the motion must specifically challenge an element or

elements of the opposing party’s claim. But “a specific attack on the evidentiary

components that might prove a certain element is unnecessary, as long as the element

itself is specifically challenged.” Gary E. Patterson & Assocs., P.C. v. Holub, 264

S.W.3d 180, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). Conclusory

motions or general no-evidence challenges to an opponent’s case are legally

insufficient. Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009)

(analogizing specificity requirement to “fair notice” pleading requirement and

2 noting its purpose “is to provide the opposing party with adequate information to

oppose the motion, and to define the issues” for summary judgment).

Contrary to the Mearses’ contention that Smith’s no-evidence motion was

conclusory and only generally alleged that they had no evidence, the motion

sufficiently identified and challenged at least one element of each claim. For

example, Smith’s motion expressly identified and challenged the four elements of

the Mearses’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, separately listing each

element of the cause of action and stating that the Mearses “have produced no

evidence on any of these elements.” See Colson v. Grohman, 24 S.W.3d 414, 421

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (discussing elements of cause of

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress). For the trespass claim, Smith

set out the elements of entry onto another’s property without the owner’s consent

and asserted that the Mearses had produced no evidence of any of these elements or

damages. See Envt’l Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414,

419 (Tex. 2015) (discussing elements of trespass claim). And Smith did the same for

the Mearses’ other claims.

This Court has held that similar motions satisfied Rule 166a(i). See, e.g.,

Garry E. Patterson & Assocs., 264 S.W.3d at 200–01 (no-evidence motion for

summary judgment satisfied Rule 166a(i) because it identified elements of claims

and asserted there was no evidence of all or some elements); Roventini, 111 S.W.3d

3 at 723–24 (same). Consistent with those authorities and because Smith identified

and challenged at least one element (and in most cases all elements) of the Mearses’

claims, we hold that his no-evidence motion was specific enough to satisfy Rule

166a(i). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Gary E. Patterson & Assocs., 264 S.W.3d at

201. We therefore overrule the Mearses’ sole issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Sarah Beth Landau Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.